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Individuals with intellectual disabilities (ID) are at an increased risk of abuse and are thus more 
likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system (CJS).  Research examining this 
group’s eyewitness skills is limited, particularly in relation to adults with ID, but it does suggest 
that they can be reliable and accurate witnesses.  However, there remain significant gaps in 
the existing literature.  The current research focused on three key areas of eyewitness 
testimony: investigative interviewing, line-up identification and juror perceptions.  In the first 
study, adults with ID and mental age (MA) matched typically developing (TD) children, were 
shown two separate but similar eyewitness films. Recall occurred at three points: following a 
delay of around 45 minutes, a delay of one week and, for half of the participants, a further 
delay of one week.  Participants were also asked to identify the two perpetrators (from the 
eyewitness films) from sequentially presented identification line-ups.  Overall, the adults with 
ID recalled just as much information as the TD children, whilst producing few source 
monitoring errors, confabulations and contradictions.  However, the adults with ID found the 
identification line-ups particularly challenging, evidenced by low identification accuracy rates, 
problems in recalling the non-biased line-up instructions and understanding the line-up’s 
purpose.  In an investigation of the usefulness of cognitive measures (e.g., memory and 
language) in predicting eyewitness performance, facial and verbal memory were discovered to 
be significant predictors of amount of correct information recalled for both groups, but facial 
memory was not predictive of line-up identification accuracy.  The second study examined 
how level of recall and provision of witness information affected mock jurors’ perceived 
credibility of evidence from witnesses with ID.  This group were perceived to be honest and 
believable, but their evidence was not perceived to be very complete. Provision of witness 
information did not have a detrimental impact on perceived credibility.  In summary, adults 
with ID can be reliable witnesses however, their ability to accurately identify a perpetrator 
from an identification line-up is impoverished.  These results have important practical 
implications, not only with specific reference to the police investigation process, but also in 
relation to several aspects of the criminal justice system. 
 
 
Keywords: Intellectual disabilities, eyewitness skills, investigative interviews, identification line-
ups, individual differences, mock juror perceptions 
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1.1     Introduction and Overview  
Eyewitnesses play a vital role in the Criminal Justice System (CJS), being relied upon heavily to 
provide both detailed information about a witnessed event, as well as identification of a 
perpetrator.  Given the importance of this ‘eyewitness testimony’ and the fact that it is often 
the main form of evidence in an investigation (Kebbell & Davies, 2006), gaining a thorough 
understanding of the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness testimony, together with the 
factors that might affect it, is of the utmost importance.   
 
For decades researchers have concerned themselves with studies of eyewitness testimony in 
the general population as a whole, whilst vulnerable groups, such as those with intellectual 
disabilities (ID), have been overlooked. Yet there is a greater likelihood of individuals with ID 
coming into contact with the CJS because they are at an increased risk of either witnessing 
abuse or being victims of abuse than individuals without ID (Reiter, Bryen & Shachar, 2007; 
Sullivan & Knutson, 2000).  Moreover, the abuse suffered is likely to be repeated and sustained 
(McDonnell, Breen, Deveau, Goulding & Smyth, 2014) often spanning a number of years 
(McCormack, Kavanagh, Caffrey & Power, 2005) and involving more than one perpetrator 
(Cambridge, Beadle-Brown, Milne, Mansell & Whelton, 2006). Yet this group’s access to justice 
appears thwarted by both police officers’ and jurors’ commonly held beliefs regarding their 
credibility and reliability as witnesses (Brennan & Brennan, 1994; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). 
 
In view of the above, it is evident just how crucial it is that we gain a thorough understanding 
of this group’s eyewitness skills and yet, as will become evident during the course of this 
literature review, research in this area is limited.   This chapter seeks to provide an overview of 
two key areas of eyewitness testimony, i.e., verbal recall of a witnessed event and visual 
identification of a perpetrator, together with an examination of the factors that can affect it.  It 
also includes a discussion of ID, including its diagnosis, associated cognitive deficits and 
incidence of abuse against individuals in this group, as well as an examination of the 
importance of perceived accuracy and reliability of eyewitness evidence in the courtroom. The 
chapter finishes with a brief exploration of the potential usefulness of individual differences on 






1.2 Eyewitness Testimony 
Eyewitness testimony incorporates both the verbal recall of a witnessed event (i.e., a crime) as 
well as the visual identification of a perpetrator from an identification line-up.  The provision of 
an accurate and reliable account, from either a witness or victim of crime, affords the 
investigating police officer the information necessary to ascertain what (if anything) has 
occurred and who committed the crime (Milne & Bull, 2006).  Eyewitness testimony often 
provides the main source of leads in police investigations (Kebbell & Milne, 1998) and it is just 
as important in the courtroom, where it can have a very powerful effect on the jury decision 
making process (Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, 1990; Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, 1988).  Indeed, as 
Wells, Memon and Penrod (2006) rightly point out, testimony from an eyewitness who has no 
reason whatsoever to be untruthful can be an extremely convincing form of evidence for a 
jury. 
 
Yet, eyewitness testimony is not infallible. Eyewitnesses can and often do get things wrong, 
resulting in catastrophic outcomes for those on the receiving end of their inaccurate 
eyewitness evidence. Many of those wrongfully convicted can lose several years of their lives, 
sometimes decades, being incarcerated for crimes they did not commit, or worse still, as is the 
case in some states in the United States, find themselves on death row (Innocence Project, 
2017).   In fact, according to the Innocence Project in the United States, inaccurate eyewitness 
testimony has played a role in over 70% of convictions which have subsequently been 
overturned through DNA testing. Here in the UK it was the publication of the Devlin Report in 
1976 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 1976) that finally drew attention to the fact 
that eyewitness testimony, specifically identification evidence, was not always reliable. This 
report came about in response to the individual cases of Laszlo Virag and Luke Dougherty. 
Both men, although subsequently exonerated, were convicted for crimes they had not 
committed, based on mistaken identification.  In concluding his investigation into the law and 
procedures for identification at that time, Lord Devlin recommended that prosecution cases 
should not be brought about on eyewitness evidence alone. However, this recommendation 
was never made law and eyewitness testimony continues to be relied upon heavily in order to 
bring about a successful prosecution. 
 
1.2.1  Factors Affecting Eyewitness Testimony 
Contrary to popular belief, memory is not like a video recorder, it doesn’t record every minute 
detail of an experience or witnessed event ready to be played back whenever requested.  
Memory is fragile, it is a process of reconstruction open to distortion and failure at encoding, 
storage and retrieval (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe & Kingma, 1990).  There are several factors that 
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can affect every day memory as a whole and eyewitness testimony specifically and these are 
discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow. 
 
1.2.2  Delay 
In a ground-breaking experiment, Ebbinghaus (1885) demonstrated, through his own learning 
of nonsense syllables, how forgetting increases over time. He discovered that, without 
rehearsal, forgetting was greatest very soon after learning, with around 50% of information 
being forgotten within an hour. After a delay period of one week forgetting begins to level off.  
There is currently very little research that has explored the actual period of delay at various 
stages in real life investigation cases.  However, research examining the length of time 
between first reporting and trial suggest delays ranging from a few months to a number of 
years (e.g. Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009). 
 
Delayed recall of information regarding a witnessed event can be extremely problematic for 
eyewitnesses.  The longer the interval between an experienced or witnessed event and any 
subsequent questioning can result in a decrease in both the amount and accuracy of 
information recalled (Ebbesen & Rienick, 1998; Odinot & Walters, 2006).  This effect is not just 
specific to verbal recall of a witnessed event.  A meta-analysis of 53 identification studies 
carried out by Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty and Penrod (2008) revealed that the 
accuracy of face recognition also decreases as the length of the retention interval increases. 
 
1.2.3  System and Estimator Variables 
Several variables both within and outside of the control of CJS can have an impact on 
eyewitness testimony.  The former are referred to as ‘system’ variables and include factors 
such as line-up construction, mode of presentation and line-up instructions, whereas the latter 
are referred to as ‘estimator’ variables (as their effect can only be ‘estimated’), and include 
factors such as witness characteristics (Wells, 1978).  These estimator variables can be further 
split into 3 categories: situational variables (e.g., seriousness of crime, stress and weapon focus 
effect), perpetrator factors (e.g., facial distinctiveness or attractiveness) and witness factors 
(e.g., age and intelligence/cognitive abilities) (Narby, Cutler & Penrod, 1996). 
 
Of particular importance to the research presented in this thesis are witness factors, for 
example age and cognitive abilities.  Both the eyewitness accounts and person descriptions of 
young children are often much less complete than older children and adults (Goodman & 
Reed, 1986; Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms, & Aman, 1990) and in addition, children’s identification 
accuracy on line-ups (both perpetrator present and absent) is much lower (Fitzgerald & Price, 
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2015), although this does appear to improve with age (Brigham, Van Verst, & Bothwell, 1986; 
Karageorge & Zajac, 2011). Similar findings have been reported at the other end of the age 
scale with older witnesses providing less accurate recall of an event (Coxon & Valentine, 1997) 
and also being less accurate on identification line-ups (Memon, Bartlett, Rose & Gray, 2003; 
Wilcock, Bull & Vrij, 2007). 
 
Studies examining the relationship between intelligence (another witness factor) and 
eyewitness testimony, in the general population at least, are scarce and overall provide very 
little evidence of any association (e.g., Brown, Deffenbacher & Sturgill, 1977).  With regards to 
verbal ability, Shapiro and Penrod (1986) in their meta-analysis of 128 facial identification 
studies found that high verbal ability was related to increased line-up identification accuracy.  
Whether or not intelligence and cognitive abilities in adults with ID are related to particular 
aspects of eyewitness testimony, such as amount and accuracy of information recalled and 
performance on the identification line-ups, will be explored in the relevant sections of this 
thesis. 
 
1.3      Intellectual Disability 
1.3.1 Cognitive Profile and Prevalence 
ID can vary in severity, from mild (IQ of approximately 55 to 70) through to profound (IQ of 
less than 20) and the level of ID has traditionally been defined by cognitive ability, i.e., IQ tests.  
In recent years however, there has been a shift away from diagnoses solely reliant on IQ 
towards a more person-centred approach to diagnosis, underpinned by assessments of an 
individual’s adaptive functioning (skills required to carry out everyday tasks) as well as 
cognitive abilities.  According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5, 2013) the criteria for a formal 
diagnosis of ID are: (1) commencement of symptoms during childhood, (2) an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below i.e. around two standard deviations or more below the general 
population, and (3) deficits in adaptive functioning (across the conceptual, social and practical 
domains).   
 
There are a number of known causes of ID which can occur either before birth, for example 
due to chromosomal abnormalities such as Down syndrome and foetal alcohol syndrome, or 
during / after birth, such as trauma (during birth), prematurity and infections. However, for 
many of those diagnosed with ID, the exact cause is unclear (British Institute of Learning 
Disabilities (BILD), 2011).  Whilst it is extremely difficult to provide definitive figures regarding  
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prevalence rates, it is estimated that around 2% of the general population in the UK has ID 
(Emerson & Hatton, 2008).   It is further estimated that approximately 80% of those diagnosed 
as having ID fall within the mild range (Henry, Bettenay & Carney, 2011). 
 
Individuals with ID can exhibit cognitive and adaptive deficiencies in areas such as attention, 
memory, face recognition, language and communication (Henry et. al., 2011).  Attention plays 
a crucial role in many aspects of everyday life (Eysenck & Keane, 2010), and is especially 
important for eyewitness memory where it influences an individual’s ability to attend to, 
commit to memory (encode) and later recall details about a witnessed event. With regards to 
the attentional abilities of adults with ID, Sterr (2004), in a test of everyday attention, found 
that the performance of this group was deficient compared to that of their non-ID peers. 
Individuals with ID have also been found to demonstrate memorial deficits in certain areas 
such as working memory (a component of memory responsible for the temporary storage of 
information) (Swanson & Siegel, 2001) and long-term memory (Nolan, Cottle & Walker, 1985) 
which in turn could have a negative effect on the encoding, retention and subsequent retrieval 
of information. In relation to face recognition skills in adults with ID, these have been found to 
be deficient compared with non-ID peers (Gawrylowicz, Gabbert, Carson, Lindsay & Hancock, 
2013). Whilst individuals with ID commonly exhibit deficits in general communication skills 
(Belva, Matson, Sipes & Bamburg, 2011), they can experience specific problems in providing 
detailed narrative accounts (Murfett, Powell & Snow, 2008) and demonstrate difficulties in the 
use of pragmatic language (using language appropriately in social interactions) (Abbeduto & 
Hesketh, 1997; Hatton, 1998). Taken as a collective, these impairments could have a 
detrimental impact on several facets of eyewitness skills, such as provision of accurate and 
intelligible evidence and the correct identification of a perpetrator, which in turn, may 
contribute to witnesses with ID being perceived as less credible and more suggestible. 
 
1.3.2 Cognitive Development in Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities 
Two of the main models of cognitive development in children with ID are the ‘developmental’ 
and ‘difference’ approaches.  Advocates of the developmental approach maintain that 
individuals with ID proceed through exactly the same stages of cognitive development, in the 
same sequence, as those without ID.  The pace of progression is however, slower for those 
with ID and the final level of development is lower than those without ID (Weisz, 1990).  As a 
result, individuals with ID will exhibit similar levels of development as those at a comparative 
level of cognitive functioning, i.e., those of a similar mental age (MA).  Conversely, those who 
support the difference approach assert that the cognitive development of children with ID is 
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not the same as those without ID, it is qualitatively different (Mundy & Kasari, 1990).  In this 
respect the cognitive development of children with ID lags behind MA. 
Unlike the supporters of the developmental approach who favour the use of a control group 
matched for MA, those who advocate a difference approach have traditionally employed 
control groups matched for chronological age (CA).   The argument here is that if the 
performance of CA matched groups (i.e., those with and without ID), is comparative, this helps 
to identify cognitive abilities that have been unaffected by ID.  However, this argument has 
been criticised by supporters of the developmental approach who contend that being unable 
to find any differences between groups does not provide evidence to support the assertion 
that group performance is comparative.   Instead it is more probable that such a result is due 
to methodological issues rather than a definitive attribute of the group under review (Burack, 
Russo, Flores, Iarocci & Zigler, 2012). 
 
1.3.3 Prevalence of Abuse Amongst those with Intellectual Disabilities 
Individuals with ID are at an increased risk of either witnessing abuse or being victims of abuse 
compared to individuals without ID (Reiter et al., 2007; Sullivan & Knutson, 2000; Westcott & 
Jones, 1999).   According to an investigation carried out in 2015 by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), across 106 councils in England there were 4,748 reports of sexual abuse 
against adults with disabilities during the period 2013 – 2015.  Of these cases, 63% were 
against people with intellectual disabilities (Learning Disability Today, 2015).  Of course, these 
cases merely relate to those reported, thus the prevalence of abuse against individuals with ID 
is in many respects an unquantifiable entity (Brown, Stein & Turk, 1995). The immeasurable 
nature of abuse is likely exacerbated by the fact that many crimes go unreported (McCarthy & 
Johnson, 1997) and the reasons for this appear multi-faceted. Limited life experiences, lack of 
knowledge and understanding of the laws governing sex, not realising an offence has been 
committed (O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2007), fear of retribution or loss of care (Mansell, Sobsey 
& Calder, 1992; McCormack et al., 2005) can all be contributory factors in non-reporting. 
Moreover, conviction rates in cases involving abuse against individuals with ID are often very 
low. For example, in cases of sexual abuse of adults with ID, it is estimated that out of 
approximately 1,400 cases reported each year only 1% results in a successful conviction 
(Mencap, 2001). 
 
Because many crimes against individuals with ID are likely to go unreported there is little 
chance of perpetrators being caught and convicted. Consequently, individuals with ID may be 
seen as easy targets which leaves them open to sustained abuse. In an institutionalised setting,  
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where there is an imbalance of power between those with ID and their carers’, individuals may 
experience multiple abuses by multiple perpetrators (Cambridge et al., 2006; McDonnell et al., 
2014).  Indeed, in a study of reported allegations of abuse in just two local authorities, 
Cambridge, Mansell, Beadle-Brown, Milne and Whelton (2011) found that 33% of the 
confirmed cases involved multiple abuses or multiple perpetrators.  In such instances the 
ability of eyewitnesses to discriminate between numerous similar events committed by a 
number of different individuals is vital.  However, it can be difficult to separate memory details 
when events are similar (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). As such, multiple instances of 
abuse may create source monitoring issues i.e., the inability to differentiate between the 
actual memory of the event (the experience) and other subsequent memory sources e.g., 
thoughts about the event (Memon, 1998), as well as problems with source misattribution, i.e., 
confusing the actual memory origin.  This is especially pertinent as research suggests that 
individuals with ID exhibit general deficits in source monitoring (Lorsbach & Ewing,1995).  In 
this thesis, memory for two separate but similar events will thus be examined. 
 
1.3.4 Criminal Justice Professionals’ Perceptions of Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities 
Even when crimes are reported individuals with ID may be subject to ‘secondary victimisation’ 
by professionals within the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Research suggests that even when 
individuals with ID report an offence to police they are not taken seriously (Sharp, 2001) which 
is likely underpinned by a common perception amongst CJS professionals that individuals with 
ID make less reliable witnesses, provide less accurate eyewitness evidence and are highly 
susceptible to suggestibility (Brennan & Brennan, 1994).  Nathanson and Platt (2005) asked 39 
attorneys to complete a questionnaire regarding the perceived eyewitness skills of adults and 
children without ID, as well as children with ID.  They found that the majority of attorneys not 
only considered the recall of children with ID to be less detailed and contain more 
inconsistencies than those without ID but perceived this group to be less likely to accurately 
identify a perpetrator from an identification line-up.  Moreover, the children with ID were 
perceived to be much more suggestible than their typically developing (TD) peers. 
 
Such perceptions also appear to be pervasive amongst jurors, who may perceive witnesses 
with ID to be authentic and truthful but still struggle to accept their evidence as credible 







1.4 Interviewing Witnesses 
The interviewing of witnesses is a key element of the investigation process (Vrij, Hope & 
Fisher, 2014) and the provision of an accurate and detailed account of a witnessed event is 
inextricably bound with the ability of the witness to successfully retrieve information about the 
event from memory, as well as the manner in which a police officer questions the witness 
(McLean, 1995). 
 
With regards to the retrieval of information from memory, it has already been pointed out at 
the beginning of this chapter that memory is a reconstructive process which can be affected by 
a wide variety of factors, resulting in distortion and failure. We turn now to look at some of 
these factors and how they can affect recall of a witnessed event.  
 
1.4.1 Factors Affecting Verbal Recall at Interview 
Schemas refer to mental concepts that are underpinned by knowledge about the world (Grote-
Garcia, 2011). These schemas consist of information relating to what we think should happen 
or indeed, expect to happen, in given situations for example, what to expect during a trip to 
the supermarket.  Schemas can be extremely beneficial to memory, helping us to make sense 
of events and experiences by filling in any gaps in order to produce a reconstruction.  
However, they can also distort memory, as these gaps might be filled with information based 
on what we feel is supposed to happen in a given situation, rather than what actually 
happened (Eysenck & Keane, 2010).   In a study that explored the impact of schemas on 
eyewitness memory for a bank robbery, Tuckey and Brewer (2003) discovered that where 
witnesses were exposed to ambiguous information, for example, a robber pointing to a bag as 
if there was a gun in it, participants used schema-consistent information (e.g., that bank 
robberies involve a gun) to make sense of the ambiguous elements of the crime. 
 
Memories of an event can also be affected by interference, which can be either proactive, 
where old memories or experiences from a previous event disrupt the retention of new 
memories, or retroactive, where new memories or experiences disrupt the retention of old 
memories (Eysenck & Keane, 2010).  The misinformation effect, where memory is distorted 
following exposure to new information, is a good example of retroactive interference and a 
considerable amount of pioneering research has been carried out in this area by Elizabeth 
Loftus.  In one of Loftus’ first experiments into the misinformation effect (Loftus & Palmer, 
1974) she showed participants films depicting motor vehicle accidents and asked them to 
estimate the speed at which the vehicles had been travelling.  The wording of the questions 
was manipulated so that the verbs inferred the speed of the vehicles.  Loftus and Palmer found 
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that those participants who were asked “how fast were the cars going when they ‘smashed’ 
into each other?” provided higher estimates of speed than those who were asked the same 
question with the word ‘smashed’ replaced with ‘hit’.  Moreover, a week after viewing the 
films, in comparison to those in the ‘hit’ condition, participants in the ‘smashed’ condition 
were more likely to respond ‘yes’ when asked if they had seen broken glass, despite there 
being none in the film.    
 
Another example of how exposure to subsequent misinformation can distort memory for an 
event is that of memory conformity, which occurs when memories for an event are influenced 
by information obtained from other people.  This can be especially problematic where there 
are multiple witnesses, as research studies have demonstrated how easily information 
discussed between co-witnesses can be incorporated into another witness’s account (e.g., 
Gabbert, Memon, Allan & Wright, 2004; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Wright & Schwartz, 2010). 
Indeed, there are a number of real-life cases, such as the murder of Jill Dando in 1999 (Wright, 
Memon, Skagerberg & Gabbert, 2009) and the Oklahoma bombing in 1995, where memory 
conformity appears to have had an impact on eyewitness testimony (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 
2003; Memon & Wright, 1999).   
 
1.4.2 The Cognitive Interview 
As already mentioned at the start of the chapter, eyewitness evidence plays a pivotal role in 
the investigation process and at the heart of obtaining an accurate and detailed account of a 
witnessed crime, is good investigative interviewing.  But how can police officers ensure that 
they obtain a full and accurate account from witnesses?  In the 1980s this question, along with 
an acceptance of the inefficacy of current police interviewing techniques, led researchers to 
investigate the most effective method of eliciting a detailed eyewitness account, without 
compromising accuracy.  Utilising psychological knowledge about the process of remembering 
and retrieval, as well as theories of memory (e.g., the encoding specificity hypothesis (Tulving 
& Thomson, 1973) and multiple trace theory (Bower, 1967)), Geiselman et al. (1984) 
developed the Cognitive Interview (CI). 
 
The CI sought to overcome many of the problems that were evident with police interviewing 
practice at that time, such as inappropriate question use, which resulted in a lack of detailed 
and accurate eyewitness evidence (Geiselman et al., 1984).  The CI can be split into four 
distinct sections as follows: (1) Mental context re-instatement (MCR), (2) Report everything, 
(3) Reverse order and (4) Change perspective.  The theoretical perspective underpinning these 
different sections or retrieval techniques is that of multiple trace theory (Bower, 1967).  This 
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theory proposes that our memories do not exist as distinct, unrelated events, but instead our 
memories consist of a pathway of interconnected associations.  As such there may be several 
ways that recall can be prompted.   Thus, if one of the CI techniques fails to aid retrieval of a 
memory, another technique may prove more successful (Memon, 1998). 
 
The MCR instruction encourages witnesses to take themselves back to the event by forming an 
image in their mind of the environment, to think about the sounds, smells etc., and how they 
were physically feeling at the time of the event.  This technique is underpinned by the 
‘encoding specificity hypothesis’ which asserts that reinstating the context in which 
information was originally encoded improves access to the stored information (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973).  In a particularly interesting study of context re-instatement in a naturalistic 
setting, Godden and Baddeley (1975) asked divers to learn a list of words either on dry land or 
underwater.  They subsequently asked the divers to recall the list of words either in the same 
environment in which the words were learnt or a completely different one.  They found that 
recall of the words was better when the learning and recall environments were the same.  A 
beneficial effect of context re-instatement, both mental and physical, on recall has since been 
found in a number of research studies (e.g. Bramão, Karlsson & Johansson, 2017; Smith & Vela, 
2001; Wong & Reed, 2011). 
 
The ‘report everything’ instruction is aimed at encouraging witnesses to provide a free recall 
narrative of every detail remembered, even information that might not be considered 
relevant.  This is a particularly useful prompt because witnesses may refrain from reporting 
certain information by mistakenly believing it has no investigative relevance (Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon & Holland, 1986) or thinking that the police may already have a lot of 
information about the witnessed event (Milne & Bull, 1999).   
 
With the ‘reverse order’ technique witnesses are initially asked to recall the event in 
chronological order (from beginning to end) and then encouraged to recall the witnessed 
event in a number of different orders, e.g., working backwards from the end to the beginning 
(Wilcock, Bull & Milne, 2008).  The idea behind this is that when recall occurs this usually 
happens in the order in which it occurred. However, one of the primary concerns here is that 
witnesses may use schemas or scripts about what they believe typically happens in a given 
situation which in turn may result in inaccuracies (the effect of schemas on memory have 
already been discussed in section 1.3.1 above). By asking a witness to recall the event in a 
different order the use of schemas or scripts is countered.  Geiselman and Callot (1990) 
demonstrated the effectiveness of utilising such a strategy by asking witnesses to recall an 
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event in chronological order first and then in reverse order. They found that witnesses asked 
to recall in this order produced more correct information than witnesses who were asked to 
recall the event twice in chronological order.  However, it is important to note here that other 
researchers have reported that changing the order of recall has resulted in a reduction in the 
amount of correct information recalled, together with an increase in confabulations (Dando, 
Ormerod, Wilcock, & Milne, 2011; Davis, McMahon & Greenwood, 2005). 
 
In the case of the ‘change perspective’ technique witnesses are requested to recall the event 
from another person’s perspective, i.e., to mentally put themselves’ in another person’s shoes, 
such as another witness or the victim. The objective with this, as with the ‘reverse order’ 
element of the CI, is to reduce the impact that existing schemas or scripts might have on recall.  
One of the main concerns with instructing witnesses to change perspective is that they might 
feel as if they have to ‘make information up’ perhaps because they find it difficult to put 
themselves in someone else’s place.   
 
Whilst overall, the CI was of huge benefit to the police and resulted in the elicitation of much 
more detailed witness accounts (Köhnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999) it became evident that 
further guidelines were required concerning the management of social and communicative 
aspects of a police interview.  This resulted in a revision to the CI which became known as the 
Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI).  The ECI is comprised of 7 distinct phases: (1) Establish 
rapport, (2) Explanation of interview aims, (3) Free recall, (4) Questioning, (5) Retrieval, (6) 
Summary and (7) Closure (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).  
 
The main aims of the rapport building phase are to open a dialogue with the witness, and to 
put them at ease, with the interviewer adopting an active listening role.  In the second phase, 
which includes the ‘report everything’ instruction, it’s important for the interviewer to let the 
witness know what exactly is expected of them and to let the witness feel as if they have 
control over the interview.  The third phase involves the context reinstatement instruction and 
free report, with the fourth phase consisting of detailed questioning of the witness, using open 
and closed questions where suitable.  In the fifth phase witnesses may be asked to change the 
order of recall as well as perspective. The sixth phase sees the interviewer summarising what 
the witness has recalled and allows the addition of newly recalled information if necessary, 
while the final phase brings the interview to a close, by thanking the witness and addressing 





1.4.3  The (Enhanced) Cognitive Interview versus the Structured Interview 
The efficacy of both the CI and ECI has since been explored in numerous studies, often in 
comparison to a structured or standard police interview.  The structured interview (SI) is 
commonly based on best practice interviewing guidelines, such as Achieving Best Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and guidance on using 
special measures’ (ABE; Ministry of Justice, 2011) and thus incorporates phases of rapport, 
free narrative, and questioning. However, unlike the CI or ECI, the structured interview does 
not include the cognitive components: MCR, reverse order or change perspective techniques. 
 
The beneficial effect that the (E)CI has in increasing the amount of information recalled (in 
comparison to a SI) has been demonstrated in both laboratory studies (e.g., Geiselman et al., 
1986) and in the field (e.g., Fisher, Geiselman & Amador, 1989).  Moreover, Kӧhnken et al. 
(1999) in their meta-analysis of research in this area found that use of the CI resulted in the 
recall of significantly more correct information than a SI (or standard interview) in 51 out of 
the 55 studies reviewed. These findings were further corroborated by a subsequent meta-
analysis carried out by Memon, Meissner and Fraser (2010), although these researchers 
additionally reported a small increase in incorrect information with the use of the CI. 
 
1.4.4 Use of the Cognitive Interview in the UK 
In 1992, following a review of current police interviewing practices, the PEACE model of 
investigative interviewing was introduced in England and Wales (PEACE stands for planning 
and preparation, engage and explain, account clarification and challenge, closure and 
evaluation – College of Policing, 2017).  The CI, which was an essential component of the 
‘account’ phase of PEACE, became part and parcel of the standard package of interview 
training for police officers (Howitt, 2009).  
 
Following the CI’s introduction as the interview of choice for investigative purposes, Kebbell, 
Milne and Wagstaff (1999) examined both police officer’s perceptions of it, as well as how 
often it was used in the investigative process.  Whilst police officers reported that overall, they 
found the CI useful, certain components of the CI were deemed to be more useful and more 
frequently used than others. For example, establishing rapport was found to be more useful 
and more frequently used than reverse order or change perspective.  In addition, police 
officers expressed concern about using the CI because they perceived it to be time consuming.  
In a more recent study by Dando, Wilcock and Milne (2008) the researchers found that police 
officer’s perceived usage and efficacy of certain elements of the CI were in line with those of 
Kebbell et al. (1999). 
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1.4.5 Use of the Cognitive Interview with Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
A substantial amount of research has been carried out on the effectiveness of the CI in 
improving recall however, almost all of this has focussed on the general population, with very 
little research investigating the impact of the CI on recall of adults with ID. 
 
Research on children with mild to moderate ID has found that use of the CI as opposed to a SI 
results in an increase in the amount of information recalled, including background and 
contextual details, whilst also promoting the provision of a coherent narrative account (Gentle, 
Milne, Powell & Sharman, 2013).  Milne, Sharman, Powell and Mead (2013) in their study of 
children with severe ID also found that the CI resulted in the recall of more correct information 
compared to the SI, with no increase in incorrect details or confabulations (i.e., recall of false 
information that did not occur).  However, there was no difference between the CI and SI with 
regards to the children’s susceptibility to misleading questions (although the researchers did 
point out that the levels of suggestibility overall were fairly low). 
 
In the studies that have included adults with ID, results are broadly similar to those of children 
with ID, especially in relation to the amount of information recalled.  Milne, Clare and Bull 
(1999) showed adults with mild ID a video of a road accident and interviewed them about it 24 
hours later using either a SI or a CI.  The results revealed that the participants interviewed 
using the CI recalled more correct details compared to the SI group, although the CI group 
produced more confabulations, especially in relation to person information. Unsurprisingly, 
the researchers noted that some of the adults with ID appeared to find the reverse order recall 
instruction difficult to understand. 
 
The above findings regarding correct information were further replicated in a study by Clarke, 
Prescott and Milne (2013), again utilising a sample of adults with mild ID.  Use of the CI, as 
opposed to the SI, resulted in almost a 40% increase in correctly recalled information for the 
adults with ID, without any detrimental impact on accuracy.  Whilst use of the CI did not lead 
to an increase in incorrect information, there was no difference between the CI and SI 
conditions with regards to confabulations.  These findings regarding confabulations are 
inconsistent with those of Milne et al.’s (1999) study, where an increase in confabulations with 
the CI was reported.  Of note here though is that Milne et al. (1999) suggest that their findings 
regarding confabulations may have been due to one interviewer’s use of inappropriate 





1.4.6 Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) in Criminal Proceedings 
In the UK, the main document providing guidance for interviewing vulnerable witnesses is the 
ABE (2011).   The ABE provides guidelines, underpinned by best practice, in relation to 
preparing, planning and conducting witness interviews, as well as preparing witnesses for 
court and the actual court appearance itself.  It also sets out the procedures and processes 
that can be put in place to support vulnerable individuals in their role as witnesses. The ABE 
guidelines relate to the interviewing of vulnerable witnesses (including witnesses under 18 
years of age and witnesses with a mental disorder, learning disability or physical disability), as 
well as intimidated and significant (i.e., key) witnesses, but for the purposes of this thesis the 
focus will primarily be on the guidelines specified for witnesses with learning disabilities. 
With regards to the format of the interview that the ABE proposes should be used with 
vulnerable witnesses, this constitutes what is referred to as a ‘phased approach’ and consists 
of four main phases: establishing rapport, initiating and supporting a free narrative account, 
questioning and closure.  The ABE guidelines stress the importance of establishing good 
rapport and where necessary, ensuring that the witness understands the difference between a 
truth and a lie. An uninterrupted free narrative account should be initiated by means of an 
open-ended prompt, with the interviewer adopting an active listening and non-authoritative 
role. It is also suggested that the interviewer bears in mind the susceptibility of individuals with 
ID to acquiesce. ‘Appropriate’ questions, encompassing open-ended and specific-closed should 
then be asked to explore the witness’s account further and whilst the ABE does not caution 
against the use of forced-choice and leading questions, it merely states that these should only 
be used as a ‘last resort’.  Once questioning is complete the interview should be summarised 
and the witness invited to add new information if anything comes to mind and the interview 
closed by thanking the witness and providing contact details in case any other information is 
recalled. 
 
The interview used in this thesis is a detailed witness interview protocol based on current 
police best practice.  It is consistent with the phased approach advised in the ABE guidelines. 
 
1.4.7 Use of Different Question Types 
Research carried out with individuals with ID has found that the amount and accuracy of 
information produced during an interview very much depends on the type of questions used.  
Studies that have examined the impact of different question types on the amount and 
accuracy of information recalled has, for the most part, focussed on children, with only a 




The key findings regarding children and young people with ID are that free and open-ended 
questions are most effective in eliciting accurate information (Collins & Henry, 2016; Gordon, 
Jens, Hollings & Watson, 1994; Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999; 2003) whereas specific questions 
can result in lower accuracy rates (Agnew & Powell, 2004). With regards to misleading 
questions, these can increase levels of suggestibility (Agnew & Powell, 2004; Henry & 
Gudjonsson, 2007) whilst leading closed questions may result in children agreeing with what 
the interviewer says (Gordon et al., 1994; Henry & Gudjonsson, 2007).   
 
With regards to adults with ID, researchers have reported results broadly in line with those of 
children with ID.  For example, Perlman, Ericson, Esses and Isaacs (1994) found that general 
questions (e.g., tell me some more about the man on the bike) and free recall questions were 
the most effective question types for eliciting accurate and reliable information.  In addition, 
Clare and Gudjonsson (1993) in their investigation of interrogative suggestibility reported 
increased levels of suggestibility in response to leading questions, whilst Heal and Sigelman 
(1995) noted that the inclusion of closed questions (yes/no) in interviews with adults with ID 
can result in higher rates of acquiescence (i.e., answering ‘yes’).     
 
Studies have also demonstrated that the accounts of both adults (Ternes & Yuille, 2008) and 
children (Agnew & Powell, 2004) with ID are often much less complete (i.e., contain fewer 
details) than their non-ID peers. This finding could be problematic in an investigative interview 
as a lack of detail may encourage interviewers to resort to using more prompts and 
inappropriate questions, for example, closed, in order to glean further information from 
witnesses with ID (Milne et al., 2013). 
 
In spite of research demonstrating the negative effect that certain questions types such as 
leading and closed questions can have on recall, studies of what actually happens in the field 
have shown that these types of questions are still used by police officers during interviews. 
Both Cederborg and Lamb (2008) and Cederborg, La Rooy and Lamb (2008) in their 
examination of transcripts from forensic interviews of children and young adults with ID, 
reported that police officers rarely used free-recall questions and that the interviews mainly 
consisted of yes/no and option-posing questions, which, they noted, resulted in the children 
and young adults providing unreliable and contradictory information.  
 
1.4.8 Use of Repeat Interviews 
The issue of repeat interviews has attracted a considerable amount of interest from 
researchers because of the debate around whether or not they have a beneficial or 
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detrimental impact on eyewitness evidence.  Indeed, the ABE guidelines (2011) recommend 
the use of a single interview where at all possible, and only advise the use of a subsequent 
interview in a given number of circumstances (e.g., in the case of new lines of enquiry or 
where new evidence is provided from other witnesses).  However, the use of repeat interviews 
is an important issue in the current instance, as the abuse of adults with ID can often involve 
multiple perpetrators (Cambridge et al., 2011) and as such individuals with ID may be required 
to undergo further interviews.   
 
Evidence exists to suggest that repeat interviews may facilitate reminiscence, i.e., recall of 
additional information not previously divulged, or hypermnesia, an increase in the total 
amount of information recalled in both children (La Rooy, Pipe & Murray, 2005) and adults 
without ID (Dunning & Stern, 1992). However, there is concern that repeat interviews may 
lead to the strengthening of memory for any inaccuracies reported in the earlier interview, 
whilst also leaving individuals open to the potential of both misinformation and source 
monitoring errors in the period in-between interviews (Brown, Lewis & Lamb, 2015). 
 
Findings from research that has examined the impact of repeat interviews on the eyewitness 
accounts of children with ID appear to be mixed. Brown et al. (2015) investigated the effect of 
repeat interviews on recall of an experienced event in children with ID.  Half of their sample 
were interviewed twice, after a one-week delay and again following a delay of six months, and 
the other half merely interviewed once after six months.  Children interviewed twice recalled 
more information with higher accuracy rates than those children interviewed only once.  In 
addition, the repeat interview resulted in recall of new information not previously disclosed in 
the first interview. 
 
In another study involving children with ID, Henry and Gudjonsson (2003) also reported an 
increase in information with a second interview.  However, when compared to the first 
interview, the repeat interview actually led to an increase in both suggestibility (to open-ended 
misleading questions, such as ‘what colour was the lady’s coat?’) and changed responses, as 
well as more errors during free-recall.  Furthermore, some researchers have reported that the 
use of repeat interviews results in a decrease in the amount and accuracy of information 
recalled (Gordon et al., 1994; Michel, Gordon, Ornstein & Simpson, 2000). 
 
It is, however, important to draw attention here to the fact the length of delay utilised 
between the repeat interviews in each of the studies described above was inconsistent and 
varied widely which could make direct comparison of the results problematic. Brown et. al., 
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(2015) used delay periods of one week and six months, Henry and Gudjonsson’s (2003) were 
one day and two weeks whilst Gordon et al. (1994) and Michel et al. (2000) both used delay 
periods of six weeks (following immediate recall). 
 
It is also important to clarify the difference between repeat interviews that are carried out in a 
forensic setting and those conducted in a research environment.  In a forensic setting repeat 
interviews may be carried out on the same topic (e.g., to confirm the reliability of information 
already provided in light of new evidence) or on different topics (e.g., where multiple 
perpetrators and multiple instances of abuse are involved).  Whereas in a research setting 
repeat interviews often involve repeated questioning about the same topics.   This is an 
important distinction to make since these different types of repeat interviews may have a 
different impact on eyewitness evidence (e.g., unlike repeat interviews on different topics, 
those conducted for the same topic may result in contradictory information). 
 
To date, there has been no research that has explored the effect of repeat interviews on the 
accuracy and reliability of the eyewitness accounts of adults with ID, thus this will be one of 
the main aims of the study described in chapter 3.   
 
1.5 Identification Line-ups 
Eyewitness identification evidence is deemed to be one of the most persuasive forms of 
evidence available to jurors (Cutler et. al. 1988).  There is an oft quoted adage that there is 
nothing more credible than a witness standing up in front of a jury and proclaiming that the 
person in the dock was the one that committed the purported crime.  This provides the jury 
with concrete proof of a relationship between the defendant and the crime, thereby signalling 
that the defendant is guilty (Wells et al., 1998). 
 
However, as already pointed out at the very beginning of this chapter, eyewitness 
identification is not always as accurate as it is believed to be, prompting a considerable 
amount of research in this area.  As concern has focused on mistaken identifications, 
researchers have sought to investigate this issue by using both perpetrator present (where the 
police suspect is in the line-up) and perpetrator absent (where the perpetrator is not in the 
line-up, i.e., simulating the situation where the police suspect is innocent) identification line-






1.5.1 Identification Line-up Accuracy in Children  
With regards to individuals from the general population, Pozzulo and Lindsay (1998) conducted 
a meta-analysis of identification studies involving children and adults.  They found that, on 
perpetrator present line-ups, very young children, i.e., under five years, were less likely to 
make a correct identification compared to adults.  However, children over five years 
demonstrated identification accuracy rates that were comparable to the adult group.  
Conversely, on perpetrator absent line-ups the level of correct rejections (i.e., where the 
participant states that they do not recognise or see the perpetrator in the line-up) for both 
younger and older children was considerably lower than that of the adults.  Findings such as 
this appear to suggest that witness factors, such as age and cognitive ability, may play a role in 
identification accuracy. 
 
1.5.2 Identification Line-up Accuracy in Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
If cognitive ability does indeed have an impact on identification accuracy, it follows that those 
individuals who experience cognitive deficits, such as adults with ID, are likely to experience 
problems in accurately identifying a perpetrator from a line-up.  Unfortunately, studies that 
have examined this issue are limited in number and moreover, their findings have been 
inconsistent, thus making it hard to draw any definitive conclusion.   
 
In the first study to be conducted in this area, Ericson and Isaacs (2003) found that adults with 
ID were as accurate as adults without ID in correctly identifying a perpetrator from a 
perpetrator present line-up, yet false identification rates for a line-up containing an innocent 
suspect (a perpetrator absent line-up) were higher for the ID group.  In contrast, Ternes and 
Yuille (2008) reported that adults without ID were more accurate than adults with ID in 
identifying a perpetrator from a perpetrator present line-up but performance of the groups on 
the perpetrator absent line-up was comparable. In a more recent study by Wilcock and Henry 
(2013) the performance of adults with ID was deficient compared to adults without ID on both 
the perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent line-ups. 
 
Due to the relative lack of research on identification accuracy in adults with ID, one of the key 
aims of this thesis is to examine the ability of this group to accurately identify two perpetrators 
from perpetrator present and perpetrator absent line-ups. 
 
1.5.3 Factors Affecting Identification Evidence 
As with eyewitness evidence, there are a number of variables that can influence the accuracy 
of eyewitness identification evidence, known as ‘system’ and ‘estimator’ variables, and a 
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distinction between the two has already been provided at the beginning of this chapter.  With 
regards to the research presented in this thesis, two variables are of particular interest: facial 
recognition ability (an estimator variable) and line-up instructions (a system variable). 
 
1.5.3.1  Facial Recognition Ability  
In many respects it seems a rather common-sense assumption that someone who may have 
good facial recognition skills would be accurate in identifying a perpetrator from a line-up. But 
does the research bear testament to this assumption? Morgan et al. (2007) conducted 
research to explore the relationship between eyewitness identification accuracy and facial 
recognition abilities of soldiers undergoing survival training. As part of the training programme 
the soldiers were placed in a mock prisoner of war camp and subsequently interrogated. Two 
days later, the soldiers’ facial recognition abilities were tested and they were subsequently 
asked to identify their interrogator from a photographic line-up. Findings revealed that there 
was a significant positive association between performance on the facial recognition test and 
identification accuracy.  Andersen, Carlson, Carlson and Gronlund (2014) in their study of 
eyewitness identification and individual differences, which used both sequential (images 
presented one at a time) and simultaneous (images presented altogether) line-ups, also found 
that those with better facial recognition abilities made more correct identifications on the 
eyewitness identification task, but that the effect was more pronounced on simultaneous as 
opposed to sequential line-ups. 
 
Whilst there appears to be little research (that the researcher is aware of) that has specifically 
focused on the relationship between facial recognition ability and identification performance 
in children, general research in this area appears to suggest that whilst younger children may 
possess some basic skills in this area, overall the ability to accurately identify faces does not 
fully develop until much later on, i.e., during adolescence (Carey, Diamond & Woods, 1980; 
Mondloch, LeGrand & Maurer, 2002).  It is possible, therefore, that this could have an impact 
on identification accuracy in young children. 
 
With regard to facial recognition ability in adults with ID and its impact on identification 
accuracy, there is currently very little research in this area. However, one study by 
Gawrylowicz et al. (2013) is of relevance here.  The researchers examined facial recognition 
and facial description skills in adults with mild ID. In the first study, which looked at facial 
recognition, participants were presented with a set of five familiar and five unfamiliar faces 
and then asked to indicate whether or not they had seen the faces previously.  It was found 
that the recognition performance of the adults with ID was poorer than that of their non-ID 
32 
 
peers.  In the second study, which explored facial description skills, participants were asked to 
describe five unfamiliar faces.  Findings again indicated that the performance of the adults 
with ID was much poorer than that of the non-ID group, specifically, they recalled substantially 
less facial information. 
 
To shed some further light on an association between facial recognition ability and 
identification accuracy in adults with ID, a test of facial recognition will be included in this 
thesis. 
 
1.5.3.2  Line-up Instructions 
Clark (2005) maintains that when witnesses are informed that they will be asked to identify a 
perpetrator from a line-up, it’s quite probable that this will lead them to believe that a 
perpetrator has actually been apprehended and thus they may feel obliged to make a 
definitive line-up decision. In order to mitigate against this, it’s considered helpful to provide 
the witness with ‘non-biased’ instructions advising them that the perpetrator may or may not 
be present in the line-up (as opposed to ‘biased’ instructions where witnesses are not provided 
with such cautionary information).  Malpass and Devine (1981) carried out a study to look at 
the impact of biased and non-biased instructions on line-up identification performance.  They 
discovered that non-biased instructions dramatically reduced the number of false 
identifications on a perpetrator absent line-up (from 78% to 33%) without a detrimental 
impact on correct identifications.  In a meta-analysis of studies examining the effect of ‘biased’ 
line-up instructions on identification accuracy, Steblay (1997) reported that overall, these 
instructions resulted in more choices being made across both perpetrator present and 
perpetrator absent line-ups.  Although the instructions did not appear to have a detrimental 
impact on accuracy on the perpetrator present line-ups, there was a negative effect for 
perpetrator absent line-ups, with a substantial decrease in identification accuracy. 
 
A study by Pozzulo and Dempsey (2006) which included both biased and non-biased line-up 
instructions, found that the use of non-biased instructions, i.e., informing participants that a 
perpetrator ‘may or may not be present’, resulted in a higher number of correct rejections 
(i.e., fewer false identifications) on a perpetrator absent line-up (compared to biased 
instructions) for both children (10 – 14 years) and adults (18 – 42 years).  However, other 
research that has focused specifically on children has found that even when they are 
presented with non-biased line-up instructions, children will still make a choice on a 
perpetrator absent line-up e.g., Keast, Brewer and Wells (2007).  A number of possible reasons 
for this behaviour have been suggested. For example, children may acquiesce by giving the 
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answer they think the person in authority wants (Ceci & Bruck, 1993).  In addition, children 
may misunderstand the true purpose of the line-up, thinking that the researcher is telling 
them that the perpetrator is actually present, i.e., not heeding the additional caution that the 
perpetrator may not be in the line-up (Dunlevy & Cherryman, 2013).  
 
None of the existing studies exploring line-up identification performance in adults with ID have 
addressed the issue of the effect of type of line-up instruction, i.e., biased versus non-biased 
instructions, on identification performance.  However, both Ericson and Isaacs (2003) and 
Wilcock and Henry (2013) administered non-biased instructions prior to their identification 
line-ups and yet the adults with ID still demonstrated higher rates of choosing compared to the 
non-ID groups, possibly suggesting that this group were disregarding the instructions. 
 
Of the three studies that have explored identification performance in adults with ID (see 1.5.2 
above), only one of them (Wilcock & Henry, 2013), actually asked participants for their recall of 
the non-biased instructions that had been administered prior to viewing the line-ups.  Of the 
25 adults who had ID, only six were able to correctly recall the line-up instructions compared 
to 22 (out of 26) of the adults without ID.  Whilst Ericson and Isaacs (2003) did not explicitly 
ask participants about their memory for the line-up instructions they did, however, ask those 
participants who did not make a choice to explain the reason why.  The researchers noted that 
only one of the adults with ID attributed their non-choosing to the belief that the perpetrator 
was not in the line-up.  This suggested that the majority of the adults with ID either could not 
remember or had misunderstood the line-up instructions. 
 
The ability of adults with ID to accurately remember line-up identification instructions will be 
investigated in the identification study reported in chapter 4 of this thesis.  Non-biased line-up 
instructions will be administered before the identification task and participants’ memory for 
these instructions will be assessed once the task has been completed. 
 
1.5.4 Code D (2017) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) 
In the UK, Code D (2017) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PACE Code D) sets out 
the procedures that should be undertaken by police officers conducting identification line-ups.  
According to PACE Code D (p. 4), these procedures were created with two key aims in mind: ‘to 
test the eye-witness’ ability to identify the suspect as the person they saw on a previous 




The Code helps to counter the potential effect on identification accuracy of a number of 
system variables (see section 1.2.3 for a definition of these).  It provides guidance relating to 
the construction of a line-up as well as its administration and presentation.  In relation to 
construction, it states that a line-up ‘must include the suspect and at least eight other people 
who, so far as possible…. resemble the suspect in age, general appearance and position in life’ 
(PACE Code D 2017, Annex A, p.37).  These ‘other people’, i.e., foils, are chosen on a ‘match to 
suspect’ basis (from a vast database of visual images).   
 
With regards to mode of presentation, PACE Code D advises that identification can take place 
by three main methods including video identification (utilising moving images), identification 
parade (where the suspect is placed in a line with foils) and group identification (where the 
suspect is viewed in an informal group of people).  The guidelines specify that, first and 
foremost, a suspect should be offered a video identification, unless this type of presentation is 
impracticable or impossible, thus this is the primary method of identification for the majority 
of Police Forces in the UK. 
 
The way in which a line-up is presented, including the instructions that should be administered 
prior to it being undertaken, are also directed by guidance laid down in PACE Code D.  These 
guidelines state that ‘immediately before the images are shown, the eye-witness shall be told 
that the person they saw on a specified earlier occasion may, or may not, appear in the images 
they are shown and that if they cannot make an identification, they should say so’ (PACE Code 
D 2017, Annex A, p.38).  In addition, although line-ups can be presented simultaneously 
(images shown all together) or sequentially (images shown one at a time), the guidelines state 
that identification line-ups should be displayed sequentially.  The line-ups used in the 
identification study referred to in this thesis were therefore constructed and administered in 
accordance with the guidance set out in PACE Code D. 
 
It is important to point out that the PACE Code D sequential presentation which was used in 
this thesis, differs from the type of ‘strict’ sequential presentation often used in much of the 
identification research.  With the strict sequential line-up, once an identification is made the 
line-up is usually halted, whereas with the PACE Code D sequential presentation, witnesses are 
instructed to watch the entire line-up at least twice before making a decision.  Also, of note is 
that fact that the strict sequential line-ups often used in identification research have been 
found to produce fewer correct identifications when compared to PACE Code D compliant 




1.6 Predicting Eyewitness Performance from Individual Differences on Cognitive Measures 
Research has demonstrated that when asked to recall information about a witnessed event 
and invited to identify perpetrators from identification line-ups, some individuals are much 
better than others (Darling, Martin, Hellman & Memon, 2009).  It is likely that such variation in 
eyewitness performance is underpinned by differences in cognitive abilities and it is thus 
highly probable that these disparities in cognitive abilities extend to other populations, such as 
those with ID.   
 
Being able to identify which cognitive abilities underlie the various facets of eyewitness 
memory (in this instance, verbal recall and visual identification) would in turn help predict 
eyewitness performance.  Such an ability would prove to be of enormous benefit to 
professionals within the CJS, particularly in relation to measures that can be obtained with 
ease, e.g., age, facial and verbal memory etc.   
 
In relation to adults from the general population, existing research has demonstrated that 
eyewitness performance may be linked to a number of cognitive factors such as age (West & 
Stone, 2013) and facial recognition abilities (Bindemann, Brown, Koyas & Russ, 2012).  For 
example, Russ, Sauerland, Lee and Bindemann (2018) discovered that scores on two tests of 
unfamiliar face recognition, the 1-in-10 task and the Cambridge Face Memory Test, were 
correlated with line-up identification performance.  
 
Individual differences in cognitive abilities, such as age, (Geddie, Fraddin & Beer, 2000) 
language (Burgwyn-Bailes, Baker-Ward, Gordon & Ornstein, 2001) and memory (e.g., Henry et 
al., 2017) have been shown to be effective predictors of eyewitness performance in TD 
children.  Furthermore, a number of these cognitive abilities have also been found to be useful 
as predictors of eyewitness performance in children with ID.  For example, Henry et al. (2017) 
discovered that age and memory (facial memory and memory for stories) were all significant 
predictors of eyewitness recall in children with (and without) autism. 
 
However, very little is known about the extent of individual differences in cognitive abilities in 
adults with ID, nor their usefulness in predicting eyewitness performance, although it is 
thought likely that such variations will parallel those observed amongst the general 
population.  To this end, the research presented in chapter 5 describes an exploratory study of 
individual differences in cognitive abilities of adults with ID and their usefulness as predictors 




1.7 Jurors and Eyewitness Evidence 
Mock juror studies have consistently demonstrated the emphasis jurors place on eyewitness 
testimony when making a decision about a defendant’s guilt (Cutler et al., 1988; Cutler et al., 
1990). The perceived accuracy and reliability of eyewitness evidence is of utmost importance 
in jury decision making. Berman, Narby and Cutler (1995) investigated the impact of 
inconsistent eyewitness evidence on juror’s perceptions of a witness as well as on a 
defendant’s guilt.  Participants (mock jurors) were shown a video of a witness being cross-
examined on their eyewitness evidence (about an armed robbery) by an attorney.  The amount 
of inconsistency contained in the eyewitness evidence was manipulated.  Findings revealed 
that inconsistencies in eyewitness evidence led to mock jurors perceiving the witness to be less 
credible and the defendant less guilty. 
 
1.7.1  Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness Evidence from Children  
As jurors are members of everyday society, it is likely that they bring to the courtroom various 
perceptions, beliefs and stereotypical views about certain members of society, such as 
children, older adults and adults with ID, which could have an effect on the jury decision 
making process.   
 
Children in particular have traditionally been perceived as suggestible and thus unreliable as 
witnesses (Brainerd & Reyna, 2012).  However, these perceptions may not always be justified.  
Whilst there is evidence to support the notion that children can be suggestible, this is very 
much tempered by a swathe of social and cognitive factors such as the type of questions used 
during forensic interviews, as well as the age and developmental level of the child (Ceci & 
Bruck, 1993).  With regards to research that has examined jurors’ perceptions of evidence 
from children, the findings are somewhat mixed.  Some studies have reported that children are 
perceived by mock jurors to be less credible eyewitnesses compared to adults (e.g. Goodman, 
Golding, Helgeson, Haith & Michelli, 1987) whilst, other research has found the opposite to be 
true (e.g., Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). Moreover, it also appears that a child witness’s 
perceived credibility may depend somewhat on whether they are a victim or an eyewitness 
(i.e., a bystander).  Pozzulo and Dempsey (2009) presented mock jurors with mock transcripts 
containing testimony from either a witness (bystander) or victim who was either a child or an 
adult.  The mock jurors were asked to rate the credibility of the witness/victim.  The 
researchers found that the child victim was perceived to be as credible as the adult victim, 
however, the perceived credibility of the child bystander was less than that of the adult 




1.7.2   Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness Evidence from Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
Another group who are often perceived, particularly by professionals within the CJS, to be 
unreliable and less credible compared to individuals from the general population, are 
witnesses with ID (Brennan & Brennan, 1994; Nathanson & Platt, 2005).   In respect of jurors, it 
appears that even though they may perceive witnesses with ID to be truthful, the credibility of 
their evidence is still called into question (Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003).   
 
As with children, it would appear that existing stereotypes and attitudes may play a role in the 
perceived credibility of evidence from individuals with ID.  Peled, Iarocci and Connolly (2004) 
presented participants with testimony described as being either from a 15-year old with mild 
ID (with a MA of 10 years), a TD 15-year old or a TD 10-year old. They informed participants 
that the young person with ID would have an approximate MA of 10 years and thus be 
functioning comparative to a TD 10-year old. Participants were asked to complete credibility 
questionnaires for each of the young people, which consisted of several different measures 
e.g. perceived accuracy, suggestibility and consistency of testimony.  They found that the 
young person with ID was perceived to be less credible than both the TD 15-year old and the 
TD 10-year old, thus merely informing mock jurors that a witness had ID resulted in ratings of 
evidence transcripts as less convincing.   
 
It is also important to point out that jurors may not always be aware that a witness has ID (e.g., 
the witness may not have divulged this information to their legal team, or they may not want 
this information revealed to jurors) and thus they may instead rely on an assessment of 
credibility based on the amount and accuracy of information presented in the eyewitness 
testimony.  Henry, Ridley, Perry and Crane (2011) asked mock jurors to read written transcripts 
from children with and without ID and subsequently provide credibility ratings for several 
measures such as believability, credibility and honesty.  In this study the researchers did not 
inform the mock jurors that some of the transcripts were from children with ID, as they 
wanted to ascertain whether credibility of the witness was linked to existing stereotypes or to 
differences in eyewitness testimony.  They discovered that the mock jurors rated the 
transcripts of the children with ID as less credible than their TD peers which, they argued, was 
due to the fact the transcripts from this group contained less information and fewer details. 
 
The study reported in chapter 6 seeks to build upon existing research in this area by 
investigating mock juror perceptions of adult eyewitnesses with ID, whose eyewitness 
evidence varies according to level of recall (amount of information recalled).  The study also 
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investigates whether the type of information mock jurors receive about the witness has an 
effect on perceived credibility. 
 
1.8 Thesis Aims  
As is evident from the above literature review, very little is currently known about the 
eyewitness skills of adults with ID.  It is also apparent that there are still significant gaps in the 
minimal amount of research that has been carried out in this area.  This thesis seeks to go 
some way towards redressing these issues.  Its key aims, together with some of the questions 
it hopes to explore, are: 
 
(1) To examine the quality, accuracy and reliability of eyewitness memory for two similar 
events.  Two of the main questions here are: (a) Can adults with ID provide accurate 
and reliable eyewitness accounts of two separate but similar events? (b) Will 
eyewitness recall of two similar events be subject to source monitoring errors? 
 
(2) To assess the impact of repeat interviews on the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness 
evidence.  Questions of interest here include: (a) Will the repeat interviews result in 
new recalled details about the event? (b) Will repeat interviewing lead to changed 
responses?  
 
(3) To investigate the performance of individuals with intellectual disabilities in the 
identification of multiple perpetrators from video identification line-ups. The specific 
questions that will be addressed here are: (a) Can adults with ID accurately identify the 
perpetrators from a perpetrator present line-up? (b) Will adults with ID still make a 
choice from a perpetrator absent line-up? (c) Will the adults with ID be able to 
remember the line-up instructions and understand the purpose of the line-up? 
 
(4) To investigate whether individual differences on several cognitive measures are 
effective predictors of eyewitness performance.   The focus here will be on whether: 
(a) MA, memory and receptive vocabulary might be significant predictors of the 
amount of correct information recalled on a detailed witness interview, (b) 
Confabulation scores will be related to the number of confabulations produced in a 
detailed witness interview, (c) Facial memory scores and MA will predict line-up 
identification accuracy, (d) Receptive and expressive vocabulary scores will predict 
understanding of the purpose of the identification line-ups, (e) Receptive and 
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expressive vocabulary scores will predict memory for the non-biased line-up 
identification instructions. 
 
(5) To assess mock juror perceptions of witnesses with intellectual disabilities. Some of 
the key questions that will be examined are: (a) Are adults with ID perceived as 
credible and reliable witnesses? (b) Do jurors perceive the testimony of witnesses with 
ID to be accurate, reliable and credible?   
 
Prior to the chapters covering experimental data, a general methodology chapter has been 
included (chapter 2), which outlines the key methodological issues and challenges relating to 
research involving adults with ID and explains how these were accounted for during the course 
of the research.  Chapter 3 presents a research study examining the interviewing of adults with 
ID and TD children, whilst chapter 4 focuses on the ability of these two groups to accurately 
identify perpetrators from ecologically valid video identification line-ups.  Chapter 5 provides 
details of a preliminary exploration of the predictive usefulness of cognitive measures in 
relation to eyewitness performance, whereas the focus of chapter 6 is on mock juror 
perceptions of eyewitness evidence from adults with ID, using a sample of interviews from 
chapter 4.  The final chapter (chapter 7) reviews the findings from each of the experimental 
chapters, drawing conclusions about the contribution of this research to existing knowledge 


















Research on Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
– Methodological Challenges 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Researchers carrying out studies in the area of intellectual disability (ID) face a number of very 
unique and challenging methodological issues. As such, this area of research is often referred 
to as ‘hard’ (Bull, 2013) with many preferring to shy away from conducting studies in this field. 
This can result in individuals with ID being excluded from research, thereby further 
marginalising a group already on the periphery of society. 
 
This chapter seeks to give an overview of these methodological issues as well as explain how 
they were taken into account during the course of the research.  It starts with a discussion of 
the difficulties the researcher faced during recruitment and how these were overcome.  
Participant matching is then discussed, with particular reference to the distinction between 
matching processes based on chronological and mental age, as well as individual and group.  
An explanation as to which matching approaches were adopted during the course of the 
research is provided, along with the rationale behind these decisions.  Clarification of how an 
appropriate sample size was ascertained is then detailed, before an outline of the much-
debated subject of ethics and ‘informed consent’, including a discussion of how these were 
accounted for in the current research.  Following this, an overview of issues related to 
comorbidity and diagnostic confirmation are highlighted.  The various cognitive and memory 
assessments employed in the research are described together with details of the reasoning 
behind the delay periods chosen for each of the stages of the research. The chapter finishes by 
examining the strategies put in place to ensure ‘accessibility’ of the language used for 
information and communication purposes throughout the whole research process. 
 
2.2 Recruitment Procedures 
The recruitment of adults with ID was particularly challenging and indeed, extremely time-
consuming.  Many of the groups and associations approached during the recruitment process 
either did not respond to the researcher’s enquiries (by either telephone or email), or felt that 
they were unable to commit to the amount of time required to assist with recruitment.   In 
addition, the researcher felt that one or two groups/clubs who declined the opportunity of 
being involved with the research, were being extremely cautious, possibly out of concern for 
protecting the adults with ID from exploitation. Whilst this was understandable given the 
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rather unscrupulous and questionable nature of some of the research studies from previous 
decades (see the section on general ethics and informed consent for a further discussion on 
this), it can also be viewed as a rather sad decision which excludes this group from making a 
valuable contribution to desperately needed research. Eventually however, after much 
perseverance and a number of face-to-face meetings, several establishments agreed to assist 
with recruitment including: two arts centres, a day centre, a local farm (offering work 
experience for adults with ID) and a wellbeing hub.  
 
First and foremost, efforts were focused on the recruitment of adults with ID, mainly because 
it was envisaged that it would be much harder to recruit this sample and also because it was 
necessary to ascertain the mental ages (MAs) of this group so that the researcher knew the 
approximate ‘target’ ages for the TD comparison group.   
 
2.3 Participant Matching 
2.3.1 Chronological versus Mental Age Matching 
Much psychological research involves the inclusion of a comparison group, whose purpose is 
to provide a baseline measure against which to compare results obtained from the group 
under review (Coolican, 2009). What is important however, is that steps are taken to ensure 
that the groups are appropriately matched on any control variables. Matching in this way helps 
to negate the possibility that any observed between-group differences on the variables under 
review have not arisen as a result of differences between the groups on the control variables. 
 
In research involving individuals with ID the issue of matching on a control variable often 
revolves around that of age. Whilst this initially seems a straightforward matter, things are not 
as simple as they first appear, primarily because of the specific distinction between many 
different types of age e.g., biological, chronological and mental. Research that focuses on 
individuals with ID usually concerns itself with a distinction between chronological age (CA) 
(determined by date of birth) and mental age (MA) (based on intellectual ability, ascertained 
via IQ tests).  Historically, this distinction has been an issue linked to the domain of research on 
children with ID, particularly in relation to the difference and developmental models of 
cognitive development.  Difference theorists argue in favour of CA comparisons, as their stance 
is that the cognitive development of children with ID is distinctly different to that of TD 
children, whereas developmental theorists maintain that MA comparisons are more effective 
because children with ID proceed through the same developmental stages as TD children albeit 
at a slower rate (Mundy & Kasari, 1990).   
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Whilst the CA / MA distinction is mainly relevant to research on ID in children (because of the 
developmental aspect) it is, however, of importance to research on adults with ID.   With 
previous studies that have examined the eyewitness skills of adults with ID some researchers 
have included a CA comparison group (e.g., Perlman et al., 1994; Milne et al., 1999), whilst 
others have gone down the MA route (e.g., Gudjonsson & Henry, 2003), and indeed some have 
included no comparison group at all (e.g., Cardone & Dent, 1996).  One of the main 
weaknesses of CA comparisons is that it does not compare ‘like for like’, as adults with ID are 
likely to have very different cognitive abilities to adults from the general population (i.e., 
adults without ID).  Alternatively, MA comparisons enable researchers to compare 
performance across groups, as this method helps establish, as far as is practicable, that 
participants’ cognitive abilities are on a par.  This latter approach is thus the one usually taken 
by researchers examining the cognitive abilities of individuals with ID (Hodapp, Griffin, Burke & 
Fisher, 2011).    
 
With reference to the current study, at the outset it was planned to include both a group of TD 
children to facilitate MA matching, as well as a group of adults without ID to allow matching 
based on CA.  Unfortunately, however, as the study progressed it became apparent that, time-
wise, it was not possible to recruit and test both of these groups.  It was thus considered the 
most sensible option to omit the CA group (adults without ID) and merely include the MA 
group (TD children).  In this way performance across the groups could be compared in a much 
more reliable and equivalent manner, based on MA matching. 
 
2.3.2 Individual versus Group Matching 
Another issue related to the process of matching in psychological research relates to whether 
matching should be carried out on an individual or group basis. Matching on an individual basis 
involves matching each participant from the experimental group with a participant from the 
comparison group based on a particular variable (e.g., within +/- 3 points on a given set of 
scores). On the other hand, group matching involves looking at a group as a whole (e.g., its 
overall mean raw test scores) and comparing these with the means of a comparison group to 
ensure that there are no significant differences between the means. Both of these matching 
processes have strengths and weaknesses. 
 
The main issue with matching on an individual basis is that it can be very time consuming and 
may necessitate a much larger sample size or even screening out unsuitable participants.  
Whilst this may, however, be tempered by the fact that individual matching can provide a 
much more direct comparison of participant groups and their abilities, the reality of 
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conducting research, particularly with ‘hard to reach’ populations such as individuals with ID, 
means that researchers may often need to adopt a pragmatic and logical approach to 
matching.  Due to the numerous methodological challenges associated with the current 
research and the delays experienced in overcoming these issues, it was necessary to adopt 
such an approach when considering which matching process to undertake.  As a result, the 
decision was taken to match on a group as opposed to individual basis 
 
However, one of the concerns that arises in relation to group matching is how to ascertain 
whether or not the groups have been matched sufficiently well enough on the control 
variables to counter the potential confounding effect of between-group differences on the 
variables under review.  The standard method used in psychological research is to carry out a 
statistical analysis, usually in the form of t-tests, to compare the group means. However, the p 
value traditionally used, 0.05, is often deemed to be too low to ensure confidence in the group 
matching process, an issue which Mervis and Klein-Tasman (2004) suggest can be overcome by 
using a p value of > .50 instead.  This was therefore the p value adopted in the current research 
to ensure that the two groups (adults with ID and TD children) were matched well on the 
control variable of mental age. 
 
2.4 Estimating Mental Age 
Estimates of MA are usually calculated through scores achieved on intelligence tests.  
Participants’ raw scores are compared against a table of scores listing age equivalents, i.e., the 
average age at which a child from the general population would be expected to obtain the 
given score.  In the research presented in this thesis, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II, Wechsler, 2011) was initially used to obtain MA 
equivalents.  This test was primarily used as it was estimated that the MAs of the adults with 
ID would be in the range of six to 12 years and this test would therefore be suitable as it can be 
used with individuals aged six years and above.  However, as testing progressed it soon 
became apparent that a large number of the raw scores obtained by the adults with ID on the 
vocabulary and matrix reasoning sub-tests were so low that they fell below those stated in the 
MA equivalents table.  This indicated that these participants likely had estimated MAs below 
six years of age, which meant that the WASI-II was unsuitable for this sub-group.   
Extrapolation of these scores was an option that was considered, but this process was 
ultimately deemed inappropriate due to concerns regarding the reliability and validity of using 
such a method to obtain estimates of so many MAs, especially as MAs would subsequently be 




An equally suitable alternative for obtaining MA equivalents was therefore identified as being 
The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB-5; Roid, 2003).  The SB-5 overcame the 
issue associated with the sub-group of adults with ID who appeared to have an estimated MA 
of below six years, as it is suitable for use with individuals aged two years and above and 
furthermore, rather than having to administer the whole battery of tests, it has an abbreviated 
two test version which can provide a quick estimate of MA.  Consequently, participants who 
had originally been tested using the WASI-II were re-assessed using the SB-5.  Whilst this did in 
fact cause a delay to the research study, it was considered a necessary step to take to ensure 
the validity and reliability of the MA matching process. 
 
2.5 Sample Size  
One of the primary questions that every researcher must ask themselves at the outset of their 
study is what sample size will be required in order to achieve both the preferred outcome for 
the alpha level they have specified as well as the hypothesised effect size (Cohen, 1992). 
 
The required sample size of the two groups under review in the current study had to be given 
careful consideration, not just because of the generic issue of ‘generalisability’ but because of 
other factors such as participant matching, repeat interviews and mode of presentation on the 
identification line-ups.  To assist with this decision a review of sample sizes used in existing 
eyewitness literature was undertaken.  In addition, where necessary, power calculations were 
conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) to ensure that the sample 
size would be sufficient to achieve the required effect size. 
 
2.6 General Ethics and Informed Consent 
One of the main areas of concern in conducting research involving individuals with ID is that of 
ethics and in particular the issue of protecting this group from exploitation and harm by 
researchers (Dalton & McVilly, 2004).  This concern has arisen from many infamous studies 
involving individuals with ID where the ethical conduct of researchers has been called into 
question.  In one such study that has received much media coverage, children with ID who 
were attending Willowbrook State School in New York in the 1960s were injected with the 
hepatitis virus with the aim of investigating the natural progression of the disease (Iacono & 
Murray, 2003). The research attracted much attention and facilitated a great deal of moral 
debate amongst researchers and the wider community. It also served to highlight the ‘thorny’ 
issue of consent. Whilst the researcher conducting the study, Dr Saul Krugman, argued that he 
had actually obtained parental consent to inject the children with the virus, critics maintained 
that the children themselves had neither provided consent, nor were they aware, that they 
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were being purposefully infected with hepatitis. Moreover, Krugman’s assertion that parents 
had provided ‘voluntary’ consent was called in question with many arguing that parents had 
felt coerced into consenting to the research for fear of losing their child’s place at the school 
(Iacono & Carling-Jenkins, 2012). 
 
Events such as the one described above have undoubtedly led to many ethics committees 
becoming so concerned about protecting this vulnerable group that the stringent procedures 
they put in place actually discourage researchers from carrying out studies in this area. It 
would appear that one of the primary reasons for the introduction of such rigorous measures 
is the issue of obtaining ‘informed consent’ from individuals with ID.  However, before 
addressing the issue of whether or not individuals with ID do possess the capacity to consent, 
it is important to look at the nature of ‘informed consent’.   
 
The Nuremburg Code was introduced in 1947 following the Nuremburg Trials which sought to 
bring about the conviction of Doctors who had carried out horrific experiments on Nazi 
prisoners of war.  At the very heart of this Code was the subject of ‘informed consent’ which is 
covered under Principle 1: 
 
“The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This 
means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent 
………..… and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the 
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision” (Shuster, 1998, p. 1436)  
 
In 1964 the Declaration of Helsinki further extended this principle of informed consent by 
asserting that research participants should be fully informed of the aims, methods, risks and 
benefits associated with any research (Fischer, 2006).  Together, the 1946 Nuremberg Code 
and the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki form the basis of many of today’s ethical guidelines that 
underpin research involving human participants. 
 
Whilst individuals from the general population may be able to make an informed decision 
about participating in research, based on information provided, this may prove a much more 
challenging exercise for individuals with ID.  Individuals with ID often experience specific 
cognitive deficits e.g., in attention and memory (Henry et al., 2011) which could make it harder 
for them to understand the information presented.  In addition, deficits in receptive, 
expressive and written language (Belva et al., 2011), together with speech production 
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problems (Chapman, 1997) and difficulties in the use of pragmatic language (using language 
appropriately in social interactions) (Abbeduto & Hesketh, 1997; Hatton, 1998) could all make 
it difficult for adults with ID to communicate their decision to the researcher.  Nevertheless, 
these deficits should not be used as justification for the exclusion of this group from research 
nor should it automatically be assumed that these deficits prevent members of this group from 
being able to provide informed consent. 
 
So, given these issues, the question arises as to how to establish that an individual with ID 
possesses the capacity to provide informed consent?  In the UK the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Code of Practice (2007) provides guidance on assessing an individual’s capacity to consent. At 
the core of this act is the assertion that “it should be assumed that an adult (aged 16 or over) 
has full legal capacity to make decisions for themselves (the right to autonomy) unless it can be 
shown that they lack capacity to make a decision for themselves at the time the decision needs 
to be made”. (Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice, 2007, p.15) 
 
The Act sets out a two-stage test to assess whether an individual has the capacity to make a 
decision for themselves.  This comprises the following two questions: 1) Does the person have 
an impairment of the mind or brain, or is there some sort of disturbance affecting the way 
their mind or brain works?  2) If so, does that impairment or disturbance mean that the person 
is unable to make the decision in question at the time it needs to be made?  With reference to 
these fundamental principles the researcher created a flow chart (see Figure 2.1) to summarise 
this two-stage test and provide guidance in assessing the capacity of the adults with ID to 
provide informed consent to participate in the study. 
 
In order to ensure that every adult with ID who agreed to take part in the research actually 
possessed the capacity to consent, an assessment was carried out at the beginning of the first 
research session and the results recorded (see Appendix A for the Assessment of Capacity to 
Consent Form).  As part of this assessment, the researcher went through the Participant 
Information Sheet (see Appendix B) with the adult with ID, before asking them a set of 
questions that were based both on the two-stage test of capacity as defined by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (2007), as well as the questions used by Horner-Johnson 
and Bailey (2013) in their study on obtaining consent from adults with ID.  All of the adults with 






Figure 2.1  Flow chart depicting process for assessing individual’s capacity to provide consent    
                    to take part in the research study (based on the two-stage Test of Capacity as  
                    defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (2007)) 
 
 
The research described in this thesis was carried out in accordance with The University of 
Winchester's Research and Knowledge Exchange Ethics Policy and Procedures, the Economic 
and Social Research Council's Framework for Research Ethics (with specific reference to their 
guidance on research with potentially vulnerable people) and the British Psychological 
Society’s (2014) Code of Human Research Ethics (with particular regard to Section 10.1 which 
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describes the special safeguards that should be put in place when conducting research with 
vulnerable populations including children under the age of 16 and individuals with ID). 
 
2.7 Comorbid Diagnosis 
According to Rutter (1994) comorbidity refers to a situation whereby two distinct conditions 
co-occur at a level above that which you could expect to obtain by chance alone.  Intellectual 
disabilities often co-occur with other conditions such as Down syndrome (DS), Williams 
syndrome (WS) and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), with each of these being characterised 
by its own individual and often, very distinctive, cognitive profile.  For example, individuals 
with DS often possess intelligence quotient (IQ) levels in the moderate to severe ID range (25–
55) and demonstrate difficulties with expressive language (Chapman, 1997; Laws & Bishop, 
2004; Ypsilanti, Grouios, Alevriadou & Tsapkini, 2005) and in the provision of coherent 
narratives (Chapman 1997; Laws & Bishop, 2004).  They also exhibit impairments in verbal 
short-term memory (Brock & Jarrold, 2005; Carney, Brown & Henry, 2013; Jarrold, Baddeley & 
Phillips, 2007) and in long-term memory for visual information (Jarrold et al., 2007).  WS on the 
other hand is typically characterised by IQ levels in the mild to moderate ID range (40-70) and 
whilst the verbal skills of this group are superior to those of other conditions (Bellugi, Lai & 
Wang, 1997), they demonstrate deficits in both short-term and long-term memory for visual 
information (Costanzo et al., 2013; Jarrold et al., 2007; Vicari, Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini & 
Volterra, 1996).  Unlike DS and WS, individuals with ASD often exhibit a substantial variation in 
both IQ levels (ranging from typical through to severe and profound), as well as cognitive 
abilities.  
 
Due to the immense variation in cognitive abilities across many conditions, it was considered 
the most sensible approach to only include individuals in the research study who had ‘non-
specific ID’ (i.e., where the cause of the ID was unclear/unknown) and, as far as could be 
ascertained, individuals without any comorbid diagnoses.  Whilst it was acknowledged that in 
some respects adopting such an approach would limit the number of suitable/potential 
participants available to the researcher, this would, however, negate any complications arising 
from attempts to compare the performance of numerous individuals with an extensive range 
of cognitive deficits. 
  
2.8 Diagnostic Confirmation and Severity of Intellectual Disability 
As already explained in chapter 1, for a formal diagnosis of ID the individual must have 
experienced the onset of symptoms during childhood, possess an IQ of less than 70 and exhibit 
impairments of cognitive and adaptive functioning. 
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Unfortunately, however, it was not possible to have access to clinical records in order to 
establish the diagnoses for the adults with ID who participated in the research.  On 
establishing contact with the various groups and clubs that assisted in the recruitment of the 
adults with ID, the researcher specified that the inclusion criterion was ‘a formal diagnosis of a 
non-specific mild to moderate learning disability, without any co-morbid/dual diagnoses such 
as Down syndrome, autism spectrum disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder etc.’   It 
was further specified that the adults with ID should be aged between 18 and 65 years.  The 
upper age limit of 65 years was deemed appropriate in order to counter any potentially 
confounding issues relating to the onset of dementia (Janicki & Dalton, 1993; Janicki & Dalton, 
2000).  The researcher was thus reliant on the managers and staff at the clubs and centres, 
who worked closely with the potential participants, to ensure that this inclusion criterion was 
met.   
 
The decision to limit the research to those individuals with mild to moderate ID (IQs in the 
range of 40 – 70) was based on a number of factors.  To include individuals from the whole 
spectrum of ID (mild through to profound) would have proved extremely problematic for 
several reasons.  There are very pronounced differences in the cognitive abilities of individuals 
with mild ID and those with more severe levels of ID (The British Institute of Learning 
Disabilities, 2019) and this would have made any statistical analysis of data and subsequent 
generalisability of the performance of this group as a whole very difficult and unwieldy.  It 
might not only have proven much more difficult to ensure that those with more severe levels 
of ID possessed the capacity to provide informed consent, but these individuals may also have 
found some of the tasks employed in the research particularly challenging.   From a 
methodological perspective, the issue of MA matching would have become even more 
complicated, necessitating the inclusion of a sample of much younger TD children.   
 
It should be noted that three participants had to be excluded from the research study because 
their estimated IQs were found to be above the cut-off point of 70 (and thus these participants 
were deemed to be functioning in the non-ID range).    For those participants who actually had 
IQ’s of 70 (two in total) background information was sought from managers and other 
members of staff to ensure that these participants met the diagnostic criteria specified in the 







2.9 Assessments of Cognition and Suggestibility 
The current research necessitated the use of several assessments to provide not only an 
estimate of IQ and general cognitive ability (and thus MA), but also measures of vocabulary 
(expressive and receptive), memory (for stories and faces) and interrogative suggestibility as 
these were all considered to be relevant to the recall of the witnessed events and 
identification of the perpetrators from the video identification line-ups.  The decision to use 
the assessments described below, as opposed to other equally viable alternatives, was 
tempered by not only their suitability for the groups under review, but also their proven 
reliability. 
 
At the commencement of the research it was anticipated that the MAs of the adults with mild 
to moderate ID would be in an ‘approximate’ age range of 6 to 12 years, thereby requiring a 
group of TD children of similar MAs.  However, as already mentioned in section 2.4 above, as 
data collection progressed it became evident that the MAs of a number of the adults with ID 
fell below six years. This presented an issue with the original choice of cognitive tests, i.e., the 
WASI-II, as the minimum age for this test was six years. The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, 
Fifth Edition (SB-5; Roid, 2003) was therefore selected as an alternative test to provide an 
estimate of MA.  This test was chosen as it is a highly reliable test of cognitive ability and can 
be administered to individuals from two years of age.  Moreover, this test incorporates a two 
sub-test version which together provide a quick measure of general cognitive ability/IQ 
(Abbreviated Battery IQ – ABIQ).  The ABIQ sub-test consists of two tests, one to measure 
verbal ability (vocabulary) and the other non-verbal ability (object series/matrices).  In the 
vocabulary test participants are required to use their acquired verbal knowledge to answer 
questions such as identifying what individuals are doing in various pictures (e.g., eating, 
drinking etc.) and stating what particular words ‘mean’.  In the non-verbal test participants are 
required to identify patterns or series of objects and pictures.   
 
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, Fourth Edition (PPVT-4; Dunn & Dunn, 2007) provides a 
measure of receptive (hearing) vocabulary, i.e., listening and understanding of words.   This 
test consists of a stimulus book with four images on each page.  Participants are asked to 
either point to or give the number of the image that corresponds to the word spoken by the 
researcher and is thus suitable for non-readers and those with ID.  The test can be 
administered in approximately 15 minutes and is suitable for individuals aged between 2 years 
and 6 months to 90 years plus.  The PPVT-4 was therefore used to provide a reliable measure 
of receptive vocabulary (including MA equivalents), as this was deemed important in the  
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current study where the ability to provide an accurate verbal account of the witnessed events 
was reliant on an individual’s comprehension of the films’ narratives. NB: This assessment was 
originally chosen because of the age range it covers. As noted above in section 2.3.1, time 
constraints led to the exclusion of the CA group (adults without ID), however, the PPVT-4 was 
still appropriate for the two remaining sample groups (adults with ID and TD children).  It is 
noted though, that the British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (BVPS-III; Dunn, Dunn & Styles, 
2009), would have been equally suitable.   
 
The Test of Memory and Learning – Second Edition (TOMAL-2; Reynolds & Bigler, 2007) is a 
standardised battery of tests that assesses general and specific aspects of memory functioning. 
It includes eight core subtests and six supplementary subtests (including Memory for Stories, 
Facial Memory, Word Selective Reminding, Visual Selective Reminding, Object Recall, Abstract 
Visual Memory, Digits Forward, Visual Sequential Memory, Paired Recall, Memory for Location, 
Manual Imitation, Letters Forward, Digits Backward, and Letters Backward) plus two delayed 
recall tasks.  The test allows for the assessment of memory strengths and weaknesses and can 
be administered to individuals aged between 5 years and 60 years.   The two sub-tests deemed 
to be the most suitable for this study were memory for stories and memory for faces. 
 
As individuals with ID are often perceived to be more suggestible that their TD peers, a 
shortened version of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS2; Gudjonsson, 1997) was 
utilised to provide a measure of interrogative suggestibility.  This test is presented to 
participants as a ‘test of memory’, i.e., participants are not informed that it is a test of 
suggestibility.  It comprises a short test of recall following which the interviewer administers a 
set of questions, some of which are leading, which are repeated twice and are designed to 
measure participant’s susceptibility to ‘yield’ or give in to the leading questions.  This 
shortened version of the GSS2 has been used in previous research involving individuals with ID 
(Henry & Gudjonsson, 1997).  In comparison to the full version of the GSS2, the shortened 
version merely utilises 80% of the original GSS2 story (comprising 32 of the 40 pieces of 
information) and 80% of the questions (16 of the 20 questions). 
 
2.10 Delay Periods 
There were three points within the current study that necessitated set periods of delay. These 
included between: (1) viewing the eyewitness events and the main evidence gathering 
interviews, (2) the first and second interview in the repeat interviewing condition and (3) 
viewing the eyewitness events and identifying the perpetrator(s).  In a police investigation 
52 
 
process witnesses may not be questioned for days or even weeks following an incident. 
Additionally, the length of elapsed time between the incident and subsequent identification of 
the perpetrator(s) may be anywhere between a number of hours to a number of weeks 
(Behrman & Davey, 2001; Davis, Valentine, Memon & Roberts, 2015).   
 
From a logistical perspective, and to ensure that delays were consistent for every participant, it 
was necessary to establish a standard period of delay for each of the specified stages. It is 
usually helpful to look to existing eyewitness literature to guide such decisions.  In line with 
previous research (e.g., Brown et al., 2015; Brown, Lewis, Lamb & Stephens, 2012), the chosen 
period of delay used in the thesis was one week and this was for the delay between the 
witnessed event and main evidence gathering interviews, the witnessed event and the 
identification line-ups, as well as the first and repeat detailed interviews (Waterhouse, Ridley, 
Bull & Wilcock, in press). 
 
2.11 Language Used in the Research 
It was imperative that the adults with ID were able to comprehend both the written and verbal 
information presented in the research as this was crucial to the participants not only being 
able to make an informed decision about participation, but also having a thorough 
understanding of the tasks that were required to be undertaken during the sessions. A 
considerable amount of thought had to be given to the content and format of all the 
information so that it was suitable for the cognitive abilities of this group. 
 
‘Easy read’ refers to a type of format used to make information more accessible for individuals 
with ID.  There is no legal clarification or guidance on the actual format of easy read 
information, however, the following is a summary of the guidelines included in Mencap’s 
‘Make it Clear’ guide to producing easy read information (Mencap, 2013): 
 
o Use short, clear sentences, without complicated language or punctuation 
o Keep everything about a subject on one page and use page numbers 
o Pictures can be helpful, as long as they relate to the information. Pictures 
should be placed on the left 






All of the written information used in this study which was created for the adults with ID, was 
therefore produced with reference to Mencap’s easy read guidelines. Copies of the Participant 
 Information Sheet (for adults with ID), Parent/Guardian Information Sheet, Participant 
Consent Form, Parent/Guardian Consent Form and Debriefing Document (adults with ID) can 
be found in Appendices B – F. 
 
With regards to the verbal information, including verbal communication, again it was 
imperative that the researcher was aware of, and took into consideration, the verbal and non-
verbal abilities of the adults with ID.  With this in mind, the researcher once again looked to 
guidelines provided by Mencap, in particular their website article entitled ‘Communicating 
with people with a learning disability’ (Mencap, 2017).  These guidelines were designed to 
highlight some of the issues faced by individuals with ID and provide tips and advice on 
communicating with this group.  Some of the advice includes: 
 
o Think about your tone of voice, the words you use and your body language 
o Use accessible language, easy to understand words and avoid jargon 
o Take your time, use gestures and facial expressions to reinforce what you are 
saying 
 
The researcher therefore made every effort to adhere to the above advice when 
communicating with the adults with ID.   Communication was tailored to meet the needs of 
each participant and they were encouraged to inform the researcher of any words or 
instructions that were not understood so that suitable alternatives could be employed.  
 
2.12 Presence of Staff/Key Workers (During Testing) 
One of the things that became apparent during testing of the adults with ID was that some of 
them initially felt anxious due to unfamiliarity with the researcher (even though the researcher 
had attended the group/club previously in an attempt to build rapport).  A handful of the 
adults with ID asked if a member of staff/key worker could sit in on the sessions.  The 
researcher agreed to this, however, in order to ensure that the participant was not unduly 
influenced nor distracted by the third party, they were requested to sit behind the participant 
(out of view) and asked not to attempt to answer any of the questions (on behalf of the 
participant) that might be asked during the sessions, unless the researcher required their 
assistance, e.g., where a participant had speech production difficulties which made their 





Chapter 2 presented an overview of the very distinct methodological issues that researchers 
are presented with when conducting research with individuals with ID. These issues range 
from quite specific considerations such as participant matching and adherence to prescribed 
ethical guidelines to much more practical matters such as accessible forms of communication.  
All of these issues were taken into account when conducting the research presented in the 
following chapters. 





























Interviewing Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
 
3.1 Abstract 
As has already been noted in chapter 1, there is very little research that examines the 
interviewing of adults with ID in a forensic context, in spite of this group being at an increased 
risk of being victims or witnesses of abuse, and the concerns of CJS professionals regarding 
their reliability as eyewitnesses.  Apprehension also exists in relation to the use of repeat 
interviews with adults with ID, especially as this group is often perceived to be susceptible to 
acquiescence and changed responses.  The research presented in chapter 3 aimed to examine 
the ability of adults with mild to moderate ID, and MA matched TD children to recall 
information about two separate, but similar, eyewitness events at three different points: (1) in 
an immediate brief statement taking interview, (2) in a detailed witness interview after a one 
week delay and (3) in a repeat detailed witness interview following a further one-week delay.  
Of interest was the ability of the adults with ID to distinguish between, and accurately recall 
information about, the two separate eyewitness events and the impact of the repeat interview 
on eyewitness recall.  Results demonstrated that, in comparison to the TD children, the adults 
with ID recalled comparative amounts of accurate information, with few source monitoring 
errors and confabulations and were no more likely to change their responses in a repeat 
interview.  These findings have practical implications for the CJS, as they provide evidence that 
adults with ID can provide accurate and reliable verbal recall of a witnessed event across more 
than one interview. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
Interviewing witnesses is an integral part of the investigation process, allowing police officers 
the opportunity to gather crucial evidence necessary for a successful prosecution.  The ability 
to extract a detailed and complete account of an event from an eyewitness can be influenced 
by a whole range of factors, from the interviewing skills, questioning style and behaviour of the 
interviewer (Kӧhnken, 1995), to the personal characteristics of the eyewitness, such as the 
witness being a child or having ID. 
  
3.2.1 Interviewing Children 
The reliability of children as witnesses has historically been a very contentious issue and this 
appears to hinge on the belief that they are susceptible to acquiescence and suggestibility 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999).  During the 1980s and 1990s researchers began to take an interest in the 
abilities of children as eyewitnesses due to a number of high-profile sexual abuse cases,  
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such as the Michaels nursery case in the USA (Ceci & Bruck, 1993).  These criminal cases meant 
that young children were routinely being required to provide evidence about their experiences 
of abuse. 
 
Research prompted by these cases demonstrated that even children as young as two years can 
provide accurate information about experienced events (Fivush, Gray & Fromhoff, 1987) and 
moreover, children’s recall abilities appear to increase in line with age.  Goodman and Reed 
(1986) examined age differences in eyewitness evidence by asking three year olds, six year olds 
and adults to play a game with a man they had not met before and subsequently interviewing 
them about this interaction.  They found that the amount of information recalled increased 
with the age of the participant, such that the adults produced more correct information than 
the six year olds and the six year olds in turn produced more correct information than the 
three year olds.  
 
Episodic memory, the ability to remember past experiences (Tulving, 2002), plays an extremely 
important role in eyewitness memory and research suggests that there is a distinct and 
noticeable improvement in episodic memory during early childhood (Riggens, Blankenship, 
Mulligan, Rice & Redcay, 2015), which is likely bound with developmental changes in the 
acquisition of knowledge and language (Pipe, Thierry & Lamb, 2007).  This finding regarding 
the age-related development of episodic memory appears to parallel the findings from 
research on children’s recall abilities (e.g., Goodman & Reed (1986) above). 
 
The amount of information recalled and level of detail contained in information provided by 
children about a witnessed event may depend on a number of different factors relating to the 
manner in which the account was elicited, the child’s abilities and the actual event itself (Pipe, 
et al., 2007).   It does appear that children can be reliable as eyewitnesses if they are 
questioned appropriately.  Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz and Abbott (2007) examined 
the types of questions used by forensic investigators in actual cases of sexual abuse against 
children aged between three and 13 years. They found that the use of open-ended free-recall 
type questions (e.g., ‘tell me everything that happened’) resulted in the recall of more 
information with greater accuracy compared to more focused or option-posing prompts.  Such 
findings regarding the beneficial effect on recall of open-ended questions have been 
corroborated by other researchers, e.g., Brown et al., 2013; Horowitz, 2009. 
 
One of the primary concerns with regards to children as witnesses is their purported 
vulnerability to suggestibility, particularly in response to certain types of questions.  For 
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example, younger children find it hard to contest misleading or suggestive questions (see Ceci 
& Bruck, 1993 for a review of research in this area), whilst more specific questions (e.g., 
requiring either a one-word response or a yes/no response) and multiple-choice/option-posing 
questions (e.g., presentation of more than one option from which to make a choice) can 
increase susceptibility to suggestibility and acquiescence (Mehrani & Peterson, 2018; Rocha, 
Marche & Briere, 2013).  This is of particular concern in a forensic context as the accounts of 
children are sometimes much less complete that those of adults (Goodman & Reed, 1986), 
which can lead to interviewers using more specific prompts to elicit information (Davies, 
Westcott & Horan, 2000; Lamb, Sternberg & Esplin, 2000; Peterson & Grant, 2001).   
 
Concerns also exist about the negative effect that repeat interviews (where individuals are 
interviewed more than once about the same topic or event) might have on susceptibility to 
suggestibility.  Research has indeed demonstrated that repeat interviews can result in an 
increase in suggestibility, but much of this research has relied on the use of misleading or 
suggestive questioning methods, often in relation to never experienced events (e.g. Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1996; Bruck, Ceci & Hembroke, 2002).  Furthermore, researchers have been especially 
concerned that repeated investigative interviewing of children may lead to previously recalled 
inaccurate information being sustained and consolidated. Whilst a number of researchers have 
reported that the use of repeat interviews with children does indeed lead to an increase in 
errors (see La Rooy, Lamb & Pipe (2008) for an evaluation/overview of research in this area) 
others have found the opposite.   For example, suggestibility aside, repeat interviews may have 
a beneficial effect in that they can result in the production of new, and potentially forensically 
relevant, information (Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007).  Indeed, Waterhouse, Ridley, Bull, La Rooy 
and Wilcock (2016) examined transcripts of first and second interviews conducted with child 
witnesses and victims and found that the amount of information recalled in the second 
interviews (repeat) was consistent with that of the first interviews and moreover, repeat 
interviews resulted in the recall of new information with very few contradictions (changed 
responses between the first and second interviews).   
 
However, it does seem that the length of delay between both an experienced/witnessed event 
and initial interview, as well as initial and subsequent interviews, may also have an effect on 
both the amount and accuracy of information recalled as well as a child’s vulnerability to 
suggestibility.  This is of particular importance given that lengthy delays are common place in 
the Criminal Justice System (CJS).   Interviewing children promptly has been found to preserve 
memory for an event (Pipe, Sutherland, Webster, Jones & La Rooy, 2004; Salmon & Pipe, 2000) 
and may also serve to protect them from the effects of suggestibility (Quas et al., 2007).  
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Longer delays though can have a deleterious effect on the amount and accuracy of information 
recalled (Flin, Boon, Knox & Bull, 1992; Salmon & Pipe, 2000).  With regards to delays between 
interviews, research does suggest that even following a long delay, i.e., of around five years, 
children are able to recall new details about a witnessed event (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 
1998).  However, as Salmon and Pipe (2000) found, compared to a shorter delay of just a few 
days, a longer delay of around one year can have a potentially negative impact on the accuracy 
of the newly recalled information. 
 
In addition to the above, it is also important to note that other factors, such as individual 
differences and social influences, may play a role in both the amount and accuracy of 
information recalled by children, as well as their tendency to acquiesce.  Roebers and 
Schneider (2001) examined the effect of individual differences in intelligence and shyness on 
children’s recall for an eyewitness event.  They reported that children with higher intelligence 
(M IQ = 120.2) recalled more correct information than those with lower intelligence (M IQ = 
89.4), but there were no differences between the two groups in relation to suggestibility.  
Furthermore, shy children were less accurate in answering specific questions compared to 
peers who were not shy.  With regards to social influences, this is a factor that could play a 
significant role in children’s proneness to acquiescence and susceptibility to misleading 
information.  It is quite likely that children find it hard to challenge the authority of 
interviewers, because they are socially programmed to accept that adults have more power 
and control and ultimately much more knowledge (Ceci, Ross & Toglia 1987; Fielding & Conroy, 
1992).   
 
Another issue that is purported to influence recall of an experienced event, particularly when 
events are highly similar, as with repeated abuse, is that of the child confusing details about 
individual events, i.e., being less able to cognitively monitor the source of the information 
(Poole, Dickinson, Brubacher, Liberty & Kaake, 2014).  In a study that investigated source 
monitoring for a repeated event in children (using a timeline) aged between six and nine years, 
Zhang, Roberts and Teoh (2019) gave participants different activities, such as drawing and 
puzzles, that were repeated on four occasions over a period of two weeks.  Within these 
activities, there were 16 target items, for example, type of sticker, or colour of the sticker 
sheet.  These target items were the focus of subsequent interviews.  The researchers reported 
that when the children were asked to provide details about a particular event, they confused 





3.2.2 Interviewing Witnesses with Intellectual Disabilities 
Many of the challenges associated with interviewing children are also present when 
interviewing adults with ID.  Moreover, these challenges can be further exacerbated by the 
wide-ranging cognitive deficits they may experience and the potential impact these might have 
on the interviewing process.  Deficits in attention (Sterr, 2004) together with poor facial 
recognition abilities (Gawrylowicz et al., 2013) could mean that witnesses do not encode 
sufficient information about a witnessed event, whilst problems with working memory 
(Swanson & Siegel, 2001) and long-term memory (Nolan et al., 1985) could lead to difficulties 
in retention and retrieval of details. These issues could be further exacerbated by the language 
and communication problems often exhibited by individuals with ID (Abbeduto & Hesketh, 
1997; Belva et al., 2012).  
 
The perceptions and beliefs that are pervasive amongst some professionals within the CJS 
about the eyewitness skills of adults with ID (Nathanson & Platt, 2005) can put this group at a 
particular disadvantage before the interview even commences.  Police Officers may not be 
aware of the additional level of support this group might need and may not adapt their 
language and behaviour to suit the needs of these witnesses (Brennan & Brennan, 1994).  This 
lack of awareness could result in the accounts of witnesses with ID being less complete, 
meaning that police officers resort to the repetition of questions and the use of more prompts 
and a closed questioning style to extract more detailed information (Milne et al., 2013).  As 
noted in chapter 1, open questions (e.g., free recall prompts), are most effective at eliciting 
accurate information from individuals with ID (Collins & Henry, 2016; Henry & Gudjonsson, 
1999; 2003), whilst more specific prompts can have a detrimental impact on accuracy rates 
(Agnew & Powell, 2004) and closed question types can lead to an increase in acquiescence 
(Heal & Sigelman, 1995). 
 
Whilst individuals with ID are at an increased risk of being abused, there is also the likelihood 
that left undetected, this abuse may be repeated over many months or even years 
(McCormack et al., 2005).  It is therefore likely that these individuals would need to be 
repeatedly interviewed. However, the potential effects of repeat interviewing on the reliability 
of eyewitness evidence is subject to much debate.  In children with mild and moderate ID, the 
use of repeat interviews can lead to an increase in the amount of information produced, 
particularly in response to free recall and general questions (Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003).  
However, whilst repeat interviews can result in the reporting of new information, this 
information may be less reliable (Brown et al., 2015). In addition, some of the reservations 
about using repeat interviews are that they may encourage witnesses to produce 
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contradictory information, i.e., change details of their account from one interview to the next, 
(which could consequently affect the perceived accuracy and credibility of eyewitness 
evidence), whilst also causing witnesses additional distress (at having to repeat information 
about potentially upsetting events) (Odinot, Memon, La Rooy & Millen, 2013).  Research does 
suggest, however, that concerns regarding the production of contradictory information may be 
unfounded as Cederborg et al. (2008) in their study of repeated interviews with children with 
ID, found that only 3% of the information in the repeat interview was contradictory. With 
regards to adults with ID, as far as the researcher is aware, there is currently no research that 
has explored the impact of repeat interviews on this group’s eyewitness evidence.  
 
Repeat instances of abuse may also raise concerns about confusing specific details from 
separate events, i.e., source misattribution.   This is especially problematic when events are 
similar (Johnson et al., 1993), as might be the case with abuse.  Indeed, research has shown 
that exposure to similar events in TD children can result in increased source misattribution 
errors (Roberts & Blades, 1999) and this could also prove a problem for individuals with ID 
since research has found that this group experience issues with source monitoring (Lorsbach & 
Ewing, 1995).   
 
The research presented here explores the ability of adults with ID and TD children to recall 
information about two separate but similar eyewitness events.   Being able to discriminate 
between the two events is pertinent, not only because the abuse or victimisation of these two 
groups can often be repeated and sustained (Cambridge et al., 2011; Finkelhor, Ormrod, 
Turner & Hamby, 2005), but also because they will be required to recall events separately for 
particularisation purposes.  Approximately 30 minutes after viewing the two eyewitness 
events, the participants, who were matched based on mental age, undertook a brief witness 
interview, as per a police officer taking a statement at the scene of a crime.  Little research has 
examined witness performance in statement taking interviews.   One-week later participants 
undertook a much more detailed witness interview.  Due to the mixed findings regarding the 
use of repeat interviews with TD children and the fact that, as far as the researcher is aware, 
no such research exists in relation to adults with ID, this study also investigated the effect of a 








The key aims of this study were therefore: 
 
(1) To examine the quality, accuracy and reliability of eyewitness memory in adults with ID 
and TD children for two separate but similar eyewitness events.  
 
(2) To ascertain if the requirement to recall information about two separate but similar 
events will result in source monitoring errors. 
 
(3) To assess the effect of repeat witness interviews on eyewitness evidence, including 
whether: (a) new details will be recalled and (b) participants will change their 
responses. 
 
Based on findings from previous research it is predicted that, for the brief and first detailed 
witness interviews, the mental age matched adults with ID and TD children will recall 
comparative amounts of correct, incorrect and confabulated information, with similar levels of 
accuracy.  It is further predicted that the adults with ID will produce more source monitoring 
errors, across both the brief and detailed witness interviews, than the TD children.  Definitive 
predictions have not been made in relation to the repeat interviews, due to the mixed findings 
of previous studies in relation to TD children and the lack of research regarding adults with ID.  
However, the key questions that will be addressed here are whether the repeat detailed 
interviews will have a beneficial effect on recall i.e., result in recall of new information, or 




A total of 80 participants took part in the study: 40 adults with ID (17 males and 23 females, 
aged between 23 years and 64 years 5 months) and 40 TD children (19 males and 21 females, 
aged between 4 years 7 months and 8 years).  The adults with ID were recruited through two 
arts and craft centres, a wellbeing hub and a farm providing work-based training experience 
for adults with learning disabilities.  The TD children were recruited through family and friends 
as well as two local primary schools.  As far as could be ascertained (from the Centre or Club 
Managers), each of the adults with ID had received a diagnosis of a non-specific intellectual 
disability (without any co-morbid diagnoses such as Williams syndrome, Down syndrome or 
Autistic Spectrum Disorder) in the mild to moderate ID range (i.e., an approximate IQ of 
between 40 and 70).  In addition, parents and teachers of the TD children were also advised 
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that the children should not have an intellectual disability.  The range of IQ’s for the adults 




A post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to examine the 
statistical power required for a small (w = .10), medium (w = .25), and large (w = .40) effect size 
with an alpha level of p < .05 (Cohen, 1992).   This power analysis was conducted for: correct 
and incorrect information, as well as overall total information (correct + incorrect + SMEs + 
confabulations) and overall total incorrect information (incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) 
recalled in the (main) first detailed witness interview. 
 
For a MANOVA with 80 participants, examining the effect of the main independent variable 
(group: adults with ID and TD children) on correct and incorrect information recalled, the 
statistical power required was .14 for detecting a small effect, .60 for detecting a medium 
effect and .94 for detecting a large effect.  The power analysis results were exactly the same 
for overall total information (correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) and overall total 
incorrect information (incorrect + SMEs + confabulations).  Thus, there was ample power to 
detect medium and large effect sizes.   
 
Table 3.1  Means (and standard deviations) for chronological age, mental age and    
abbreviated Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test score (ABIQ) for the adults with ID and TD 
children 
* No significant difference in mental age between the two groups, t(78) = -0.62, p = .53 
** Significant difference in ABIQ between the two groups, t(78) = -31.01, p < .001 
 
3.3.2 Design 
A between-subjects design was employed for this study. The independent variables were 
group which had two levels (adults with ID and TD children) and type of interview, which had 
two levels (detailed interview and repeat detailed interview).  The dependent variables 
consisted of the information types as described in section 3.3.4.1 below.  
 
Measure Adults with ID TD Children 
    
Chronological age 39yrs 4m (11yrs 4m) 6yrs 1m (11m) 
Mental age* 6yrs 5m (1y 1m) 6yrs 7m (11m) 




3.3.3.1  Eyewitness Events 
There were two filmed eyewitness events, the presentation of which was counterbalanced to 
guard against order effects1.  Film A, which was 3 minutes and 51 seconds in duration, 
depicted a very mild disability hate crime and was set inside in a council office training room.  
A female in a wheelchair (the victim) attends a first aid course run by a male instructor 
(perpetrator).  During the course the male asks the female to carry out a number of training 
exercises (bandaging an arm and assisting someone who has fainted), one of which she is 
unable to perform, much to the male’s annoyance.  The film culminates with a confrontation 
between the male and female over the use of a disabled toilet, during which the male is very 
rude to the female. 
 
Film B was 3 minutes and 48 seconds long and again depicted a very mild disability hate crime 
that occurs outside in a park.  It involves the same female in a wheelchair (the victim) taking 
her dog for a walk and a different male (the perpetrator) to the first film, who is cycling along 
on his bike.  Tensions between the two begin to escalate after the male obstructs the pathway 
with his bike. The film concludes with the female’s dog picking up the man’s ball and the male 
verbally abusing the female (calls her and her dog ‘stupid’).  The films contained no violent 
content so as to minimise potential psychological distress.   
 
The same female (victim), but different males (perpetrators) were used in each film to 
simulate the situation whereby adults with ID and TD children may be subjected to repeated 
abuse by multiple perpetrators.  Of interest here was the participant’s ability to distinguish 
between, and accurately recall information from, two separate events. 
 
To ensure that both films contained similar amounts of quantifiable information, each film was 
coded (both by the researcher and a second coder) for the number of people, locations, items, 
actions and speech details.  Film A contained 40 pieces of information relating to people, 8 for 
location, 14 for items, 50 for actions and 43 for speech.  Film B contained 43 pieces of people 
information, 6 for location, 16 for items, 54 for actions and 39 for speech.  There was a high 









3.3.3.2  Investigative Interviews 
All participants (N = 80) undertook a brief interview and a detailed witness interview. Half of 
the participants (N = 40: 20 adults with ID and 20 TD children) undertook a second (repeat) 
detailed witness interview (which was completed in an identical manner to the first). 
 
Brief Statement Taking Interview 
The brief statement taking interview consisted of a set of evidence gathering questions similar 
to those a First Response Police Officer would ask upon arriving at the scene of a crime.  The 
questions included a free recall question (‘tell me what you remember about what you just 
saw’) as well as more specific questions (‘who was there?’, ‘what did they do?’, ‘what did they 
look like?’ etc.) (see Appendix G for a copy of the Brief Statement Taking Interview) 
 
Detailed Witness Interview Protocol 
The detailed witness interview, which was used for both the first and repeat interviews, was 
based on current police practice and as per the ABE (Ministry of Justice, 2011) it consisted of a 
phased questioning approach, compromising seven separate phases in total.  
 
In the first phase the participant was thanked for coming and asked if they were happy to take 
part in the research.  Phase 2 comprised the establishment of rapport with the interviewer 
asking the participant some general questions about hobbies and pets etc. Phase 3 sought to 
establish that the participant understood the difference between a ‘truth’ and a ‘lie’.  This was 
carried out using an example such as, ‘can you tell me whether what I say is true or a lie’ and 
then pointing to a computer and stating ‘that is a television, is that true or a lie?’. In phase 4 
the purpose of the interview was explained and the interviewer clarified which film the 
participant would be questioned about.  This was done by referring to film A as the film that 
was ‘inside’ and film B as ‘outside’ to differentiate clearly between the two films, without 
divulging anything regarding their content.  The participant was reminded that they should tell 
the truth.  In the next section of the interview, phase 5, participants were prompted to provide 
a free recall narrative of the relevant film and reminded ‘never to guess or make anything up’.  
Phase 6 consisted of specific questioning, with participants being asked one question for each 
main piece of information recalled during the free narrative phase.   
 
The order of questioning was led by the order in which information had been recalled using 
open-ended questions and suggestive questions (i.e., suggesting the answer) were not used.  
In the final ‘closure’ phase participants were offered the opportunity to add to or amend their 
eyewitness account before being thanked for their assistance. 
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This detailed witness interview is a tried and tested protocol which has been used in previous 
research on child witnesses with and without autism spectrum disorder (Henry et al., 2017) 
(see Appendix G for a copy of the Detailed Witness Interview Protocol). 
 
3.3.3.3  Assessments of Cognition and Suggestibility 
The following measures of cognition and suggestibility were used in this study:   
 
(1) An abbreviated version of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB-
5; Roid, 2003) – employed to provide an estimate of overall intellectual 
functioning (nonverbal and verbal ability) 
 
(2) The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, Fourth Edition (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 2007) 
– included to measure receptive (hearing) vocabulary. 
 
(3) Two sub-tests from the Test of Memory and Learning (memory for stories and 
memory for faces), Second Edition (TOMAL-2; Reynolds & Bigler, 2007) - to assess 
participants’ memory functioning in these two areas. 
 
(4) An abbreviated version of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS2; 
Gudjonsson, 1997) – employed to ascertain participants’ susceptibility to 
interrogative suggestibility.   
 
Further information about these measures, their scoring criteria, and their relationships with 




All of the participants were tested on an individual basis and testing took place at the group, 
club or school they attended.  There were up to three sessions in total.  Half of the participants 
undertook two sessions (a brief statement taking interview and a detailed witness interview) 
and half undertook three sessions (a brief interview, a detailed witness interview and a repeat 
detailed witness interview).  Questions were asked based upon the order in which the films 
were presented, i.e., film A followed by film B or film B followed by film A.  The researcher 
referred to film A as the film that was ‘inside’ and film B as the film that was ‘outside’, so that 
the participants were clear as to which film the interview questions related. 
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Parental consent was obtained for the TD children and where applicable, from the parents of 
the adults with ID (see Appendices C and E for the Parent Information Sheet and Consent 
Form).  In the first session the researcher discussed the relevant Information Sheet with each 
participant (see Appendix B for the adults with ID and Appendix H for the TD children).  
Capacity to consent was then assessed for the adults with ID.  This entailed asking the adults a 
set of questions to ensure that they understood what the study was about and what they 
would be required to do if they decided they would like to take part (see chapter 2 
Methodological Challenges, for further information about the capacity to consent process). 
After written consent was obtained (see Appendices D and I), participants were instructed to 
watch the two eyewitness events (films) on a laptop.  Once the films had been viewed, the two 
sub-tests from the TOMAL-2 (memory for faces and memory for stories) followed by the two-
subtests from the SB-5 (nonverbal fluid reasoning and verbal knowledge) were administered.  
These tests served as a ‘buffer task’ between viewing the films and the brief interview. They 
were administered in the same order for every participant.  The session finished with the 
administration of the brief interview, with the order of questions following that of the 
presentation of the films.   The brief interviews were video recorded. 
 
The second session was conducted after a delay period of one week and commenced with the 
PPVT-4 followed by the detailed witness interviews, which were video recorded.  The 
interviews were conducted in the same order in which the films had been presented. Once the 
interviews were complete, participants were provided with instructions for the video 
identification line-ups and then the line-ups were administered (See chapter 4 – Identification 
in adults with ID, for a more detailed discussion about the identification line-ups).  Finally, the 
abbreviated GSS2 was administered (responses were audio recorded). 
 
Half of the participants, i.e., every second participant, undertook a third session after a further 
delay of one week (i.e., one week after the first interview, two weeks after viewing the 
eyewitness films).  During this session the detailed witness interview was again administered 
(as with the first interview, this repeat interview was also video recorded). 
 
Participants were debriefed after each session (see Appendices F and J) and offered the 







3.3.4.1   Transcribing and Coding 
All of the interviews (brief statement taking, detailed witness and repeat detailed witness) 
were transcribed verbatim to facilitate coding.  During this process any references to names 
and places etc. were removed to ensure participant anonymity. 
 
The transcripts were coded as follows with each piece of information recalled being awarded 
one point: 
 
Brief statement taking interview and detailed witness interview 
• Correct  
• Incorrect (inaccurate information) 
• Source monitoring errors (SME, i.e., information from the other film)  
• Confabulations (fabricated information) 
 
Repeat detailed witness interview 
• New correct (not mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• Repeated correct (mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• New incorrect (not mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• Repeated incorrect (mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• New SME (not mentioned in first detailed interview)  
• Repeated SME (mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• New confabulations (not mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• Repeated confabulations (mentioned in first detailed interview) 
• Contradictions (i.e., changed responses, mentioned in first detailed interview but 
changed in repeat detailed interview) 
 
Information from each film was coded separately as well as in combination, i.e., film A plus 
film B, for each interview.   
 
3.3.4.2    Inter-rater Reliability 
20% of the transcripts from the brief, detailed and repeat detailed interviews were re-coded 
by a second rater.  This was undertaken following a detailed discussion between the two 
coders, during which the main ideas relating to each piece of information were explained and 
examples highlighted.  See Table 3.2 below for details regarding the correlational analyses for 
each of the question types across all 3 interviews for the inter-rater reliability checks.  The 
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acceptable level of consistency between coders was based on a correlational coefficient of at 
least r = 0.80 (indicating a strong relationship; Coolican, 2009).  In relation to recall for film B in 
the repeat detailed interview, initial correlational analyses indicated inconsistency between 
the two coders for new source monitoring errors and repeat incorrect questions.  Resolution 
and agreement of these inconsistencies between the coders was achieved by further 
discussion and clarification of the key concepts behind these two dependent variables, before 
analyses were repeated. 
 
Table 3.2   Inter-rater reliability correlation coefficients (r) for each question type across  








































Interview and Question 
Type 
Eyewitness Film 
 Film A Film B 
 Brief statement taking interview 
Correct .917 .957 
Incorrect (inaccurate) .876 .955 
SMEs .942 .873 
Confabulations .845 .889 
 First detailed witness interview 
Correct .953 .964 
Incorrect (inaccurate) .934 .818 
SMEs .992 .902 
Confabulations .960 .959 
 Repeat detailed witness interview 
New correct .952 .907 







New SMEs .800 .889 
Repeated SMEs 1.00 .913 
New confabulations .828 .906 
Repeat confabulations .941 .802 
Contradictions .938 .934 
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3.4    Results 
Data for both films was combined to counter the fact that participants recalled more total 
information for film B compared to film A.  Descriptive statistics for each individual film are 
however, provided in the relevant tables and data was examined separately with regards to 
SMEs. 
 
Non-normality and homogeneity of variance 
Prior to running any detailed analyses, statistical checks were undertaken in relation to non-
normality and homogeneity of variance.   As the data for SMEs, confabulations and 
contradictions was highly positively skewed (i.e., > 1.96 (Field, 2009)), (due to a high number of 
low scores) and transformations were unsuccessful in reducing this skew, descriptive statistics 
for these data have been presented, as opposed to subjecting this data to formal statistical 
analyses.  Moreover, as percentage accuracy across the three types of interview demonstrated 
varying levels of negative skew, which was also not reduced sufficiently by the use of 
transformations, this data was analysed using a Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
Multicollinearity  
In order to ensure that none of the variables were highly correlated (r >.80 according to Field, 
2009) (i.e., there was no multicollinearity), a correlation matrix was produced for each 
interview using all of the dependent variables (type of information).  This revealed correlations 
of > .80 for the relationship between correct information and total information recalled (r = 
.979), and between incorrect information (not SME) and total incorrect information recalled 
(incorrect, SME and confabulations) (r = .900) for the brief interviews.  In relation to the first 
detailed interviews, correlations were > .80 for the relationship between correct information 
and total information recalled (r = .960) and between incorrect information (not SME) and 
total information recalled (r = .846).  For the repeat detailed interviews, correlations of >.80 
were discovered for the relationship between repeat correct information and total information 
recalled (r = .928), between repeat correct and total correct information recalled (r = .972), 
between new incorrect and total incorrect (r = .887), between total correct and total 
information recalled (r = .963) and between total incorrect and total information recalled (r = 
.842).  
 
 As it appeared that it was primarily the ‘total’ variables that were creating the issue of 
multicollinearity, these variables were analysed in a separate MANOVA (after further checks 




3.4.1 Brief Statement Taking Interview 
The mean number of items of information recalled by the adults with ID and TD children for 
the brief statement taking interviews for both film A and film B are provided in Table 3.3 
below. 
 
To examine group differences in the amount of correct, incorrect, overall total information 
(correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) and overall total incorrect information (incorrect 
+ SMEs + confabulations) recalled, two separate MANOVAs were conducted to overcome the 
previously mentioned issues with multicollinearity.  Correct and incorrect information was 
analysed in the first MANOVA and overall total information and overall total incorrect 
information was analysed in the second MANOVA.  For both MANOVAs, group was entered as 
the independent variable and type of information entered as the dependent variable.   
 
A Bonferroni correction of p < .025 (the usual p value (.05) divided by number of tests used, 
i.e., two) was applied to the MANOVAs and follow-up univariate ANOVA test results. 
 
The MANOVA relating to correct and incorrect information revealed that Levene’s test was 
significant for the incorrect data (p = .043), despite skew and kurtosis of < 1.96 (Field, 2009).  
The incorrect data was therefore subjected to square root transformation and the MANOVA 
re-run.  The square root transformed data was successful in reducing variance however, use of 
the transformed data made no difference to the MANOVA results. Results relating to the non-
transformed incorrect data are therefore reported for ease of interpretation. 
 
Data relating to overall total incorrect information (incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) was 
also subject to a square root transformation in order to reduce skew and kurtosis.  The square 
root transformed data was successful in reducing variance however, use of the transformed 
data made no difference to the MANOVA results.  Results relating to the non-transformed 
overall incorrect data are therefore reported. 
 
3.4.1.2 Amount of Information Recalled (Correct and Incorrect) 
Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that group had a significant effect on the amount of 
information recalled (correct and incorrect), V = 0.19, F(2, 77) = 9.23, p < .001.  Follow up 
univariate ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of group on the amount of incorrect 
information recalled, F(1, 78) = 11.20, p = .001, r  = 0.22, representing a small effect size.   The 
TD children produced more incorrect information (M = 5.70. SD = 3.64) compared to the adults 
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with ID (M = 3.25, SD = 2.86).  There were however, no significant group differences in the 
amount of correct information recalled, F(1, 78) = .15, p = .70.  
 
Using Pillai’s trace, it was also determined that group had a significant effect on the total 
amount of information recalled (overall total information and overall total incorrect 
information), V = 0.23, F(2, 77) = 11.69, p < .001.  Follow up univariate ANOVAs revealed a 
significant effect of group on overall total incorrect information recalled, F(1, 78) = 15.61, p < 
.001,  r  = .24, representing a small effect size.  The TD children produced more overall total 
incorrect information (M = 7.80, SD = 4.34) than the adults with ID (M = 4.23, SD = 3.73).  There 
were no significant group differences in the amount of overall total information recalled, F(1, 
78) = 0.22, p = .64. 
 
3.4.1.3 Accuracy of Information  
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there was a significant difference between the groups in 
relation to percentage accuracy of the information recalled, H(1) = 21.16, p < .001.  A follow up 
Mann-Whitney test established that the accuracy of information recalled was higher for the 
adults with ID (M = 89.67, SD = 8.83) compared to the TD children (M = 81.26, SD = 8.05), U = 
322, r = -.51. 
 
3.4.1.4 Source Monitoring Errors (SMEs) and Confabulations  
Whilst SMEs overall (for both films) were very low across the two groups, the TD children 
produced slightly more SMEs (M = 1.40, SD = 1.61) compared to the TD adults (M = 0.60, SD = 
1.01).   The number of confabulations was also very low across both groups.  However, the TD 
children produced more confabulations (M = 0.70, SD = 1.54) than the adults with ID, (M = 0.37 





Table 3.3   Means (and standard deviations) for type of information recalled in the brief statement taking interview 
† Total incorrect information = inaccurate information + SMEs + confabulations 
# Total information recalled = correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations 
‡ % accuracy = correct information as a percentage of total information recall 
 
 
Type of information Brief Interview (N = 80) 
 Adults with intellectual disabilities (N = 40) Typically developing children (N = 40) 
 Film A Film B Film A + B Film A Film B Film A + B 
Correct 15.10 (7.88) 20.65 (10.35) 35.75 (17.49) 13.30 (7.31) 20.95 (10.56) 34.25 (16.92) 
Incorrect (inaccurate) 1.37 (1.48) 1.88 (1.83) 3.25 (2.86) 3.05 (1.95) 2.65 (2.42) 5.70 (3.64) 
SMEs 0.40 (.81) 0.20 (.52) 0.60 (1.01) 0.75 (1.03) 0.65 (1.19) 1.40 (1.61) 
Confabulations 0.08 (.27) 0.30 (1.30) 0.37 (1.31) 0.37 (1.05) 0.32 (.69) 0.70 (1.54) 
Total incorrect  
information†  
1.85 (2.02) 2.38 (2.38) 4.23 (3.73) 4.17 (2.50) 3.62 (2.85) 7.80 (4.34) 
Total information  
recalled# 
16.95 (8.78) 23.03 (11.41) 39.98 (19.37) 17.47 (9.13) 24.58 (12.00) 42.05 (19.85) 
% accuracy‡ 87.47 (17.76) 90.06 (10.59) 89.67 (8.83) 72.28 (19.86) 85.42 (10.70) 81.26 (8.05) 
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3.4.2 First Detailed Witness Interviews 
The mean number of items of information recalled for the first detailed interview (for all 
participants), for both film A and B, are provided in Table 3.4 below.  
 
To examine group differences in the amount of correct, incorrect, overall total information 
(correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) and overall total incorrect information (incorrect 
+ SMEs + confabulations) recalled, two separate MANOVAs were conducted to overcome the 
previously mentioned issues with multicollinearity.  Correct and incorrect information was 
analysed in the first MANOVA and overall total information and overall total incorrect 
information was analysed in the second MANOVA.  For both MANOVAs, group was entered as 
the independent variable and type of information entered as the dependent variable.   
 
A Bonferroni correction of p < .025 (the usual p value (.05) divided by number of tests used, 
i.e., two) was applied to the MANOVA and follow-up univariate ANOVA test results. 
 
Data relating to overall total incorrect information (incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) was 
subject to a square root transformation in order to reduce skew and kurtosis.  The square root 
transformed data was successful in reducing variance however, use of the transformed data 
made no difference to the MANOVA results.  Results relating to the non-transformed overall 
total incorrect data are therefore reported. 
 
3.4.2.1 Amount of Correct and Incorrect Information  
Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that group did not have a significant effect on the amount of 
information recalled (correct and incorrect), V = 0.05, F(2, 77) = 1.82, p = .17.  The adults with 
ID and TD children recalled a comparable amount of correct (M = 36.93, SD = 19.78 and M = 
40.70, SD = 20.72 respectively) and incorrect information (M = 6.43, SD = 5.53 and M = 8.80, SD 
= 5.75 respectively).   
 
With regards to overall total amount of information and overall total incorrect information 
recalled, again using Pillai’s trace, it was revealed that there were no significant group 
differences, V = 0.06, F(2, 77) = 2.55, p = .086.  The adults with ID recalled just as much overall 
total information (M = 45.73, SD = 22.52) and overall total incorrect information (M = 8.80, SD 








Table 3.4    Means (and standard deviations) for type of information recalled in the first detailed witness interview  
† Total incorrect information = inaccurate information + SMEs + confabulations 
# Total information = correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations 






Type of information Detailed Witness Interview (N = 80) 
 Adults with intellectual disabilities (N = 40) Typically developing children (N = 40) 
 Film A Film B Film A + B Film A Film B Film A + B 
Correct 15.23 (10.34) 21.70 (11.16) 36.93 (19.78) 15.73 (8.84) 24.97 (13.56) 40.70 (20.72) 
Incorrect (inaccurate) 3.10 (3.22) 3.32 (2.86) 6.43 (5.53) 4.38 (3.13) 4.42 (3.41) 8.80 (5.75) 
SMEs 0.90 (2.70) 0.35 (.92) 1.25 (3.23) 0.95 (1.22) 0.85 (.89) 1.80 (1.54) 
Confabulations .13 (.40) 1.00 (3.72) 1.13 (3.72) 1.20 (2.42) 0.85 (1.12) 2.05 (3.01) 
Total incorrect  
information†  
 
4.12 (3.98) 4.68 (4.83) 8.80 (6.97) 6.53 (4.91) 6.13 (4.35) 12.65 (8.19) 
Total information  
recalled# 
 
19.35 (12.21) 26.37 (12.67) 45.73 (22.52) 22.25 (12.08) 31.10 (16.83) 53.35 (26.55) 
% accuracy‡ 68.28 (29.71) 80.41 (21.68) 79.90 (17.07) 67.96 (20.57) 76.61 (19.37) 74.45 (15.68) 
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3.4.2.2 Accuracy of Information  
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there was a significant difference between the groups in 
relation to percentage accuracy of the information recalled, H(1) = 6.70, p = .01.  A follow up 
Mann-Whitney test showed that that the accuracy of information recalled was higher for the 
adults with ID (M = 79.90, SD = 17.07) compared to the TD children (M = 74.45, SD = 15.68), U 
= 531, r = -.29. 
 
3.4.2.3 Source Monitoring Errors (SMEs) and Confabulations  
Whilst SMEs overall (for both films) were very low across the two groups, the TD children 
produced slightly more SMEs (M = 1.80, SD = 1.54) compared to the adults with ID (M = 1.25, 
SD = 3.23).    
 
The number of confabulations was also very low across both groups.  However, the TD children 
produced more confabulations (M = 2.05, SD = 3.01) than the adults with ID (M = 1.13, SD = 
3.72). 
 
3.4.3 Repeat Detailed Witness Interview 
The mean number of items of information recalled for the repeat detailed interview (for all 
participants), for both film A and B, are provided in Table 3.5 below.   
 
To overcome issues with multicollinearity two separate MANOVAs were utilised with the 
amount of new correct and new incorrect information recalled entered into one MANOVA and 
total correct (new correct and repeat correct), total incorrect (new incorrect and repeat 
incorrect) and overall total incorrect information recalled (inaccurate information, SMEs and 
confabulations) entered into another MANOVA.  For both MANOVAs, group was entered as 
the independent variable and type of information entered as the dependent variable.   
 
Overall total information recalled (new and repeat correct, new and repeat incorrect, SMEs 
and confabulations) was analysed using an independent samples t-test as this variable was 
highly correlated with each of the other ‘total’ variables (i.e., total correct, total incorrect and 
overall total incorrect information).  
 
Data relating to new incorrect information as well as overall total incorrect information 
(incorrect + SMEs + confabulations) was subject to a square root transformation in order to 
reduce skew and kurtosis.  The square root transformed data was successful in reducing 
variance however, use of the transformed data made no difference to the MANOVA results.  
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Results relating to the non-transformed new incorrect data and overall total incorrect data are 
therefore reported. 
 
A mixed design MANOVA was used to determine the effect of both group and interview on the 
amount of correct and incorrect information recalled for the 40 participants who undertook 
both a first and repeat detailed interview. 
 
A Bonferroni correction of p < .0125 (the usual p value (.05) divided by number of tests used 
i.e., four (including the mixed design MANOVA)) was applied to the MANOVAs and follow-up 
univariate ANOVA test results. 
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         Table 3.5    Means (and standard deviations) for type of information recalled in the repeat detailed witness interview 
Type of information Repeat Detailed Witness Interview (N = 40) 
 Adults with intellectual disabilities (N = 20) Typically developing children (N = 20) 
 Film A Film B Film A + B Film A Film B Film A + B 
New correct 4.25 (3.46) 6.05 (4.14) 10.30 (6.91) 5.00 (3.61) 7.75 (5.18) 12.75 (6.69) 
Repeat correct 9.35 (9.14) 14.65 (10.77) 24.00 (19.19) 11.55 (7.30) 17.00 (10.12) 28.55 (16.44) 
Total correct 13.60 (11.51) 20.70 (13.55) 34.30 (24.19) 16.55 (9.75) 24.75 (13.14) 41.30 (21.16) 
New incorrect (inaccurate) 2.20 (1.85) 3.10 (3.16) 5.30 (4.68) 2.35 (1.76) 3.20 (2.24) 5.55 (3.09) 
Repeat incorrect 
(inaccurate) 
0.70 (1.13) 1.30 (1.59) 2.00 (2.34) 1.90 (2.20) 1.55 (1.40) 3.45 (3.15) 
Total incorrect 
(inaccurate) 
2.90 (2.51) 4.40 (4.01) 7.30 (6.10) 4.25 (2.85) 4.75 (3.08) 9.00 (5.20) 
New SMEs 0.35 (.59) 0.30 (.66) 0.65 (.93) 0.65 (.75) 0.35 (.75) 1.00 (.97) 
Repeat SMEs 0.10 (.31) 0.15 (.37) 0.25 (.55) 0.55 (.76) 0.60 (.75) 1.15 (1.04) 
Total SMEs 0.45 (.76) 0.45 (.95) 0.90 (1.37) 1.20 (1.11) 0.95 (.95) 2.15 (1.35) 
New confabulations 0.70 (2.16) 0.95 (2.56) 1.65 (4.69) 0.80 (1.15) 1.65 (2.46) 2.45 (3.17) 
Repeat confabulations 0.05 (.22) 0.50 (1.67) 0.55 (1.70) 0.70 (1.26) 0.10 (.45) 0.80 (1.28) 
Total confabulations 0.75 (2.15) 1.45 (4.21) 2.20 (6.34) 1.50 (1.61) 1.75 (2.43) 3.25 (3.60) 
Contradictions 0.80 (1.15) 1.00 (1.38) 1.80 (2.31) 1.15 (1.50) 1.40 (2.04) 2.55 (2.80) 
Total incorrect  
information†  
4.1 (3.37) 6.3 (5.89) 10.40 (8.82) 6.95 (3.79) 7.45 (4.03) 14.40 (6.96) 
Total information  
recalled# 
17.70 (13.45) 27.00 (16.34) 44.70 (28.67) 23.50 (11.91) 32.20 (15.08) 55.70 (25.16) 
% accuracy‡ 60.38 (33.92) 70.30 (28.85) 70.18 (28.07) 64.87 (20.47) 71.02 (22.45) 72.03 (16.63) 
             † Total incorrect information = inaccurate information + SMEs + confabulations 
                   # Total information = correct + incorrect + SMEs + confabulations 
                   ‡ % accuracy = correct information as a percentage of total information recalled
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3.4.3.1 New Correct and New Incorrect Information Recalled 
Using Pillai’s trace it was found that there were no significant group differences in amount of 
new correct and new incorrect information recalled, V = 0.05, F(2, 37) = 0.89, p = .42.  The 
adults with ID recalled just as much new correct (M = 10.30, SD = 6.91), and new incorrect 
information (M = 5.30, SD = 4.68), as the TD children (M = 12.75, SD = 6.69 and M = 5.55, SD = 
3.09 respectively). 
 
3.4.3.2 Total Information  
Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that group did not have a significant effect on the amount of 
total correct, total incorrect and overall total incorrect information recalled, V = 0.08, F(3, 36) = 
1.09, p = .37.  The adults with ID and TD children recalled a comparable amount of total correct 
(M = 34.30, SD = 24.19 and M = 41.30, SD = 21.16 respectively), total incorrect (M = 7.30, SD = 
6.10 and M = 9.00, SD = 5.20 respectively) and overall total incorrect information (M = 10.40, 
SD = 8.82 and M = 14.40, SD = 6.96 respectively).   
 
An independent samples t-test showed that there was no significant group difference in the 
amount of overall total information recalled, t(38) = 1.290, p = .21.  The adults with ID recalled 
just as much overall total information (M = 44.70, SD = 28.67) as the TD children (M = 55.70, SD 
= 25.16). 
 
3.4.3.3 Accuracy of Information  
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant group differences in relation to percentage 
accuracy of the information recalled, H(1) = 0.949, p > .05.  The accuracy of the information 
recalled for the adults with ID (M = 70.18, SD = 28.07) was comparative to the TD children (M = 
72.03, SD = 16.63). 
 
3.4.3.4 Source Monitoring Errors (SMEs) and Confabulations  
Levels of SMEs were overall very low across both of the groups however, the TD children 
produced slightly more new (M = 1.00, SD = 0.97), repeat (M = 1.15, SD = 1.04) and total SMEs 
(M = 2.15, SD = 1.35) compared to the adults with ID  (M = 0.65, SD = 0.93, M = 0.25, SD = 0.55, 
M = 0.90, SD = 1.37 respectively).    
 
The number of confabulations was also very low across both groups.  However, as with SMEs, 
the TD children produced more new (M = 2.45, SD = 3.17), repeat (M = 0.80, SD = 1.28) and 
total confabulations (M = 3.25, SD = 3.60) in comparison to the adults with ID (M = 0.80 SD = 
1.15, M = 0.70, SD = 1.26 and M = 1.50, SD = 1.61 respectively). 
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3.4.3.5 Effect of Repeat Detailed Witness Interview on Recall of Correct, Incorrect, 
Confabulated and Contradictory Information 
A mixed design MANOVA was conducted to determine the effect of both group and interview 
on the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled for the 40 participants who 
undertook both a first and repeat detailed interview.  For this analysis correct and incorrect 
information from the first detailed interview was compared to new correct and new incorrect 
information from the repeat detailed interview.  Group was entered as the between subjects 
factor and interview as the within subjects factor.   Inclusion of the square root transformed 
data for incorrect (from the first detailed interview) and new incorrect information (from the 
repeat detailed interview) made no difference to the MANOVA results, thus results relating to 
the non-transformed data have been reported. 
 
Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that there was no significant effect of group when comparing 
the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled V = 0.04, F(2, 37) = 0.86, p = .43.    
 
There was however, a significant main effect of interview (first / repeat detailed witness 
interview) on the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled, V = 0.71, F(2, 37) = 
44.29, p < .001.  Across both groups univariate ANOVAs revealed that there was a significant 
effect of interview on correct information, F(1, 38) = 86.47, p < .001, r = 0.83, representing a 
large effect size.  For the adults with ID and TD children more correct information was recalled 
in the first detailed interview (M = 36.93, SD = 19.78 and M = 36.93, SD = 19.78 respectively) 
compared to the repeat detailed interview (M = 10.30, SD = 6.91 and M = 12.75, SD = 6.69 
respectively).   
 
The interaction between interview and group was not significant, V = 0.08, F(2, 37) = 1.54, p = 
.23,  indicating that there were no group differences in the effect of the repeat interview on 
the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled. 
 
In relation to confabulations, when comparing the first detailed interview to the repeat 
detailed interview there was a small increase in confabulations in the latter interview for both 
the adults with ID (M = 1.13, SD = 3.23 vs M = 1.65, SD = 4.69) and TD children (M = 2.05, SD = 
3.01 vs M = 2.45, SD = 3.17).   
 
Whilst there was a reduction in total SMEs between the first and repeat detailed interview for 
the adults with ID (M = 1.25, SD = 3.23 vs M = 0.90, SD = 1.37), the number of SMEs increased 
slightly for the TD children (M = 1.80 , SD = 1.54 vs M = 2.15, SD = 1.35). 
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With regards to contradictions (changed responses between the first and repeat detailed 
interviews), on the whole these were fairly low however, the TD children were more likely to 
change their responses (M = 2.55, SD = 2.80) compared to the adults with ID (M = 1.80, SD = 
2.31). 
 
To summarise, across the three interviews, there were no significant group differences in the 
amount of correct and overall total information recalled, although the TD children produced 
more SMEs and confabulations across each of the three interviews and recalled more incorrect 
information in the brief statement taking interview.  There were group differences in accuracy 
rates for the brief statement taking and first detailed witness interviews only, with the TD 
children producing less accurate information.  With regards to the actual effect of the repeat 
detailed witness interview on eyewitness recall, there was a small increase in confabulations 
for both groups, however, the TD children changed their responses more often and also 
produced more SMEs.  Both groups recalled less correct information in the repeat detailed 
witness interview in comparison to the first detailed witness interview. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The aims of this study were twofold: firstly, to examine the overall quality, accuracy and 
reliability of eyewitness memory in adults with ID and TD children for two separate but similar 
events and secondly, to assess the effect of a repeat interview on eyewitness evidence.  In 
relation to the brief statement taking and first detailed witness interviews it was predicted 
that, in comparison to the TD children, the MA matched adults with ID would provide 
comparative amounts of information (correct, incorrect and confabulated) with similar 
accuracy rates, but produce more SMEs and confabulations.  Whilst a prediction was not made 
in relation to the repeated detailed witness interview, due to a lack of existing research, of 
interest here was the effect, negative or positive, of the repeat interview on recall and 
changed responses (contradictions). 
 
3.5.1 Brief Statement Taking Interview 
Whilst there were no significant differences between the two groups in relation to the amount 
of correct and overall total information recalled, there was a significant group difference with 
regards to incorrect and overall total incorrect information recalled.  The TD children produced 
significantly more incorrect information and more overall total incorrect information 




With regards to accuracy of the information recalled, this was significantly higher for the adults 
with ID in comparison to that of the TD children.  Furthermore, although the number of SMEs 
produced across both groups was quite low, the TD children produced more SMEs than the 
adults with ID.  Neither of these findings were as predicted. 
 
3.5.2 First Detailed Witness Interview 
There were no significant group differences in the amount of correct, incorrect, overall total 
incorrect and overall total information recalled, which was consistent with the predicted 
findings.  However, as with the brief interview, there was a significant group difference in 
relation to accuracy, with the adults with ID producing more accurate information compared 
to the TD children.  Whilst total confabulation and SME rates were low overall, the TD children 
produced more confabulations and more SMEs than the adults with ID.  Again, these findings 
were not in line with those predicted. 
 
3.5.3 Repeat Detailed Witness Interview 
There were no significant group differences with regards to the amount of new correct, new 
incorrect, total correct, total incorrect, overall total incorrect and overall total information 
recalled.  In addition, group did not have a significant effect on accuracy levels of the recalled 
information, as these were comparative for the adults with ID and TD children. 
 
As with the brief and detailed interviews, levels of SMEs and confabulations were on the whole 
low.  However, once again the TD children produced more SMEs and confabulations compared 
to the adults with ID. 
 
3.5.4 Effect of Repeat Detailed Witness Interview 
With regards to the actual effect of the repeat detailed witness interview (i.e., examining the 
effect of the repeat detailed witness interview in comparison to the first detailed witness 
interview) on eyewitness recall, there was an increase in confabulations for both groups.  
Whilst there was a reduction in the number of SMEs for the adults with ID, SMEs rose slightly 
for the TD children.   Moreover, although the number of changed responses (contradictions) 
across both groups was on the whole low, the repeat interview led to more changed responses 
in the TD children.   
 
There were no significant group differences in the effect of the repeat detailed witness 
interview on the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled.  However, there was a 
significant effect of interview on the amount of correct information recalled by both the adults 
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with ID and TD children.  Both groups recalled less (new) correct information in the repeated 
detailed witness interview compared to the first detailed witness interview.  In addition, there 
was a slight reduction in accuracy in the repeat detailed interview, with the decrease being 
greater for the adults with ID (9.72%) compared to the TD children (2.42%). 
 
3.5.5 General Discussion 
Overall, the results of this study demonstrate that when matched for MA with a group of TD 
children, adults with ID recall comparable amounts of accurate information and produce very 
few confabulations, source monitoring errors and contradictions. 
 
Across all three interviews accuracy levels were fairly high.  However, the highest levels for 
both groups were seen in the brief interview, which could potentially be attributed to the fact 
that the delay between witnessing the events and undertaking the brief interview was fairly 
minimal, i.e., approximately 30 - 40 minutes, and as such would have been too short a period 
for memory decay to have occurred.  Indeed, it appeared that as the length of time between 
the interviews increased, accuracy rates decreased accordingly.  When comparing the initial 
brief statement taking interview with the repeat detailed witness interview, it is evident that 
the effect of length of delay between interviews was more pronounced on the accuracy rates 
for the adults with ID, who experienced an overall reduction of 19.5% compared to 9.2% in the 
TD children.  This effect could have been due to the adults experiencing problems with long-
term retention of information (Nolan et al., 1985). 
 
Whilst it is difficult to compare, on a like-for-like basis, the information recalled from the brief 
interview with the detailed witness interview because the question format was different, the 
brief interview does, however, serve a very important purpose.  It not only provides a baseline 
for the subsequent detailed witness interview, but it also acts to replicate what would actually 
happen in a real investigation.  Even more importantly, this brief interview may have 
functioned to strengthen memory for the two witnessed events and thus aid recall in the 
subsequent detailed interviews, as was evidenced by the high levels of accuracy and amount of 
information recalled.  Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1995) in their review of research on the 
impact of repeated interviews on TD children’s recall, maintain that an interview carried out 
fairly soon after a witnessed event may be particularly useful to long-term recall by 
safeguarding memory against forgetting.  Beneficial effects of an early interview on the 
amount and accuracy of information recalled in subsequent interviews have also been 
reported in research involving children with ID (Brown et al., 2015; Henry & Gudjonsson, 
2003). 
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The number of new correct details that participants reported in the repeat interview ranged 
from 0 to 27 for the adults with ID and 1 to 24 for the TD children.  In a police investigation any 
new correct information would undoubtedly be of huge benefit to the investigation process. It 
could provide new leads as well as helping to bolster the completeness of an account (La Rooy, 
Katz, Malloy & Lamb, 2010). This last point is especially pertinent given the fact that previous 
research, such as that by Agnew and Powell (2004) and Henry et al. (2011), has found that the 
accounts of children with ID tend to be less complete.  However, it is important to point out 
that both groups also recalled a significant number of new incorrect details (ranging from 0 to 
18 for the adults with ID and 1 to 11 for the TD children).  Whilst this may not have a 
detrimental impact in an experimental setting, where the researcher is afforded the advantage 
of being able to corroborate the accuracy of information recalled, it is likely to be problematic 
in a forensic setting. 
 
Of particular concern in relation to repeat interviews is the effect they might have on accuracy 
rates.  As already touched upon above, it is argued that repeat interviews may be beneficial in 
that they may help to strengthen original memory traces thus facilitating recall of additional 
information (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1995). However, there is concern that errors such as 
confabulations and incorrect information might become integrated into existing accurate 
memories of an event thereby contaminating the original memories (Ceci, Huffman, Smith & 
Loftus, 1994).  With regards to the current study, in comparison to the first detailed interview, 
accuracy rates in the repeat interview remained fairly consistent for the TD children.  However, 
there was almost a 10% reduction in accuracy rates for the adults with ID, although, as already 
noted, this reduction in accuracy for the adults with ID merely brought their accuracy rates in 
line with those of the TD children.  Furthermore, whilst the repeat interview did lead to a small 
increase in confabulations for both groups, this was fairly minimal (1.2% for the adults with ID 
and 0.6% for the TD children) and concerns regarding confabulations and incorrect information 
contaminating original memories appeared unfounded, due to the low number of repeat 
confabulations and incorrect details. 
 
Contradictions (i.e., changed responses) can prove an issue with regards to perceived 
credibility of eyewitness evidence, with jurors more likely to perceive witnesses who have 
changed their answers to be less reliable and less accurate (Berman et al., 1995).  The number 
of contradictions in the current study was however, low for both groups, which demonstrates 
that the two groups were quite consistent in their responses across both the first and repeat 
detailed interviews.  Such findings are in line with those of other studies that have employed 
84 
repeat interviews with children who do (e.g., Cederborg et al., 2008) and do not have ID (e.g., 
Waterhouse, 2016). 
 
As to why the adults with ID produced less contradictory information than the TD children, an 
answer to this may lie in social factors.   The use of repeat interviews may lead individuals to 
change their response because they believe their original answer in the first interview to be 
incorrect, which suggests that societal influences are at play.  These societal influences may be 
even more pronounced when there is a perceived imbalance of power between the 
interviewee and the interviewer, as might be the case when interviewing adults with ID or TD 
children.  Perhaps the adults with ID have learnt to better cope with such societal influences 
and imbalances of power, whereas the TD children have not yet acquired the same knowledge 
and experience. 
 
The fact that children consistently produced more source monitoring errors (across each 
interview) compared to the adults with ID is an interesting finding, given the cognitive deficits 
adults with ID are likely to experience and the fact that the two groups were matched for MA.  
An answer for the difference between the two groups may lie in developmental differences.  
Research that has examined source monitoring in TD children has found that when compared 
to adults (from the general population), young children (i.e., between 4 and 6 years) produce 
many more source monitoring errors, especially where events are similar.  However, the ability 
to distinguish between different sources of information appears to improve in line with age, 
i.e., be developmental (Lindsay, Johnson & Kwon, 1991; Sprondel, Kipp & Mecklinger, 2011).  
Whilst the adults with ID were matched to the TD children according to MA, it is important to 
point out that this is merely based on cognitive ability. The MA matching process cannot take 
into account the effects of life experience, knowledge, societal influences, nor the impact of 
maturity generally.  It is therefore possible, as has been touched upon above with 
contradictions, that a combination of these factors was to some extent influencing the 
production of source monitoring errors in the adults with ID.  It is further possible that, in 
accordance with the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), the adults with ID 
have more experience of assessing the likely source of an event based on qualitative 
characteristics of that memory.  As such a combination of these factors may have afforded the 
adults with ID an advantage in being better able to determine the source of their recalled 
memories. 
 
If, as it appeared, the TD children were experiencing more problems with source monitoring 
compared to the adults with ID, this in turn might help explain why this group also produced 
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more confabulations.  Researchers have suggested that confabulations stem from an 
individual’s inability to determine the source of a memory (Johnson, Hayes, D’Esposito, & 
Raye, 2000).  On this basis it is possible that when the TD children could not establish the 
actual source of the recalled information they instead resorted to confabulations.  It is further 
possible that these confabulations were actually source monitoring errors, whose source was 
distinct from the two eyewitness events.  
 
Taken as a whole, the results of this study have demonstrated, for the first time, that adults 
with ID can provide a substantial amount of reliable information about two separate but 
similar witnessed events with very few source monitoring errors and confabulations.  
Moreover, the repeat interview appeared to have a beneficial effect on recall, as many of the 
adults with ID produced several pieces of new correct information, without a particularly 
deleterious effect on contradictions, confabulations or accuracy rates when compared to the 
TD children.   
 
Obviously, the key limitation with the current study, as with much of the research on 
eyewitness memory, is that participants were not exposed to the same levels of emotional and 
psychological distress associated with witnessing a real crime.  Moreover, participants were 
interviewed in familiar surroundings surrounded by familiar faces as opposed to the alien 
environment of a police station.  This undoubtedly makes a big difference to the anxiety that 
an individual might experience in a real-life situation and is of particular relevance in relation 
to individuals with ID, who may find it especially difficult to contend with novel circumstances 
and unfamiliar environments (Bull, 1995). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In spite of the common perception of adults with ID as being less credible and reliable 
eyewitnesses, the results of this study demonstrate that this group can provide substantial 
amounts of accurate information about a witnessed event and moreover, are able to discern 
between two separate but similar witnessed events, with few source monitoring errors.  
Additionally, the results of this study not only add to the small body of existing literature in this 
area but also provide an insight into two previously unexplored areas, those of repeat 
interviews and eyewitness memory for multiple similar events. 
 
These findings also have important practical implications for the forensic investigation process.  
One of the main concerns regarding adults with intellectual disabilities is that they are 
prevented from participating fully in the CJS.  This can be due to several reasons which might 
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include: low reporting rates, the claims of adults with ID not being taken seriously (either by 
caregivers/guardians or police officers), stereotypical perceptions of adults with ID as 
unreliable and inaccurate witnesses as well as police officers and other CJS professionals not 
being aware of the most effective interviewing techniques (and appropriate questions) to 
facilitate recall of an accurate and reliable account from adults with ID.   However, the findings 
reported here demonstrate that, with the right interviews and the use of appropriate 
questioning (informed by previous research), adults with ID are just as capable of providing 
detailed and accurate eyewitness evidence as MA matched TD children. 
 
Moreover, although this group might be perceived to be at risk of confusing details from 
similar events (source monitoring errors), due to cognitive deficits in memory and attention, 
this does not appear to be the case, at least in the data from this study.  The present research 
demonstrates that this group are able to discern between two events and indeed, provide a 
narrative account of separate witnessed events.  Whilst there might be concern about the use 
of repeat interviews with adults with ID, it would appear that they can have a positive effect 
on eyewitness evidence by aiding recall of new (correct) details.  As already noted, any new 
detail, big or small, could be highly valuable in terms of the forensic investigation, possibly 
leading to the apprehension and subsequent identification of a perpetrator.  Indeed, it is this 
next part of the investigation process, that of eyewitness identification, that we turn to look at 


















Line-up Identification Performance 
in Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Whilst a considerable amount of eyewitness identification research has been conducted with 
the general population, very little has been carried out regarding individuals with ID.  The 
research reported in this chapter sought to address this imbalance by investigating the ability 
of adults with ID and MA matched TD children to accurately identify two perpetrators from PP 
and PA identification line-ups.  It also examined both groups’ memory for the non-biased line-
up instructions and understanding of the line-up’s purpose.   Results revealed that, in 
comparison to the TD children, across both line-ups the adults with ID made more false 
identifications, less correct identifications and less correct rejections.  Both groups struggled to 
remember the non-biased line-up instructions, however, the adults with ID demonstrated a 
better understanding of the line-up purpose than the TD children.   These findings have 
revealed that, for adults with ID, the task of identifying perpetrators from identification line-
ups is a particularly challenging element of the investigation process, thereby highlighting the 
need for much more research in this area. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Eyewitness identification not only plays a key role in the ability of police officers to link an 
offence to a specific perpetrator (Wells et al., 1998), but is also a highly persuasive form of 
evidence for a jury (Cutler et al., 1990).  However, as has already been noted in chapter 1, 
eyewitness identification evidence is not always accurate and can be influenced by a number 
of wide-ranging factors from both within and outside the control of the CJS (Wells, 1978).    Of 
notable interest with regards to the current study are witness factors such as age and cognitive 
ability and the role they might play in line-up identification accuracy. 
 
4.2.1 Line-up Identification Performance in Children 
A substantial proportion of the line-up identification research on children has reported 
equivalent accuracy rates on perpetrator present (PP) line-ups for children over the age of five 
years with adults (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998; Pozzulo & Balfour, 2006).  Whilst this was a well-
established and often quoted finding in the eyewitness literature, a meta-analytic review of 
research in this area found that adults actually make more correct identifications than young 
children on PP line-ups (Fitzgerald & Price, 2015).   Whilst there might be debate as to 
children’s identification accuracy on PP line-ups, the finding in relation to perpetrator absent 
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(PA) line-ups appears much clearer.  Even when informed that the perpetrator may not be 
present children still like to make a choice.  This is a finding that has been reported 
consistently across numerous research studies and does not appear to differ in relation to line-
up type (simultaneous versus sequential) nor mode (photographic versus video) of line-up 
presentation (Havard, Memon, Clifford & Gabbert, 2010; Humphries, Holliday & Flowe, 2012).    
 
The propensity for children to make a choice on PA line-ups has led researchers to investigate 
the use of alternative selection options (e.g., in the form of pictures), with the aim of assisting 
children in their ability to correctly reject the line-up choices.  In one such study, Zajac and 
Karageorge (2009) showed children aged between eight and eleven years a live eyewitness 
event and asked them to view a PP or PA line-up following a delay of between 24 and 48 
hours.  If children believed the perpetrator was not present, they were asked to either state 
this or point to a picture of a silhouetted figure superimposed with a question mark (wildcard). 
It was found that use of the wildcard significantly reduced the number of false identifications 
i.e., it led to an increase in correct rejections on the PA line-ups, without a detrimental impact 
on accuracy on the PP line-ups.  These findings regarding the effective benefits of pictorial 
prompts or aids on identification accuracy rates on PA line-ups have been corroborated in 
other research studies, for example, Dunlevy and Cherryman (2013); Havard and Memon, 
(2013). 
 
A number of explanations for the low identification accuracy rates often exhibited by children 
have been proposed, including the assertion that facial recognition abilities may develop in line 
with age, progressing from less accurate featural processing in childhood to more accurate 
holistic face processing in adulthood (Pozzulo & Lindsay 1998).  Indeed, research does exist 
which appears to provide support for this assertion, demonstrating a dramatic increase in 
children’s facial recognition ability from the age of five, with levels reaching those of adults 
during adolescence (Flin, 1980; Johnston & Ellis, 1995).  At first glance this would fit well with 
early identification research which has reported adult-like line-up identification performance 
in children aged five years and over (see Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998 for a meta-analysis of such 
research).  However, other researchers have since reported evidence of holistic face 
processing in children around four years of age (de Heering, Houthuys, & Rossion, 2007). 
 
Another explanation as to children’s low accuracy rates, particularly in relation to PA line-ups, 
is related to the possibility that children feel compelled to acquiesce, (Dunlevy & Cherryman, 
2013).  Dunlevy and Cherryman (2013) suggest that if children do not fully understand the task 
they have been given, i.e., the identification line-up, and believe that the line-up administrator 
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requires them to make a choice, they will ignore the non-biased line-up instructions (advising 
that ‘the perpetrator may or may not be present’) and acquiesce by making a choice from the 
line-up.  This is obviously of particular concern in a forensic setting where an innocent suspect 
is erroneously included in the line-up, as children may not only struggle to remember the non-
biased line-up instructions but may also be prone to making false identifications. 
 
4.2.2 Line-up Identification Performance in Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
Much of the research that has explored line-up identification accuracy has focused on the 
general population, whilst individuals with ID have been largely neglected.  Indeed, there are 
currently only a handful of published studies that have explored line-up identification 
performance in individuals with ID.  In the first of these, Ericson and Isaacs (2003) investigated 
line-up identification performance in adults with ID using simultaneous PP and PA photo 
identification line-ups.  They reported no differences in identification accuracy for the adults 
with and without ID on the PP line-up, however, for the PA line-up, the adults with ID made 
more false identifications.   
 
In a study by Ternes and Yuille (2008) adults with and without ID were asked to identify a 
photographer who had taken the participants’ photos up to two weeks previously.  As per 
Ericson and Isaacs (2003), the line-ups were photographic and consisted of both PP and PA 
line-ups, however, the mode of presentation was sequential as opposed to simultaneous.  In 
contrast to Ericson and Isaacs (2003), Ternes and Yuille (2008) found that the identification 
performance of the adults with ID was less accurate than the adults without ID on the PP line-
ups and moreover, there were no group differences in performance on PA line-ups.   
 
In a subsequent study, Wilcock and Henry (2013) showed adults with and without ID a short 
film of a burglary and subsequently asked participants to identify the two perpetrators from 
simultaneously presented photographic PP and PA line-ups. The identification performance of 
the adults with ID was less accurate across both line-ups, with this group making more false 
identifications overall and being less likely to make correct rejections on the PA line-ups, 
compared to the adults without ID.   
 
It is noteworthy, however, that whilst the adults with ID in both the Ericson and Isaacs (2003) 
and Wilcock and Henry (2013) studies had IQs in the moderate to mild ID range, Ericson and 
Isaacs (2003) extended the IQ cut-off point for their study to 75 instead of 70, thus some 
participants would have possessed a much milder level of ID.  As Ternes and Yuille (2008) did 
not assess IQ it is not possible to ascertain the level of ID experienced by their participants. 
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Individuals with ID often exhibit deficiencies in a number of cognitive areas that could have an 
impact on their ability to provide accurate identification evidence, for example in relation to 
attention (Sterr, 2004), memory (Nolan et al., 1985; Swanson & Siegel, 2001) and language 
(Abbeduto & Hesketh, 1997).   One of the key skills required to accurately identify someone 
from an identification line-up is face recognition. Whilst individuals with ID might be perceived 
to have deficient facial recognition abilities, perhaps because of the general cognitive deficits 
they are likely to experience, very little research has actually explored whether such 
perceptions are in fact accurate.  Gawrylowicz et al.’s (2013) study of facial recognition and 
facial description abilities in adults with mild ID reported that this group’s performance was 
deficient on both counts compared to adults without ID.  Moreover, Wilcock and Henry (2013) 
in their study described above, noted that whilst the adults with ID exhibited deficient facial 
recognition abilities in comparison to the adults without ID (as measured by the Benton Facial 
Recognition Test (BFRT); Benton, Hamsher, deS, Varney & Spreen, 1983), there was also a 
positive correlation between these abilities and line-up identification accuracy, i.e., better 
facial recognition skills were associated with more accurate identifications.   
 
Adults with ID may also struggle to understand the purpose of an identification line-up, which 
could have an impact on their identification performance.  If this group experience problems in 
understanding the objective of the line-up they may not therefore understand what it is they 
are required to do.  Indeed, Ericson and Isaacs (2003) reported that adults with ID were 
confused as to the aim of an identification line-up and suggest that this could have been due to 
the fact that some members of this group thought the aim of the task was to choose the 
individual with the closest resemblance to the perpetrator.  These findings regarding a lack of 
understanding of the identification task were further corroborated by Wilcock and Henry 
(2013) who reported that none of the adults with ID in their study demonstrated a full and 
complete understanding of the nature of the identification line-up. 
 
Linked to the above is the ability to accurately recall the instructions given prior to undertaking 
an identification line-up. In accordance with PACE Code D (2017), the administration of an 
identification line-up (in the UK) should be preceded with a witness being informed that “the 
person they saw on a specified earlier occasion may, or may not, appear in the images they are 
shown and that if they cannot make an identification, they should say so”.  These ‘non-biased’ 
line-up instructions are extremely important as they can act to reduce the incidence of false 
identifications (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, 1997). However, research suggests that 
witnesses without ID can sometimes struggle to recall these instructions (Rose, Bull & Vrij, 
2005).  It thus follows that recall of these non-biased line-up instructions may prove 
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problematic for adults with ID, particularly if they are prone to memory and attention deficits.  
Again, the research of Ericson and Isaacs (2003) and Wilcock and Henry (2013) provides an 
insight into this supposition, with the former finding that adults with ID were more likely to 
disregard these instructions and still make a false identification and the latter reporting that 
when asked to recall the non-biased line-up instructions, only six of the 25 adults with ID were 
able to correctly do so. 
 
Having to identify multiple perpetrators might also be a factor that can have an impact on the 
ability of witnesses, especially those with ID, to accurately identify a perpetrator from a line-
up.  This issue is a pertinent one, as a study carried out into reported allegations of abuse 
involving individuals with ID found that 33% of the confirmed cases involved multiple abuses 
or multiple perpetrators (Cambridge et al., 2011).  There is currently no research that has 
explored the identification of multiple perpetrators in individuals with ID.  However, research 
involving adults without ID has demonstrated that the presence of multiple perpetrators has a 
negative impact on identification accuracy of a single perpetrator (Megreya & Burton, 2006), 
and moreover, identification accuracy is further compromised when witnesses view and are 
then required to identify multiple perpetrators (Hobson & Wilcock, 2011).   
 
The study reported here will seek to provide some clarity on the mixed findings reported by 
previous researchers regarding the eyewitness identification performance of adults with ID. In 
addition, it will also attempt to fill some of the gaps in existing knowledge and literature and it 
aims to do this in a number of ways. Unlike previous research, which has employed 
photographic line-ups, the current study will use PACE Code D compliant video identification 
line-ups.  Video identification line-ups are much more ecologically valid, as this is the most 
common type of media currently used by Police Forces in England and Wales to present line-
ups.  In addition, the current study will use sequentially presented line-ups as opposed to 
some other previous studies that have used simultaneous. Again, this is deemed to be more 
ecologically valid as it is the mode of presentation for line-ups in England and Wales.  As there 
is evidence to suggest that the abuse of adults with ID can be repeated and involve multiple 
perpetrators, this group’s ability to accurately identify more than one perpetrator is of much 
interest.  To explore this matter adults with ID and MA matched TD children will be asked to 
identify two perpetators (from two distinct but similar events) from separate line-ups.  In light 
of the findings from previous studies regarding the difficulties that adults with ID appear to 
experience in their understanding of the purpose of a line-up and issues relating to accurate 
recall of the non-biased line-up instructions, both of these aspects will be measured in the 
current study.  
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The key objectives of the current study are therefore: 
 
(1) To explore whether adults with ID and TD children can accurately identify one or more 
perpetrators from separate PP identification line-ups 
 
(2) To ascertain if adults with ID and TD children can correctly reject PA identification line-
ups. 
 
(3) To determine if adults with ID and TD children are able to: (a) remember the non-
biased instructions provided before viewing the identification line-ups and (b) 
understand the purpose of an identification line-up 
 
It is predicted that for both the PP and PA line-ups, when matched for MA, identification 
performance of the adults with ID and TD children will be comparative.  It is further anticipated 
that rates of full understanding of the line-up’s purpose and full recall of the non-biased line-




Adults with intellectual disabilities (ID) 
A total of 40 adults with ID (17 males and 23 females), aged between 23 years and 64 years, 
took part in the study. 
 
Typically developing (TD) children 
A total of 40 TD children (19 males and 21 females), aged between 4 years and 8 years, took 
part in the study.   
 
These were all the same participants that took part in the research described in chapter 3 (see 
Table 3.1 for participant demographics). 
 
Power Analysis 
A review of existing identification literature revealed that the norm regarding the number of 
participants included in each cell for chi square analysis is between 20 and 30 participants.  In 
the current study there were between 17 and 23 participants per cell (there was a slight 
difference for the number of adults with ID viewing a PP line-up for film A and a PA line-up for 
film B due to the fact that 3 participants were excluded from the original sample, as their 
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estimated IQs were found to be above the cut-off point for functioning in the ID range).  A 
post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to examine the 
statistical power required for a small (w = .10), medium (w = .30), and large (w = .50) effect size 
for a chi square analysis with an alpha level of p < .05 (Cohen, 1992).   
 
For an analysis with 80 participants, examining the effect of the main independent variable 
(type of line-up i.e. PP and PA) on line-up accuracy (correct versus incorrect), the statistical 
power required was .12 for detecting a small effect, .64 for detecting a medium effect and .97 
for detecting a large effect.  Thus, there was sufficient power to detect a medium and large 
effect. 
 
The adults with ID were matched according to mental age with the TD children on a group 
basis as described in chapter 2. 
 
4.3.2 Design 
A 2 x 2 mixed design was employed for this study. The between participant independent 
variable was group, which had two levels: adults with ID or TD children, the within participant 
independent variable was the type of line-up, which had two levels: PP and PA.  The 
dependent variables consisted of the participant’s performance on the identification line-ups 
(PP: correct identification, false identification, incorrect rejection and refused e.g. where the 
participant advised that they could not remember or did not know, PA: false identification, 
correct rejection and refused) as well as memory for the line-up instructions (i.e., full, partial 




4.3.3.1  Eyewitness Event 
The two eyewitness events (i.e., films), were the same as those used in the interviewing study 
described in chapter 3.  
 
The two films were edited so that the amount of facial exposure for each of the perpetrators 
was comparable in each film.  In film A the total length of facial exposure for the perpetrator 
was 58 seconds (full, side and partial), with 11 seconds of this consisting of the full face. For 
film B the perpetrator’s face was in view for one minute and two seconds (full, side and partial) 
of which 14 seconds consisted of the full face. 
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Perpetrator 1 (film A) was of medium height, with short blonde hair and a stocky build. 
Perpetrator 2 (film B) was also of medium height, with short brown hair and slim build. Both of 
the perpetrators were Caucasian, male and were aged between 23 and 30 years.  Neither of 
the perpetrators had any distinguishing features, e.g., scars, tattoos. 
 
4.3.3.2  Video Identification Line-ups 
Assistance in the production of the video identification line-ups was provided by two Police 
Officers from the Metropolitan Police who possessed considerable experience in visual 
identification.  The line-ups were created using the PROMAT Video Identification System, a 
national database used by approximately half of the police forces in England and Wales to 
facilitate profile matching.  The line-ups were produced in accordance with the guidelines 
provided under PACE Code D 2017, Annex A (p.37) which states that a line-up ‘must include 
the suspect and at least eight other people who, so far as possible…. resemble the suspect in 
age, general appearance and position in life’.    
 
A PP (where the perpetrator in the line-up is the perpetrator) and a PA (where the perpetrator 
is replaced by a designated ‘innocent’ suspect) line-up was produced for each film.  As per 
PACE Code D, each line-up consisted of nine images: eight foils plus the perpetrator for the PP 
line-up, eight foils plus an ‘innocent suspect’ for the PA line-up.  The ‘search criteria’ (e.g., age 
range, gender, race, build, hair colour etc.) was entered into the PROMAT database to extract 
a set of potentially suitable foils.  The foils were then chosen by the officers on a ‘match to 
suspect’ basis (see Appendix K for static images of the PP and PA identification line-ups). 
Each of the colour images consisted of a moving head and shoulders shot displayed from a side 
and frontal view which was presented sequentially (one at a time) for a duration of 15 
seconds.  The images were set against the same plain background, with the line-up position 
number shown in the top left-hand corner. 
 




One of the key concerns regarding identification line-ups is that they should be ‘fair’, i.e., they 
should not be unfairly biased in favour of the suspect.   To test for line-up bias, individuals who 
were not witnesses to the crime (or in the current instance were not shown the eyewitness 
films) are asked to identify a suspect based solely on a description.  According to Doob and 
Kirshenbaum (1973) a line-up can be deemed to be fair or non-biased when the number of 
95 
people selecting the perpetrator from a line-up is equal to that which would be expected by 
chance alone, i.e., 1/N, where N is the number of people in the line-up.  With nine people in 
the line-up, as per the current study, the line-up would therefore be deemed to be fair if .11, 
i.e., 11% of the individuals chose the perpetrator from the line-up.  
 
Furthermore, in the construction of an identification line-up it is also important to ensure that 
each of the foils are suitable alternative choices, in other words the line-up has an ‘effective 
size’ (Malpass & Lindsay, 1999).  Ensuring the effective size of a line-up further counters 
against bias towards a suspect and it is often measured in terms of Tredoux’ E (calculated using 
the total number of mock witnesses, total number of line-up members and the number of 
witnesses choosing each line-up member).  Whilst two drawbacks of effective size are that it 
can be complicated to calculate and it has an unknown sampling distribution, its benefits lie in 
the fact that its calculation is based on information from every member of the line-up and it 
also has clear upper (total number of people in the line-up) and lower (zero) limits (Malpass & 
Lindsay, 1999). 
 
To assess line-up bias and effective size (Tredoux’ E) prior to the study, 20 individuals (11 
males and 9 females, aged between 23 years and 55 years) watched the eyewitness films and 
were asked to complete an online survey using Qualtrics (a surveying tool that enables the 
collection and analysis of data) in order to provide descriptions of the two perpetrators using a 
pre-defined set of descriptors relating to gender, age, ethnicity, build and hair colour.  
Responses were collated to provide an overall description of each perpetrator. 
 
In respect of line-up bias, 17 additional individuals (4 males and 13 females, aged 19 – 60 years 
(M = 29.7 years, SD = 11.2 years)), who had not viewed the eyewitness films, were 
subsequently asked to identify the perpetrator from a PP photographic line-up, based on the 
overall description which had been created as described above.  For film A, three of the 17 
participants (18%) chose the perpetrator from the line-up.  For film B, one participant (6%) 
chose the perpetrator from the line-up.  Although for film A 18% of the participants chose the 
perpetrator, this was actually within the 1% confidence interval of -0.06 – 0.42, thereby 
indicating that this line-up was not biased towards the perpetrator.   
 
Tredoux’ E (effective size) was calculated for each line-up by using an auto calculating 
spreadsheet template created by Malpass (1999).  For Film A, Tredoux’ E was calculated as 
7.61 and for film B it was 6.88, indicating that the majority of the line-up members were 
suitable alternative choices.   
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Pilot Study 
A pilot study was carried out to test the efficacy of the identification line-ups and ensure that 
neither the perpetrators nor foils ‘stood out’. 11 adults from the general population (six 
females and five males, aged between 37 years and 61 years, M = 47.73, SD = 7.42) viewed the 
two films and were subsequently asked to identify the two perpetrators from a PP 
identification line-up.  Five of the participants undertook this task directly following the 
viewing of the film, whilst six were asked to identify the perpetrators following a delay of one 
week. Of the five participants who undertook the identification without a delay, four correctly 
identified both perpetrators.  For those who identified the perpetrators after a delay of one 
week, four correctly identified both perpetrators.  The line-ups were therefore deemed 
appropriate for use in the study. 
 
4.3.3.3  Assessments of Cognition and Suggestibility 
The measures of cognition and suggestibility employed in this study (SB-5, PPVT-4, TOMAL-2 
and GSS2) were the same as those used in the study described in chapter 3 (further 
information about these measures and their scoring criteria is included in chapter 2).  An 
analysis of participants’ scores on a number of the cognitive measures (specifically memory 
and language) was conducted to ascertain whether any of these might prove good predictors 
of line-up identification performance.  See chapter 5 for further discussion on this.    
 
As facial memory is likely to be associated with identification performance, particularly in 
relation to the PP line-ups, an analysis of raw scores on the TOMAL-2 memory for faces sub-
test was conducted to check for group differences.  An Independent Samples t-test revealed 
no significant difference in scores between the two participant groups (adults with ID and TD 
children), t(78) = -3.21, p = .10. 
 
4.3.4 Procedure 
All of the participants were tested on an individual basis and testing took place at the group, 
club or school they attended. 
 
The format of the first session is described in detail in chapter 3 so only a brief overview is 
provided here.  During the first session participants were shown the two eyewitness events on 
a laptop and then undertook the sub-tests from the TOMAL-2 and the SB-5.  The final task 
during this session was the brief interview. 
 
97 
The second session took place after a delay period of one week and commenced with the 
PPVT-4 followed by the detailed witness interview (video recorded).  Once the interview was 
complete, participants were advised that they would be asked to identify the perpetrators 
from the two films they had viewed the week before.  Participants viewed two line-ups in total 
(one PP and one PA), i.e., one for each film.  Before viewing the line-ups, the researcher 
informed the participant which perpetrator they were required to identify, i.e., either the 
perpetrator from film A or the perpetrator from film B. As per the interviews (see chapter 3), 
the researcher used the terms ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ to differentiate between film A and film B.  
The line-ups were presented in the same order in which the films had been presented, with 
the researcher seated behind the participant to avoid administrator (researcher) bias (i.e., 
inadvertently providing the participant with cues as to the perpetrator’s position in the line-
up). The type of line-up, i.e., PA and PP, was counterbalanced such that participant one viewed 
a PP line-up for film A and a PA line-up for film B and vice versa for participant two. As per 
PACE Code D guidelines, the participants were instructed to watch each line-up twice before 
making a decision. They were also advised, in accordance with PACE Code D guidelines, that 
the perpetrator may or may not be present in the line-up and if they did not see or recognise 
him, they should say so.  These instructions were given before each identification line-up. 
 
When the participant had viewed each line-up twice through, they were given the opportunity 
to either see the whole line-up again or view an individual image. Once the participant had 
made a decision, they were shown the image of the individual they had chosen for 
confirmation purposes and their decision was recorded on a response sheet.  Participants were 
then asked to recall the instructions they had been given before viewing the identification line-
ups and were also asked about their understanding of the purpose of a line-up. The responses 
to these questions were recorded as full remembering / full understanding (e.g., ‘I had to 
watch the films twice and tell you which was the man from the film that was inside and say if I 
can’t see him’ / ‘to identify the faces from the films’), partial remembering / partial 
understanding (e.g., ‘watch the faces twice and at the end say which face it is’ / ‘to remember 
the people’), or no memory / no understanding (e.g., ‘can’t remember’ / ‘don’t know’).  In 
addition, participants were also asked to state anything they could think of that might have 
helped them further in carrying out the identification task.  Again, these responses were 
recorded. 
 
Once the identification line-ups had been completed, the shortened GSS2 was administered 
(responses were audio recorded) following which the participants were debriefed (if not 
undertaking a repeat interview) and asked if they had any questions. 
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4.4 Results 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide details of line-up identification performance for both the PP and PA 
line-ups for film A and film B (PP: correct identifications, false identifications, incorrect 
rejections and refusals: PA: correct rejections, false identifications and refusals) respectively.  
For film A, 17 adults with ID and 19 TD children viewed a PP line-up, whilst 23 adults with ID 
and 21 TD children viewed a PA line-up. For film B, 23 adults with ID and 21 TD children viewed 
a PP line-up, whilst 17 adults with ID and 19 TD children viewed a PA line-up.   The order in 
which the line-ups were shown was determined by the order in which the participants had 
viewed the eyewitness films.  There was no significant effect of the order in which the line-ups 
were shown on line-up accuracy (correct: correct identifications and rejections, incorrect: false 
identifications and refusals) for either film A, 2 (1, n = 80) = 1.08, p = .44, ϕc = .116 or film B, 
2 (1, n = 80) = 0.013, p = .57, ϕc = .013. 
 
To ascertain the effect of group on the line-ups, as well as memory for line-up instructions and 
understanding of the line-up’s purpose, individual chi-square tests were conducted.  Chi 
square tests were also carried out to examine the effect of perpetrator presence on accuracy 
of participant’s responses on both the PP and PA line-ups individually (as opposed to overall 
accuracy).  Where the rules of chi-square were violated (i.e., the expected cell frequencies fell 
below 5), Fisher’s Exact test values are reported.   
 
4.4.1 Line-up Identification Performance 
Perpetrator presence 
With regards to film A, there was no significant effect of perpetrator presence (whether or not 
the perpetrator was in the line-up) on line-up accuracy for the TD children, Fisher’s Exact test p 
= .53.  However, there was a significant effect for the adults with ID, Fisher’s Exact test p = 
.009.  Accuracy rates for the adults with ID were higher when the perpetrator was in the line-
up. 
 
For film B there was no significant effect of perpetrator presence on line-up accuracy for either 
the TD children Fisher’s Exact test p = .74, or adults with ID, Fisher’s Exact test p = .25. 
 
Perpetrator present line-ups 
Chi-square analysis revealed no significant effect of group on line-up performance (correct 
hits, false identifications, incorrect rejections and refusals) for film A, Fisher’s Exact test p = .08.  
As can be seen from Table 4.1, correct identification rates for the PP line-ups for film A were 
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low across both groups, with the percentage of correct identifications being 29% and 32% 
respectively for the adults with ID and TD children.   
 
For film B there was a significant effect of group on participants’ line-up identification 
performance, Fisher’s Exact test p = .002.   Whilst overall correct identification rates were 
again low across both groups (adults with ID = 13%, TD children = 29%) the adults with ID 
made fewer correct identifications and more false identifications compared to the TD children.   
 
Table 4.1 Performance on perpetrator present line-ups for Film A and Film B for adults with ID 
and TD children 
 
                 Adults with intellectual disabilities Typically developing children 
 Film A 
(N = 17) 
Film B 
(N = 23) 
Total 
(N = 40) 
 Film A 
(N = 19) 
Film B 
(N = 21) 
Total 






















12% (2) 0% (0) 5% (2)  42% (8) 33% (7) 37% (15) 
Refused 
 
0% (0) 4% (1) 2% (1)  0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Note: Data shown as percentages (frequencies) 
 
Perpetrator absent line-ups 
For film A, there was a significant effect of group on line-up performance (correct rejections, 
false identifications and refusals), Fisher’s Exact test p = .001.   The adults with ID were less 
likely to make a correct rejection and more likely to make a false identification compared to 
the TD children.  
 
With regards to film B there was also a significant effect of group on line-up performance, 
Fisher’s Exact test p = .008.  Once again, the adults with ID were less likely to make a correct 









Table 4.2 Performance on perpetrator absent line-ups for Film A and Film B for adults with ID 
and TD children 
 
  Adults with intellectual disabilities  Typically developing children 
 Film A 
(N = 23) 
Film B 
(N = 17) 
Total 
(N = 40) 
 Film A 
(N = 21) 
Film B 
(N = 19) 
Total 
(N = 40) 
        
Correct 
Rejection 


















5% (1) 0% (0) 2% (1)  5% (1) 10% (2) 7% (3) 
Note: Data shown as percentages (frequencies) 
 
4.4.2 Memory for Line-up Instructions  
Data for participants’ memory for the non-biased line-up instructions (advising that the 
perpetrator may or may not be present) is provided in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3 Memory for non-biased line-up instructions for adults with ID and TD children 
 
 Memory for line-up instructions 
 Full memory Partial memory No memory 
Adults with intellectual 
disabilities (N = 40) 
 
10% (4) 42% (17)  48% (19)  
Typically developing  
Children (N = 40) 
3% (1) 40% (16) 57% (23) 
Note: Data shown as percentages (frequencies) 
 
Fisher’s Exact test revealed no significant effect of group on memory for the non-biased line-
up instructions p = .36.   Rates of full remembering were very low across both groups, four for 
the adults with ID and one for the TD children.  17 adults with ID and 16 TD children reported 
partial memory for the line-up instructions whilst 19 adults with ID and 23 TD children had no 
memory for the line-up instructions. 
 
There was no significant association between memory for the non-biased line-up instructions 
and line-up accuracy rates for each film for either the adults with ID (Film A, Fisher’s Exact test 
p = .62 and Film B Fisher’s Exact test p = .44) or TD children (Film A, Fisher’s Exact test p = .84 
and Film B Fisher’s Exact test p = .62).  When line-ups for the films were analysed separately, 
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for the TD children these non-significant effects remained for each line-up (PP and PA) and 
each film (film A and film B).  For the adults with ID, on the PP line-ups the non-significant 
effect remained for both films.  It was however, not possible to conduct the same analysis for 
the PA line-ups for the adults with ID for either of the films, as none of the participants made a 
correct choice (correct rejection). 
 
4.4.3 Understanding the Purpose of the Line-up 
Data relating to participants’ understanding of the line-up’s purpose is provided in Table 4.4 
below. 
 
Table 4.4 Understanding of line-up purpose for adults with ID and TD children 
Note: Data shown as percentages (frequencies) 
 
There was a significant effect of group on understanding of the line-up purpose, 2 (2, n = 80) 
= 6.83, p = .03, ϕc = .292.  The adults with ID reported a better understanding of the line-ups 
purpose compared to the TD children. 
 
There was no significant association between understanding the line-up purpose and line-up 
accuracy rates for each film for either the adults with ID (Film A, Fisher’s Exact test p = .26 and 
Film B Fisher’s Exact test p = .39) or TD children (Film A, Fisher’s Exact test p = .55 and Film B 
Fisher’s Exact test p = .16).   
 
When the line-ups for the films were analysed separately, for the TD children these non-
significant effects remained for both of the line-ups (PP and PA) and both films (film A and film 
B).  For the adults with ID, on the TP line-ups the non-significant effect remained for both films.  
As with memory for the line-up instructions, it was not possible to conduct the same analysis 
for the PA line-ups for either of the films, as none of the adults with ID made a correct decision 
(correct rejection).   
 







Adults with intellectual 
disabilities (N = 40) 
 
25% (10) 18% (7) 57% (23) 
Typically developing children 
(N = 40) 
5% (2) 30% (12) 65% (26) 
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4.5 Discussion 
Whilst performance on the PP line-ups for film A was comparative for the adults with ID and 
TD children, for film B the adults with ID were less likely than the TD children to make correct 
identifications and more likely to make false identifications. These findings provide only partial 
support for the hypotheses. 
 
On the PA line-ups for both films, there was a significant effect of group, with the adults with 
ID making fewer correct rejections and more false identifications compared to the TD children.  
These findings are not in line with the hypotheses. 
 
As predicted, there were no group differences in rates of full remembering of the non-biased 
line-up instructions.  Both the adults with ID and TD children struggled to recall the 
instructions provided before viewing the line-ups.  Furthermore, in contrast to the predicted 
findings, the adults with ID reported a better understanding of the actual purpose of the line-
ups in comparison to the TD children. 
 
Across the two films, for the PP line-ups, only 20% of the adults with ID made a correct 
identification with the majority of this group i.e., 73%, making a false identification.   Whilst 
the level of correct identifications were in line with those reported by Ericson and Isaacs 
(2003), they were far lower than those reported by Wilcock and Henry (2013).  Moreover, false 
identifications were much higher than those obtained in both the Ericson and Isaacs (2003) 
and Wilcock and Henry (2013) studies. With regards to the PA line-ups, in the current study 
almost all of the adults with ID (98%) made a false identification.  These rates were 
considerably higher than those found in the research of Ericson and Isaacs (2003) and Wilcock 
and Henry (2013).   
 
The findings overall, i.e., across both the PP and PA line-ups, appear to be more consistent 
with those of Ternes and Yuille’s (2008) study.  On PP line-ups Ternes and Yuille (2008) 
reported correct identification rates for adults with ID of 18% and false identification rates of 
64%, while for the PA line-ups, false identifications accounted for 82% of the line-up decisions 
made by the adults with ID.  The similarity in findings between the current study and those of 
Ternes and Yuille (2008) are interesting, because both of these studies used sequential line-
ups, whereas Ericson and Isaacs (2003) and Wilcock and Henry (2013) both employed 
simultaneous line-ups.  It is important to note though, that Ternes and Yuile (2008) employed a 
strict sequential presentation for their line-ups, thus the line-up was stopped once a decision 
had been made.  This differs from the current study which employed a PACE Code D sequential 
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presentation, which advises witnesses to watch the entire line-up at least twice before making 
a decision.  Research has demonstrated that strict sequential line-ups produce fewer correct 
identifications in comparison to PACE Code D compliant sequential line-ups (Wilcock & Kneller, 
2011). 
 
The number of overall correct identifications for the TD children on the PP line-ups was fairly 
low (30%) and moreover, these levels were much lower than those reported in other studies 
(e.g. Dunlevy & Cherryman, 2013).  On the other hand, whilst rates of false identifications on 
the PA line-ups for the TD children (53%) were far lower than the adults with ID, levels of 
choosing overall were still fairly high and these findings provide support for other research in 
this area (e.g. Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998; Roebers & Schneider, 2001).  
 
An alternative explanation specifically for the TD children’s performance on the line-ups 
relates to the purported existence of an ‘own age bias’, i.e., where people are better at 
identifying faces when they are of a similar age to themselves.  In the current study the 
targets, i.e., the perpetrators, were both adults and this could have been a factor which led to 
a detrimental effect on the TD children’s identification performance.  Havard, Memon, 
Laybourn and Cunningham (2012) explored the existence of own age bias in both adults and 
six to eight-year-old children.  The researchers manipulated the age of the target (the 
individual to be identified) such that they were either a child aged nine years of age or an adult 
(26 years of age).   It was found that the children, but not the adults, demonstrated an own 
age bias exemplified by the fact that they made more correct identifications on a PP line-up 
and more correct rejections on a PA line-up when the target was a child as opposed to an 
adult. 
 
It is noted that during the assessments of line-up bias (carried out before the testing of 
participants) the rate of choosing the perpetrator for film A (18%) was both higher than that 
for film B (6%) and higher than the 11% choosing rate deemed appropriate for a 9-person line-
up (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973).  Whilst this rate was still within the 1% confidence interval of 
the 11% choosing rate, it is accepted that concerns may be raised as to the impact this might 
have on the performance of participants on the PP line-ups for this film.  On reviewing 
identification accuracy rates for film A, it is evident that the adults with ID did make more 
correct identifications for film A (29%) compared to film B (13%).  However, the number of 
correct identifications for the TD children was comparative across the two films.  As a result, it 
is not possible to state with any degree of certainty that line-up bias played a part in the 
identification performance of the two groups.   
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Although there was no significant association between identification accuracy and either 
memory for the non-biased line-up instructions (advising that the perpetrator may or may not 
be present and that the participant should state if they do not see or recognise him) nor 
understanding of the line-ups’ purpose across either line-up (PP or PA), it was evident from the 
information provided (in response to the associated questions) that each of the groups were 
experiencing some issues on both these counts.  A combination of these two factors might 
therefore go some way towards providing a partial explanation for identification performance 
across the two line-ups. 
 
Memory for the non-biased line-up instructions could contribute to the findings that we see in 
relation to the PP line-ups.  Although there was no significant association between 
identification accuracy and recall of line-up instructions for either of the two groups, it did 
however, appear that memory for line-up instructions was in some way influencing line-up 
decisions, as two adults with ID and 15 TD children rejected (albeit incorrectly) the line-up 
choices.   It was initially thought that a possible explanation for these incorrect rejections 
might lie in these participants having undertaken a PA line-up first followed by a PP line-up, 
i.e., the repetition of the line-up instructions could have led to a better understanding of them.  
However, a review of the order in which the participants were presented with the line-ups did 
not provide support for this hypothesis, as all those participants who made incorrect rejections 
on the PP line-ups viewed a PP line-up first followed by a PA line-up. 
 
It was also thought that perhaps participants (mis)understanding of the purpose of the line-up 
could have been playing a part in the performance of the two groups on the PA line-ups.  
Maybe those participants who had originally made an incorrect rejection on the PP line-up 
(where this was presented first) believed that they now had to make a choice on the PA line-up 
because they’d failed to make a choice first time round, i.e., on the PP line-up.  Whilst this 
seemed like a sensible postulation a review of the line-up choices for these participants 
revealed a very different picture.   Whilst all the adults with ID (two in total) who had made an 
incorrect rejection on the PP line-up went on to make a false identification on the PA line-ups, 
the situation was not as clear cut for the TD children as only three of the 15 went on to make a 
false identification on the PA line-up.   It is possible that the adults with ID did indeed feel 
pressurised to make a choice on the second line-up but for the TD children there were other 
factors influencing their line-up decisions. 
 
Whilst feeling obliged to make a choice may not be the sole explanation for the line-up 
identification performance of the TD children in the above scenario, perhaps instead it might 
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help explain the high number of false identifications observed on the PA line-ups overall.  
Adults with ID often experience a lack of authority and imbalance of power, stemming from 
having to depend on others for caregiving (Thornberry & Olson, 2005) or for assistance with 
general decision making and everyday tasks such as managing finances (Williams, 
Abbotwrightt, Rodgers, Ward & Watson, 2007). This might make it difficult for them to 
challenge those deemed to have more authority and certainly research suggests that adults 
with ID find it much harder to provide a ‘don’t know’ answer to those perceived to be 
authoritative figures (Brown & Geiselman, 1990).   
 
With regards to TD children, they also appear to struggle to admit that they do not know an 
answer when the person asking the question is an adult.  It is suggested that TD children, 
particularly those who are younger, defer to the perceived authority of adults, thereby 
providing an answer which they believe the adult wants (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998; Pozzulo, 
Dempsey, Bruer & Sheahan, 2011).  In a study that sought to demonstrate the influential 
nature of social demand factors on line-up identification performance, Lowenstein, Blank and 
Sauer (2010) presented TD children with both PP and PA line-ups whilst manipulating the type 
of clothing that the line-up administrator wore, i.e., either a police-type uniform, or casual 
clothes. They discovered that identification performance on the PP line-ups was comparative 
for the uniform and casual clothes conditions, however, on the PA line-ups the uniform 
condition led to a significant increase in false identifications.  For both groups, research 
examining instructions that explain that it is acceptable to say ‘none of them’ may be 
warranted. 
 
Memory deficits, which have already been touched upon above, might also have been a 
contributory factor in the overall poor identification performance of the adults with ID, 
particularly in relation to long-term memory (Nolan et al., 1985) and working memory 
(Swanson & Siegel, 2001).  In addition, research on the development of working memory in TD 
children has revealed age-related differences, suggesting that, like other aspects of memory 
e.g., episodic memory, working memory appears to improve in line with age (Gathercole, 
Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006).  Taken 
together, these findings regarding working memory in adults with ID and TD children could 
have a negative effect on the amount of information encoded at the time of viewing the 
events, whilst also affecting the temporary storage of information during the identification 
task and thus the participants’ decision-making abilities. 
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Viewing the identification line-ups twice through (as per PACE Code D) entailed a great deal of 
concentration and a focusing of attention for a substantial amount of time (just over 10 
minutes).  Casual observations during this process revealed that for some of the adults with ID 
and indeed, some of the younger TD children, the identification task appeared to place a 
significant demand on their attentional abilities.  Some participants stopped looking at the 
screen and had to be reminded to re-focus their attention on the line-ups.  This observation is 
interesting, particularly in relation to the adults with ID, since Sterr (2004) found that on the 
whole, everyday attention performance in young adults with ID was poorer than that of their 
non-ID peers, and more specifically this group exhibited marked difficulties in visual selective 
attention (the ability to focus solely on information appropriate to a task whilst inhibiting 
inappropriate information).  In addition, Swanson and Siegel (2001) in a review of research on 
working memory in adults (and children) with ID, conclude that this is an area of short-term 
memory which is deficient in this group.    This could mean that the identification line-up 
procedure, as specified in PACE Code D, is particularly challenging for adults with ID because of 
the cognitive demands associated with this task. 
 
Research on the development of attention in TD children has also demonstrated that, as with 
many other cognitive abilities, there is a dramatic improvement during childhood, especially in 
relation to a child’s ability to maintain their attention for longer periods of time (Reynolds & 
Romano, 2016) and filter out irrelevant information (Enns & Akhtar, 1989).  Furthermore, it is 
also important to point out that the development of attention and working memory are 
interlinked, with attention playing a key part in the performance of working memory.  In the 
current study it is therefore possible that working memory and attention, both singularly as 
well as in combination, may not have been as fully developed in the younger TD children when 
compared to the older TD children, which in turn may have had a negative effect on both the 
initial encoding of information (from the eyewitness films) as well as the identification task 
itself.   
 
Rather than any one single factor it is possible that a combination of factors, specifically social 
and cognitive, could help explain performance on both the PP and PA line-ups across both 
groups.  Indeed, Pozzulo et al. (2011) sought to shed light on this notion in their research on TD 
children’s choosing rates on PA line-ups.  The researchers manipulated the cognitive load of 
the identification task by using highly familiar cartoon characters as targets, thus reducing the 
cognitive demand and increasing the ease of the task.  The idea here was that if the children 
correctly identified the target 100% of the time on the PP line-ups, but subsequently 
demonstrated much lower correct rejection rates on the PA line-ups, then this would provide 
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strong evidence for the influence of social factors on line-up choosing rates.  As predicted, the 
TD children opted to make a false identification of the wrong cartoon character rather than 
correctly reject the line-up, i.e. the social demands of the task far outweighed the cognitive 
ones.   It is thus possible that in relation to the PA line-ups in the current study, even those 
participants who reported some memory of the non-biased line-up instructions still chose to 
ignore them because they felt social pressure to make a choice. 
 
It became evident during the course of the study that the literacy and numeracy skills of the 
adults with ID varied widely.  This is especially pertinent given that every image in the line-ups 
is numbered and thus the adults with ID were expected to remember the number of the image 
they had identified as the perpetrator.  Once the line-ups had been viewed participants were 
asked if they wanted to see all or part of the line-up again (three participants accepted this 
offer).  If participants were struggling to make a decision, they were shown a matrix of the still 
images to assist them.  In addition, once they had made a choice, participants were shown that 
image to confirm identification. However, it is likely that this still did not go far enough 
towards overcoming any potential issues relating to numeracy.  In hindsight, it would 
therefore have been beneficial to include a measure of numeracy skills, as this could have 
helped identify any adults with ID who might have required additional support in carrying out 
the identification task. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has helped shed light on the ability of both adults with ID and TD children to identify 
more than one perpetrator from video identification line-ups.  Of particular interest was the 
identification performance of the adults with ID and whilst identification accuracy rates for this 
group were lower than those reported in previous research, the findings regarding this group’s 
apparent difficulties in understanding the nature of the identification task and failure to 
remember the ‘non-biased’ line-up instructions, were in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Ericson & Isaacs, 2003; Wilcock & Henry, 2013).   
 
As already noted at the start of this chapter, adults with ID are at increased risk of abuse (Lin, 
Yen, Kuo, Wu & Lin, 2009), so it is imperative that we have a thorough understanding of the 
abilities of this group as eyewitnesses.  However, very little is known about the identification 
skills of this group because of the scarcity of research in this area.   This is of concern as it is 
quite probable that the cognitive deficits experienced by adults with ID will in some way 
impact their skills as eyewitnesses.  Moreover, it is also likely that there will be considerable 
variation in this group’s cognitive abilities and thus eyewitness skills.  Being able to ascertain 
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which cognitive abilities are linked to which aspects of eyewitness performance could 
potentially prove useful in helping criminal justice professionals predict both the recall and 
identification performance of vulnerable witnesses, something which will be explored further 
in chapter 5. 
 
Hopefully the research presented in this chapter will help fill a number of gaps in existing 
knowledge regarding the ability of adults with ID to accurately identify perpetrators from 
identification line-ups.  However, the results of this study also demonstrate the need for 
further research in this area, not just on the identification skills of adults with ID, but also on 























Predicting Eyewitness Performance in Adults with ID and TD Children  
from Individual Differences in Cognitive Measures 
 
5.1 Abstract 
The ability to predict eyewitness performance of adults with ID through individual differences 
in cognitive abilities would undoubtedly prove to be of enormous benefit to professionals 
within the CJS, particularly in relation to measures that can be obtained with ease, for 
example, MA and verbal memory.  The research presented in this chapter provides a 
preliminary investigation of the relationship between several cognitive measures (MA, 
memory, confabulation and language) and eyewitness performance, both in a detailed witness 
interview, and on a subsequent identification line-up, in adults with ID and MA matched TD 
children.   Results indicated that for the adults with ID, memory for stories and faces and 
receptive vocabulary were all significant predictors of the amount of total correct information 
recalled in the detailed witness interview, whilst MA and memory for stories and faces were all 
significant predictors for the TD children.  There was no significant relationship between a 
measure of confabulation and the number of confabulations produced during the detailed 
witness interview and neither were measures of MA and memory for faces significant 
predictors of line-up identification accuracy for either group.  Whilst none of the language 
measures predicted understanding of the line-up’s purpose nor recall of the line-up 
instructions for the TD children, receptive vocabulary predicted understanding of the purpose 
of the line-up and expressive vocabulary predicted recall of the line-up instructions in the 
adults with ID.  These novel findings indicate the potential usefulness of certain cognitive 




As human beings we are all unique, with wide ranging variations in many different domains 
including physiology, emotion and cognition to name but a few.  Such individual differences 
underpin the varying levels of skills and abilities evident in everyday life and the wider society 
more generally.  Undoubtedly, these individual differences, especially in relation to cognitive 
abilities such as attention, memory, language, and IQ, could have an impact on eyewitness 
performance.   
 
With particular regard to individual differences amongst individuals with ID, it is important to 
note that ID is often referred to as an ‘umbrella term’, used to describe a group of individuals 
110 
who experience deficits in cognitive (e.g., language, memory, attention) and adaptive (i.e., the 
skills necessary to carry out everyday tasks) functioning.  In effect, this term gives the 
impression that individuals who possess an ID are a uniform group, yet this is a misleading 
concept.  Just as the cognitive abilities of individuals from the general population are wide-
ranging and diverse, so too are the cognitive abilities of those with ID.   
 
Whilst there is very little research on the relationship between cognitive abilities and 
eyewitness performance in TD children, there is even less in relation to individuals with ID, and 
what research does exist tends to focus on children with ID (hence a limited discussion of 
research regarding ID in the following section).  Yet, being able to identify which cognitive 
factors are related to eyewitness performance, as well as ascertaining how effective these 
factors might be in actually predicting eyewitness performance, could prove extremely helpful 
in a forensic setting.   Such information could not only assist in identifying individuals who may 
require additional support with various aspects of the forensic investigation process, but it 
would also help inform the implementation of appropriate adaptations to help ensure access 
to justice for these vulnerable witnesses. 
 
5.2.1 Individual Differences in Cognitive Abilities and their Capacity to Predict Eyewitness 
Performance 
5.2.1.1 Age 
There is a large variation in the MA of individuals with ID, which is often underpinned by the 
actual severity of the ID itself, with MAs ranging from between 8 to 12 years for those with 
mild ID, to below three years for profound ID (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2016).   Thus, 
not only are there wide-ranging variations between the various levels of ID, but also within 
each level as well.    Not all research on individuals with ID includes a measure of MA, but 
studies that do have highlighted these individual differences in MA and their potential effect 
on eyewitness performance.  For example, in a study by Bettenay, Ridley, Henry and Crane 
(2014), in which the researchers assessed the recall (for a live magic event) and cross-
examination performance in children with and without ID, the MAs of the children in the mild 
to moderate ID category (IQs of between 35 and 69) ranged from 39 months to 83 months (3 
years 3 months to 6 years 11 months), whilst those in the ‘borderline’ ID range (IQs of between 
70 and 84) had MAs ranging from 77 to 97 months (6 years 5 months to 8 years 1 month).  
Furthermore, with regards to the actual relationship between MA and eyewitness 
performance, in the same study the researchers found that the amount of information recalled 
was higher for the borderline ID group compared to the mild to moderate ID group, which 
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appears to suggest a relationship between MA and eyewitness recall for a witnessed event in 
that those children with a higher MA were able to recall more information. 
 
As has already been highlighted in the chapter on identification (see chapter 4), the abilities of 
TD children in several key cognitive areas, e.g., memory (Goodman & Reed, 1986), attention 
(Reynolds & Romano, 2016) and facial recognition (Flin, 1980; Johnston & Ellis, 1995), appears 
to improve in line with age.  Such age-related improvements in cognitive abilities correspond 
with findings from existing eyewitness literature, although it is important to note that there is 
very little research that has specifically focused on the relationship between cognitive abilities 
and eyewitness performance in TD children.  It has, however, consistently been reported that 
the ability of TD children to recall information about a witnessed event increases as a function 
of age (e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Goodman & Reed, 1986; Roebers & Schneider, 2002).   In 
addition, Humphries et al. (2012) found a significant effect of age on identification accuracy 
rates of TD children aged between five to six years and nine to ten years, with the older 
children making more correct identifications (on PP line-ups) and more correct rejections (on 
PA line-ups) compared to the younger children. These findings regarding age-related 
differences in identification accuracy when comparing older and younger TD children have 
been further supported in a meta-analysis of identification accuracy across the life-span 
(Fitzgerald & Price, 2015).  Although, it is also important to point out that even when children 
have the same CA, there can be extreme variability in MA which in turn might also result in 
substantial variation in eyewitness performance. 
 
CA may be a particularly useful predictor of eyewitness performance because it is a fairly 
straightforward and easy measure to obtain, unlike other cognitive measures, which rely on 
the administration of assessments.  For example, Geddie et al. (2000) included age as a 
predictor of recall performance in TD children and found that this simple cognitive measure is, 
on the whole, the best predictor of accurate recall.  However, the researchers did also point 
out that a combination of individual differences, such as those relating to certain aspects of 
memory and IQ, are also likely to play a significant role in predicting recall accuracy. 
Furthermore, in a recent study involving children with and without autism, Henry et al. (2017) 
also found, across both groups, that CA was a significant predictor of performance in a brief 
eyewitness interview.   
 
The predictive usefulness of age also appears to extend to MA.  In a study of recall 
performance in children with ID, Henry and Gudjonsson (2007) showed participants a video of 
a crime and subsequently asked them a set of questions about the video during a brief 
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eyewitness interview.  They found that, in comparison to verbal and non-verbal IQ (measured 
using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS-II) and the British Ability Scales II (BAS-II)), 
MA was a much better predictor of eyewitness memory performance.   
 
5.2.1.2 Intelligence 
It is possible that general intellectual ability is related to eyewitness performance, particularly 
in the context of the eyewitness skills pertinent to the current research, i.e., recall and 
identification.   It has been suggested that those individuals with lower levels of intellectual 
functioning may struggle to process information effectively, thereby leading to a reduction in 
encoded event information (Brown & Pipe, 2003).  This group may also experience issues with 
understanding the event, which might affect the storage of memories and they may also lack 
the intellectual ability to form and subsequently use, effective memory retrieval strategies 
(Brown & Pipe, 2003). 
 
When comparing groups with dissimilar IQs, i.e., those with and without ID, research has 
indeed demonstrated that those with lower IQs both recall less information about a witnessed 
event and have lower identification accuracy levels (Ternes & Yuille, 2008; Wilcock & Henry, 
2013).  However, it is extremely important to point out here that the lower IQ level, which 
characterises a diagnosis of ID, is also accompanied by deficits in cognitive abilities across 
several key areas.  As such, it is unlikely that intelligence alone is associated with eyewitness 
performance in this group and that instead it can be explained by an interplay between several 
cognitive abilities 
 
Findings from research that has examined a link between intelligence and eyewitness recall in 
TD children have been mixed, with some reporting no relationship between the two factors 
(e.g., Allexander & Schwanenflugel, 1994) and others reporting a significant positive 
relationship between intelligence and amount of information recalled (e.g., Brown & Pipe, 
2003; Geddie et al., 2000; Roebers & Schneider, 2001).   Moreover, some studies that have 
used separate measures of verbal and non-verbal IQ have found that verbal IQ has a stronger 
relationship with eyewitness recall (particularly in relation to the use of general questions) 
compared to non-verbal IQ (e.g., Henry & Gudjonsson, 2007).   However, there are a number 
of potential explanations for the mixture of findings seen in this area, including a wide 
variation in the type of measures of intelligence used, differences in the form of recall task 
(e.g., Alexander & Schwanenflugel employed a category sorting task as opposed to an 
eyewitness paradigm) as well as an interaction between intelligence and various other 
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individual differences for example, pre-existing subject knowledge (Bjorklund, Schneider, 
Cassel & Ashley, 1994). 
 
Eyewitness identification and intelligence has already been touched upon above in relation to 
adults with ID, but there appears to be very little research that has explicitly examined links 
between this aspect of eyewitness evidence and intellectual ability in the general population.  
Whilst it is possible that those with a higher level of intellectual functioning and thus more 
effective encoding, storage and subsequent retrieval of information, may consequently be at 
an advantage when it comes to accurate identification of perpetrators, this may not always be 
the case.  Not only has research demonstrated that there is little association between 
intelligence and facial recognition abilities (Davis et al., 2011; Wilmer, 2017) but recent twin 
studies on the heritability of face recognition skills has established that this ability is inherited 
separately to general intelligence or IQ (Zhu et al., 2010). 
 
The issue of intelligence actually being a predictor of eyewitness performance may in some 
respects seem common-sense, but the findings from research that have included measures of 
IQ do not, however, appear clear.  Henry and Gudjonsson (2003) discovered that IQ, in 
comparison to other measures of memory and suggestibility, was not as useful as a predictor 
of eyewitness recall in both children with and without ID.   Moreover, Henry et al. (2017), also 
included non-verbal IQ as one of the cognitive measures in their assessment of eyewitness 
performance (in children with and without autism) and once again found that IQ was less 
effective as a predictor of eyewitness recall when compared to measures of memory. 
 
5.2.1.3 Facial Recognition 
There is arguably substantial variation between individuals in the general population when it 
comes to the ability to recognise faces (Wilmer, Germine & Nakayama, 2014).  Some 
individuals are extremely good at recognising faces, even when they have only seen the face 
once (Russell, Duchaine & Nakayama, 2009), whilst others struggle considerably with facial 
recognition, even when the faces are highly familiar (Behrman & Avidan, 2005).    Such a 
variation in individual differences could potentially have an impact on eyewitness 
performance, particularly in relation to the ability of witnesses to accurately identify 
perpetrators from an identification line-up.    
 
With regards to adults with ID, there is a scarcity of research that has examined the extent of 
variation in the face recognition abilities of this group, however, it is likely, given the other 
cognitive deficits that this group can experience, that any variation is wide ranging.  It is 
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further likely that any individual differences in face recognition skills could have an effect on 
recall of information specific to the perpetrator e.g., provision of a description, as well as 
perpetrator identification.   In a study by Dobson and Rust (1994) high school children with and 
without mild ID were asked to learn both pictures of objects and unfamiliar faces until they 
had achieved a 100% recognition rate.  The children were subsequently asked to identify the 
objects and faces following three different periods of delay.   The researchers found that whilst 
the children with ID initially took longer to learn the faces, recognition rates at each of the 
delay periods were comparative for those with and without ID.   In a more recent study, 
Gawrylowicz et al. (2013) presented adults with ID with a set of faces to learn and 
subsequently tested their memory for the faces by asking them to state whether or not the 
face was familiar.  In addition, the researchers presented the same group of adults with a 
photograph of an unfamiliar face following which they were asked to provide a facial 
description.  They discovered that the facial recognition abilities of the adults with ID were 
impaired compared to the non-ID group and furthermore, the facial descriptions of the adults 
with ID were less detailed and less accurate. 
 
Research exploring links between individual differences in facial recognition skills and 
identification accuracy in TD children is scarce.  However, some research does exist that has 
examined these two aspects in adults from the general population.  For example, Hosch (1994) 
found that participants’ scores on the BFRT (Benton et al., 1983) were positively correlated 
with line-up identification accuracy, whilst Morgan et al. (2007) in their study involving military 
personnel, reported a significant association between scores on the Wechsler Face Test and 
participants’ performance on an identification task. 
 
Facial recognition skills are another common-sense aspect of cognitive abilities that might be 
expected to not only be associated with, but also be good predictors of eyewitness 
performance, particularly in relation to line-up identification accuracy, and there exists some 
evidence to support this pragmatic assumption.  In a study that explored, amongst other 
things, whether individual differences in facial recognition ability might predict eyewitness 
identification performance in young adults (without ID), Anderson et al. (2014) reported that 
scores on facial recognition tasks predicted correct identification accuracy rates on 
simultaneous line-ups and false identification rates on both simultaneous and sequential line-
ups.  In other words, those who had higher scores on this cognitive measure were more likely 
to correctly identify a perpetrator from a simultaneous line-up and less likely to make a false 
identification on both simultaneous and sequential line-ups.  As well as being a potential 
predictor, performance on a test of face recognition ability may also serve as a useful 
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postdictor of eyewitness identification accuracy (Bindemann et al., 2012), something which 
could prove particularly helpful in preventing false identifications in a forensic setting. 
 
5.2.1.4 Memory 
Many aspects of memory will in some shape or form be related to eyewitness performance, 
both in terms of recall and identification.  In everyday life it would appear that there is 
considerable variation in people’s memory abilities, for example in relation to both working 
memory and long-term memory (Miller, Gross & Unsworth, 2019; Unsworth 2019) as well as 
episodic memory (Kirchhoff, 2009).  Such variation may in turn affect the creation and 
subsequent retrieval of memories.  However, rather surprisingly, there are few studies, in 
either those with or without ID, that have actually examined the association between memory 
ability and recall.    
 
The cognitive deficits that adults with ID experience extend into several key areas of memory, 
including both short and long-term memory (Nolan et al., 1985) as well as working memory 
(Swanson & Siegel, 2001).   Substantial variation in working memory skills have been found to 
exist both within and across various levels of ID (e.g., Henry, 2001; Nolan et al., 1985).  Such 
individual differences in memory ability will likely impact on both recall for an eyewitness 
event as well as line-up identification performance.   
 
In research involving TD children, working memory ability and consequently rates of forgetting 
(Bayliss & Jarrold, 2015) also appear to vary widely, which could help explain the varying levels 
of recall exhibited by TD children of a similar age.   In a study by Jack, Leov and Zajac (2014) 
which investigated links between individual differences in several cognitive variables (including 
memory and free-recall), the researchers found a positive relationship between general 
memory and amount of correct information recalled in TD children.   
 
As might be expected, there is some evidence to suggest that particular aspects of memory 
may play a role in predicting eyewitness recall performance.  Henry and Gudjonsson (2003) 
reported that verbal memory (assessed using the Test of Memory and Learning - TOMAL; 
Reynolds & Bigler, 1994) in particular predicted the amount of information provided during 
free-recall in both TD children and children with ID.  Moreover, these findings, albeit only in 
relation to TD children, have been provided with further support by Henry et al. (2017) where 
verbal memory (again assessed using the TOMAL) was discovered to be a significant predictor 




According to Hayne and Jack (2011), language is essential for the effective encoding, storage 
and retrieval of event memories.   Language thus underpins an individual’s ability to not only 
understand a witnessed event and the questions posed by the interviewer, but also the 
provision of an intelligible and comprehensive narrative account. 
 
Speech production problems are a particular characteristic of individuals with ID and such 
issues often vary in line with both the individual as well as severity of ID.  Research that has 
included adults with mild and moderate ID has found that not only is there an association 
between the frequency of certain speech errors and severity of ID, but this also extends to 
intelligibility.   Thus, those with less severe levels of ID exhibit more speech intelligibility and 
fewer speech errors (Coppens-Hofman, Terband, Snik & Maasen, 2016).   Moreover, language 
impairments are likely to vary between individuals with similar levels of ID due to individual 
differences in cognitive deficits and IQ.  The impact that individual differences in language skills 
might have on various aspects of eyewitness performance can only be hypothesised from a 
common-sense perspective (see above) due to a lack of research in this area. 
 
As with adult members of the general population, language abilities vary considerably amongst 
TD children, regardless of age (Bornstein & Putnick, 2012).   Yet it is surprising that findings 
from studies investigating a link between language ability and eyewitness performance have 
been inconsistent.  For example, Greenhoot, Ornstein, Gordon and Baker-Ward (1999) found 
no evidence of a relationship between scores on a test of early language development and 
recall for a personally experienced event (an examination), whereas, Salmon, Roncolato and 
Gleitzman (2003) reported that TD children who had higher scores on a test of expressive 
vocabulary (i.e., the ability to verbally express thoughts using vocabulary) reported more 
information about an emotional experience than TD children with lower scores.  Moreover, 
Brown and Pipe (2003) found that TD children’s vocabulary scores (from the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children - WISC) were significantly positively related to event recall. 
 
Individual differences in various aspects of language e.g., expressive and receptive (the ability 
to understand spoken words), may prove effective in predicting performance in different 
elements of the investigation process.  For example, it is possible that expressive language 
skills might predict the amount and accuracy of information recalled following a witnessed 
event, whilst receptive language abilities may prove valuable in predicting an individual’s 
understanding and thus accuracy on identification line-ups.  In research with TD children, 
Burgwyn-Bailes et al., (2001) discovered that receptive vocabulary (measured with the 
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Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – PPVT) predicted recall of emergency medical treatment, 
but only after a delay of one year, i.e., it did not predict recall which was immediate. 
 
5.2.1.6 Suggestibility 
A substantial proportion of the research that has examined relationships between individual 
differences in TD children and individuals with ID and their eyewitness performance has 
tended to focus on suggestibility (e.g., Agnew & Powell, 2004; Volpini, Melis, Petralia & 
Rosenberg, 2016) and this has mainly been driven by concerns amongst professionals 
regarding the proclivity of these two groups to suggestibility and thus their reliability as 
eyewitnesses.    However, with specific reference to TD children, research points to quite a 
large variation in this group’s susceptibility to suggestibility, as some children are quite able to 
resist suggestive questioning whilst others acquiesce with ease (Chae & Ceci, 2005).   
 
In an examination of eyewitness memory and suggestibility in children with and without ID, 
Henry and Gudjonsson (1999) found that scores from certain aspects of the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS2) were related to distinct elements of eyewitness performance that 
varied according to group membership.  For example, in relation to the children with ID, higher 
yield scores (giving in to leading questions) and higher total suggestibility scores (yield plus 
number of changed responses) were significantly related to lower levels of free recall.  
Conversely, for the TD children, higher yield scores were related to more accurate 
performance on correctly leading yes/no questions, whereas higher scores on total 
suggestibility were related to increased performance on open-ended misleading questions.   
Furthermore, in research that has included adults with below average intellectual ability (i.e., a 
score of below 100 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, revised (WAIS-R)) a relationship 
has been reported between lower levels of intellectual functioning and higher levels of 
interrogative suggestibility on the GSS (Gudjonsson, 1988). 
 
A handful of studies have investigated the predictive nature of suggestibility in relation to 
eyewitness performance.  In the Henry and Gudjonsson (2003) study the researchers examined 
eyewitness performance in children with ID (mild and moderate), who were matched with TD 
peers based on both CA and MA.  Amongst a number of other things, the researchers were 
interested in whether measures of suggestibility (again, obtained from the GSS2) would be 
related to recall for a live eyewitness event.  For the children with ID only, they found that the 
GSS yield score (see above) was a significant predictor of both suggestibility in response to 
yes/no misleading questions, as well as number of changed responses in a repeat interview. 
118 
It is evident from the studies highlighted in this section that research examining the role of 
individual differences in being able to predict eyewitness performance in both individuals with 
ID and TD children is rather limited.  Moreover, what research does exist in relation to 
individuals with ID has solely focused on children with ID.  To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, there currently exists no research that has explored the predictive nature of 
cognitive abilities in relation to adults with ID.  However, the potential usefulness of being able 
to identify which cognitive abilities might predict strengths and weaknesses in eyewitness 
performance has already been highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. 
 
Consequently, the study reported here reflects a preliminary investigation of whether 
measures relating to MA, memory and language may be effective predictors of eyewitness 
recall and line-up identification performance in both adults with ID and TD children.   It further 
explored a possible relationship between confabulation scores on the GSS2 and confabulations 
produced in the first detailed witness interview.  These measures have been identified as not 
only holding the most potential for being predictors of eyewitness performance in adults with 
ID and TD children, but also being the most useful to professionals within the criminal justice 
system because of possible links with a number of areas of eyewitness testimony. 
 
It is tentatively predicted that: 
 
(1) Individual differences in MA (Stanford Binet MA equivalents), memory (verbal and 
facial memory assessed using TOMAL) and receptive vocabulary (assessed using the 
PPVT) will be significant predictors of the amount of correct information recalled on 
the first detailed witness interview. 
 
(2) Total confabulation scores (distortions and fabrications) on an abbreviated version of 
the GSS2 will be related to the number of confabulations produced in the first detailed 
witness interview. 
 
(3) Facial memory scores and MA will predict line-up identification accuracy. 
 
(4) Receptive and expressive (assessed using Stanford Binet) vocabulary scores will predict 




(5) Receptive and expressive vocabulary scores will predict memory for the non-biased 




Adults with intellectual disabilities (ID) 
A total of 40 adults with ID (17 males and 23 females), aged between 23 years and 64 years, 
took part in the study. 
 
Typically developing (TD) children 
A total of 40 TD children (19 males and 21 females), aged between four years and eight years, 
took part in the study.   
 
These were all the same participants that took part in the research described in chapters 3 and 
4.  Full details of the two groups are provided in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1   Mean (SD) scores for age (chronological and mental) and cognitive measures for the 
adults with ID and TD children 
 † Obtained by averaging mental age equivalent scores across the SB verbal knowledge and SB 
fluid reasoning tests 




Measure Adults with ID TD children Group differences 
Chronological Age 39yrs 4m (11yrs 8m) 6yrs 1m (11 m) t(39.53) = 18.43#, p < .001 




25.90 (3.82) 24.38 (2.84) t(72.12) = 2.03#, p = .05 
SB Fluid Reasoning 14.50 (4.43) 16.87 (3.70) t(78) = -2.60, p = .01 
SB-5 (ABIQ) 53.40 (7.12) 104.65 (7.66) t(78) = -31.01, p < .001 
TOMAL-2 - 
Memory for Stories 
10.63 (6.55) 16.58 (9.72) t(68.34) = -3.21#, p = .002 
TOMAL-2 - 
Memory for Faces 
20.33 (5.46) 22.40 (4.34) t(78) = -1.68, p > .05 
PPVT-4 – Receptive 
Vocabulary 
128.05 (26.65) 111.90 (18.68) t(69.86) = 3.14#,  p = .002 
GSS2 – Total 
Confabulations 
1.95 (2.22) .90 (1.11) t(57.23) = 2.68#, p = .01 
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Power Analysis 
A post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to examine the 
statistical power required for a small (w = .02), medium (w = .15), and large (w = .35) effect size 
with an alpha level of p < .05 (Cohen, 1992) for the main multiple regression. 
 
For a multiple regression with 40 participants, examining the effect of the predictor variables 
(MA, memory for stories, memory for faces and receptive vocabulary (PPVT)) on the total 
amount of correct information recalled in the first detailed witness interview, the statistical 
power required was .09 for detecting a small effect, .42 for detecting a medium effect and .81 
for detecting a large effect.  Thus, there was ample power to detect medium and large effect 
sizes.   
 
5.3.2 Design 
The design of the study was correlational.  The predictor variables consisted of participants’ 
scores on the various cognitive measures (see below for further information).  The dependent 
variables were: the total amount of correct information recalled and number of confabulations 
produced in the first detailed witness interview, line-up identification accuracy (correct versus 




A number of cognitive measures were employed to assess participants’ MA, memory, language 
and suggestibility.  As already noted in chapter 2 (Methodological Challenges), the decision to 
use the following assessments, was dependent not only on their suitability for the groups 
under review, but also their proven reliability, as well as more practical issues such as finances 
and availability.  It is however, accepted that for some of the measures, there are a number of 
other equally suitable alternative assessments. 
 
5.3.3.1  Eyewitness Events 
The two eyewitness events were the same as those described in chapter 3 and depicted very 
mild disability hate crimes. 
 
5.3.3.2  Detailed Witness Interview 
The detailed witness interview was based on current police practice and as per the ABE 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011) it consisted of a phased questioning approach compromising seven 
separate phases in total.  The interview was the same as that described in chapter 3. 
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5.3.3.3 Cognitive Measures 
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales  
A two sub-test abbreviated version of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales (Abbreviated 
Battery IQ), Fifth Edition (SB-5; Roid, 2003) was employed to provide an estimate of overall 
intellectual functioning in the form of MA, as well as verbal (expressive) ability.  The two sub-
tests consisted of verbal knowledge (expressive vocabulary) and fluid reasoning. 
 
Test of Memory and Learning 
Two sub-tests (Memory for Stories and Memory for Faces) from The Test of Memory and 
Learning – Second Edition (TOMAL-2; Reynolds & Bigler, 2007) were used to assess 
participants’ story recall abilities (verbal memory) and facial recognition skills (facial memory). 
 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
Participants’ receptive vocabulary was assessed using The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 
Fourth Edition (PPVT-4; Dunn & Dunn, 2007). 
 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
A shortened version of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS2; Gudjonsson, 1997) was 
used to ascertain participants’ susceptibility to interrogative suggestibility.  The GSS2 provides 
individual measures of free recall, total confabulations (distortions and fabrications), yielding 
to misleading questions and changed answers in response to negative feedback (i.e., shift).  
The entire test was administered for completeness, however, only the scores relating to ‘total 
confabulations’ were used for the subsequent analyses.  This was due to the fact that 
misleading questions were not included in the investigative interview phase and the main 
point of interest in relation to suggestibility was whether there might be an association 
between total confabulations on the GSS and number of confabulations produced in the first 
detailed interview.   This shortened version has been used in previously published research 
(Henry & Gudjonsson, 2007). 
 
5.3.4 Procedure 
Detailed information relating to the interviewing and identification procedures carried out in 
each session is provided under the relevant chapters (see chapter 3 for Interviews and chapter 
4 for Identification).  Only a brief summary of these two procedures is provided here, with the 
key focus being on the cognitive measures that were administered.  All participants were 
tested on an individual basis, whilst all of the cognitive measures were administered in the 
same order for each participant. 
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The format of the sessions is described in detail in chapters 3 and 4, so only a brief overview is 
provided here.  After assessing capacity to consent for the adults with ID and asking 
participants to sign a simply worded consent form, participants were shown the two 
eyewitness films.   Following this, the two sub-tests from the TOMAL-2 (memory for stories 
and memory for faces) were administered.  For the first sub-test, memory for stories, the 
participant was instructed to listen to a story that was read out by the researcher, following 
which they were requested to repeat the story back to the researcher, just as they had heard 
it.  This process was repeated twice with two different stories. Each part of the story correctly 
recalled was awarded one point, with a maximum score of 27 for the first story and 35 for the 
second.  Recall of the stories was audio recorded to facilitate scoring.  For the second sub-test, 
participants were instructed to look at a face/faces presented in a booklet and then identify 
them from a set of images by placing a purple plastic chip on each of the face(s) seen. The 
amount of time permitted to view the faces was defined in the test and increased in line with 
test difficulty, i.e., number of faces to be identified. There were 41 faces in total (thus the 
maximum score was 41) split across 7 sets and all test items were administered for every 
participant.  
 
Upon completion of the TOMAL-2, the two-subtests from the SB-5 (non-verbal, i.e., object 
series/matrices, and verbal, i.e., verbal knowledge/vocabulary) were administered.  As the 
start points for each of the sub-tests were determined by the participant’s age, for the adults 
with ID it was deemed appropriate to start the tests at item 1 (the very beginning) whereas for 
the TD children, the start points were based on their CA.  The non-verbal sub-test was 
completed first.  For this sub-test participants were either asked to identify a missing object or 
a missing piece in a series of patterns or sequences (denoted by a question mark), with the 
task gradually increasing in difficulty.  There were 36 items in total, with one point being 
awarded for each correct response (and 0 awarded for an incorrect response).  For items one, 
two and three if the participant received a score of 0 testing was to be discontinued (this did 
not occur for any of the participants in this research study).  For the remaining items the test 
was stopped when the participant received four consecutive scores of 0.  
 
For the verbal sub-test, items one through to nine required the participant to identify parts of 
the body followed by various objects.  In items 10 through to 14 participants were presented 
with a set of images and asked to state what the individual was doing in each of them (e.g., 
drinking, cutting etc.).  For item 15 only, the participant was shown a word (which was also 
read out by the researcher) and asked to tell the researcher what it was (e.g., the word was 
‘cup’ and the participant was asked ‘what is a cup?’).  For the remaining items participants 
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were shown various words (which were read out by the researcher) and asked to state what 
they meant (e.g., what is a ‘hat?’).  For items one through to 14, participants were awarded a 
score of one point for each correct response (and 0 awarded for an incorrect response).  For 
items 15 onwards, the participant was awarded a score of either 0, 1 or 2 based upon the 
quality of the response.  There were 44 items in total, with the task gradually increasing in 
difficulty.  As for the non-verbal sub-test, if the participant received a score of 0 on items one, 
two and three, testing was discontinued (this did not occur for any of the participants in this 
research study).  For the remaining items the test was stopped when the participant received 
four consecutive scores of 0.  The participants’ responses for both sub-tests were noted in a 
record booklet. 
 
The last task that was administered in this session was the brief eyewitness interview. 
 
In the second session, seven days later, participants’ receptive vocabulary was assessed using 
the PPVT-4.  Participants were asked to either point to, or give the number of, the picture that 
depicted the word spoken by the researcher.  Two practice items were first administered to 
ensure the participant understood the task.  The stimulus items were presented in a flip page 
booklet with 4 numbered images per page.  There were 228 items in total, split into 19 sets (12 
items in each set).  Each correct answer received a score of 1 point. The start point for each 
participant was defined by their estimated mental age (assessed by the use of the SB-5 in the 
first session), whilst testing stopped once the participant had made eight or more errors in a 
set.  The participant’s raw score was calculated by subtracting the number of errors from the 
last number of the item administered (e.g., 130 items administered with 10 errors = a raw 
score of 120).  
 
Once the PPVT-4 had been completed the participant undertook a detailed witness interview 
followed by the identification line-ups.  The final task during the second session was the 
shortened GSS2. Participants were first instructed to listen to a short story and then asked to 
recall everything they could remember about it.   Each idea recalled correctly was awarded 
one point, with a maximum total score of 32 points. Half a point was awarded for a partially 
correct/incomplete recalled idea. In addition, distortions i.e., a change to the original idea, and 
fabrications i.e., the introduction of new elements, were also scored (one point per 
distortion/fabrication), the sum of which constituted ‘total confabulations’.  Participants were 
subsequently informed that they would be asked some questions about the story and 
instructed to be as accurate as possible in their answers. There were 16 questions in total, 12 
of which were leading and these questions were administered twice.  On the first occasion, if 
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the participant ‘yielded’ (gave in) to the leading question this was scored as one point (and the 
total score termed as ‘yield 1’).  The researcher then gave the participant some negative 
feedback, advising that they had done well but had made some mistakes so the questions 
would have to be asked again to see if they could do better. The participants’ responses were 
again scored for yield (termed ‘yield 2’) and in addition, the number of times participants 
‘shifted’, i.e., changed their response (between yield 1 and yield 2), was also scored.  Total 
suggestibility was calculated by adding together the scores obtained from yield 1 and shift 
(total range of scores was 0 to 28).   
 
It should be noted that half of the participants undertook a repeat detailed witness interview 
following a further delay of one week.  However, for the purposes of the study reported here 
only data relating to the first detailed witness interview, which was administered to all 
participants, has been included. 
 
5.4 Results 
Mean scores (including standard deviations) for CA, MA and the cognitive measures for both 
the adults with ID and TD children are provided in table 5.1 above.  For the cognitive measures 
this data is based on raw scores.   Group differences (ascertained using independent samples t 
tests) have also been provided. 
 
To simplify the analysis process in relation to the multiple regression (to ascertain if scores on 
the cognitive measures were predictive of amount of correct information recalled in the first 
detailed witness interview), as well as the correlation relating to confabulation scores on the 
GSS and confabulations produced in the first detailed witness interview, data for both films 
was combined.  For the logistic regressions relating to line-up identification accuracy, data for 
films A and B was analysed separately.  
 
In addition, data relating to the number of confabulations produced in the first detailed 
witness interview was highly positively skewed, i.e., > 1.96 (Field, 2009), (due to a high number 
of low scores) and transformations were unsuccessful in reducing this skew.  As a result, the 
confabulations data was subject to a Spearman’s as opposed to a Pearson Correlation.   
 
Data pertinent to each group was analysed separately, since relationships between variables 
are likely to differ as a function of group and correlations between cognitive measures are 
often higher in individuals with ID (Detterman & Daniel, 1989).    As data from the two groups 
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was not combined for the analysis, it was not necessary to enter group (adults with ID or TD 
children) as a predictor. 
 
Statistical Checks 
With regards to the regression analyses, all data was subject to the appropriate statistical 
checks (e.g., Cook’s and Mahalanobis distances, average leverage, tolerance, VIF, Durbin-
Watson and DFBeta) to ensure that no individual cases were exerting excessive influence on 
the regressions.  In addition, data for the logistic regressions was tested for linearity of the 
logit and multicollinearity (Field, 2009).   See Appendix L for a table providing details of the 
correlations between the cognitive measures. 
 
5.4.1 Predicting Total Amount of Correct Information Recalled in the First Detailed 
Witness Interview from Measures of Mental Age, Memory and Receptive Vocabulary 
Two multiple regression analyses (one for each group) were employed to explore the 
relationship between the cognitive measures and performance on the first detailed witness 
interview.  MA (Stanford Binet MA equivalents), memory (TOMAL memory for stories and 
faces) and receptive vocabulary (PPVT) were all entered (using forced entry) as predictor 
variables, with total amount of correct information recalled entered as the dependent 
variable.  
 
For the TD children, a review of the casewise diagnostics highlighted one case with high 
standardised residuals, i.e., a potential outlier.  Further investigations were therefore carried 
out, i.e., using all the statistical checks specified above, however, all values were within the 
relevant ranges specified.  A review of this participant’s data revealed zero scores in relation to 
information recalled (i.e., they were unable to remember anything about either of the two 
eyewitness films).   As a result, the decision was taken to exclude this case from the analysis2.   






2 The overall model, when the outlier was included, was statistically significant, F(4,35) = 15.92, p < .001, 
with the model accounting for 65% (r2 adjusted, = 61%) of the variance.  Both SB MA and memory for 
stories (verbal memory) were significant predictors of total amount of information recalled in the first 
detailed witness interview, β = .55, p = .008 and β = .34, p = .013 respectively. 
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Table 5.2   Summary of regressions predicting the amount of total correct information recalled 
in the first detailed witness interview (significant values are indicated where relevant) 
#R2 adjusted = .69, ##R2 adjusted = .71 
* p = .05, **p < .05, ***p < .01, **** p < .001 
 
For the adults with ID the overall model was significant, F(4,35) = 22.55, p < .001, accounting 
for 69% (adjusted) of the variance.  Verbal memory (β = .61, p < .001) and facial memory (β = 
.42, p= .002) were significant positive predictors of the total amount of correct information 
recalled whereas receptive vocabulary (β = -.43, p < .001) was a significant negative predictor. 
 
 
The overall model was also significant for the TD children, F(4,34) = 24.01, p < .001, accounting 
for 71% (adjusted) of the variance.   SB MA (β = .68, p < .001), verbal memory (β = .26, p = .03) 
and facial memory (β = .23, p = .05) were all positive significant predictors of total amount of 
correct information recalled3.   
 
5.4.2 Relationship Between GSS Confabulation Scores and Confabulations Produced on the 
Detailed Witness Interview 
The relationship between confabulation scores on the GSS and the number of confabulations 
produced during the detailed witness interview was investigated using a Spearman’s 
correlation.  This revealed that there was no significant relationship between these two 
variables for either the adults with ID, rs = .20, p = .22 or the TD children, rs = .18, p = .274. 
 
3 The regression was also carried out with CA substituted for MA and this made no difference to either 
the significance of the overall model nor individual predictors. 
4 As the confabulation scores on the GSS comprise of two separate elements: distortions and 
fabrications, analyses were also run separately for each of these elements to ensure that none of these 
 Adults with ID# (N = 40)  TD Children## (N = 39) 
 
B SE B β 
 
 B SE B β 
 
Constant 14.82 13.38 -  -56.99 13.88 - 








1.53 0.45 .42***  1.04 0.51 .23* 
PPVT: Receptive 
Vocabulary 
- 0.32 0.08 -.43****  - 0.23 0.15 -.22 
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5.4.3 Predicting Line-Up Identification Accuracy from Measures of Facial Memory and 
Mental Age 
The ability of measures of MA and facial memory to predict identification accuracy on line-ups 
was explored using forced entry logistic regressions (two for each group: one for film A and 
one for film B), with overall identification accuracy (correct or incorrect) entered as the 
dependent variable and MA and memory for faces entered as the predictor variables.  See 
Table 5.3 below for a summary of the regression analyses.  
 
For Film A, for the adults with ID the overall model did not significantly predict line-up 
accuracy, omnibus χ2 = 1.20, df = 2, p = .55 and MA (p = .54) and memory for faces (p = .29) 
were not significant predictors.  The model accounted for between 3% and 5.6% of the 
variance, with 0% of accurate performance and 100% of inaccurate performance successfully 
predicted5.  For the TD children the overall model did not significantly predict line-up accuracy, 
omnibus χ2 = 0.06, df = 2, p = .97 and MA (p = .82) and memory for faces (p = .94) were not 
significant predictors.  The model accounted for between .1% and .2% of the variance, with 0% 
of accurate performance and 100% of inaccurate performance successfully predicted. 
 
For Film B, for the adults with ID the overall model did not significantly predict line-up 
accuracy, omnibus χ2 = 1.63, df = 2, p = .44 and MA (p = .32) and memory for faces (p = .96) 
were not significant predictors.  The model accounted for between 4% and 9.7% of the 
variance, with 0% of accurate performance and 100% of inaccurate performance successfully 
predicted.   For the TD children the overall model did not significantly predict line-up accuracy, 
omnibus χ2 = 1.62, df = 2, p = .44 and MA (p = .23) and memory for faces (p = .32) were not 
significant predictors.  The model accounted for between 4% and 5.5% of the variance, with 
7.7% of accurate performance and 100% of inaccurate performance successfully predicted6.
 
elements were individually related to the number of confabulations recalled during the detailed witness 
interview.  Neither of these correlations were significant for either group. 
5 Three potential outliers were identified, however, excluding these cases made no difference to the 
significance of the model overall nor individual predictors.  Analyses reported thus include all cases. 
6 One potential outlier was identified, however, excluding this case made no difference to the 





















#R2 = Adults with ID:  .04 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .03 (Cox & Snell), .06 (Nagelkerke), TD Children:  .001 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .001 (Cox & Snell),  
.002 (Nagelkerke) 
##R2 = Adults with ID:  .08 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .04 (Cox & Snell), .10 (Nagelkerke), TD Children: .03 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .04 (Cox & Snell), .06      
(Nagelkerke) 
 
 Adults with ID (N = 40)  TD Children (N = 40) 
 
B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
 B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
      Lower Upper       Lower Upper 
Film A#              
Constant -2.06 (3.09) 0.44 1 .51 0.13 - -  -1.01 (2.37) 0.18 1 .67 0.37 - - 




0.13 (0.12) 1.14 1 .29 1.14 .90 1.44  -0.01 (0.10) 0.01 1 .94 0.99 .82 1.20 
Film B##              
Constant -7.45 (4.26) 3.06 1 .08 0.001 - -  0.85 (2.56) 0.11 1 .74 2.33 - - 




-0.01 (0.14) 0.00 1 .96 0.99 .75 1.31  0.11 (0.11) 0.98 1 .32 1.11 .90 1.37 
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5.4.4 Predicting Understanding of the Purpose of the Identification Line-ups from 
Measures of Language 
For the identification line-ups, data relating to scores on the PPVT and SB verbal tests were 
analysed using forced entry multinomial logistic regressions (one for each group).   
 
Understanding of the purpose of the line-up (full, partial or no understanding) was entered as 
the dependent variable, with scores for the PPVT and SB verbal tests entered as covariates 
(predictor variables).   See Table 5.4 below for summarised results from these regressions. 
 
For the adults with ID the overall model significantly predicted understanding of the purpose 
of the line-up, χ2 = 22.50, df = 4, p < .001.  Receptive vocabulary was a significant predictor, χ2 = 
8.21, df = 2, p = .016, although expressive vocabulary was not, χ2 = .3.74, df = 2, p = .15.  The 
model accounted for between 43% and 50.2% of the variance, with 50% of full understanding, 
0% of partial understanding and 91.3% of no understanding successfully predicted.  In 
comparison to no understanding of the purpose of the line-up, the odds ratio of a partial 
understanding was 1.06, whilst the odds ratio for a full understanding was also 1.06. 
 
For the TD children the overall model did not significantly predict understanding of the 
purpose of the line-up, χ2 = 6.56, df = 4, p = .16 and receptive and expressive vocabulary were 
not significant predictors (χ2 = 5.30, df = 2, p = .07 and χ2 = 4.88, df = 2, p = .09 respectively).  
The model accounted for between 15.1% and 19% of the variance, with 0% of full 




Table 5.4  Summary of regressions predicting understanding of the purpose of the identification line-up for the adults with ID and TD children 




 Adults with ID  TD Children 
 
B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
 B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
      Lower Upper       Lower Upper 
Full understanding vs. No understanding 








0.32 (0.18) 3.19 1 .07 1.38 .97 1.96  0.03 (0.49) 0.00 1 .95 1.03 .39 2.7 
Partial understanding vs. No understanding         









0.14 (0.18) 0.62 1 .43 1.15 .81 1.64  0.46 (0.24) 3.67 1 .06 1.58 .99 2.53 
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5.4.5 Predicting Memory for the Non-Biased Identification Line-up Instructions from 
Measures of Language 
To assess the usefulness of language measures as predictors of memory for the non-biased 
identification line-up instructions, data relating to receptive and expressive vocabulary was 
analysed using two forced entry multinomial logistic regressions (one for each group).  See 
Table 5.5 below for a summary of the results from the logistic regressions. 
 
For the adults with ID the overall model significantly predicted memory for the non-biased 
line-up instructions, χ2 = 14.67, df = 4, p = .005.  Expressive vocabulary was a significant 
predictor, χ2 = 7.46, df = 2, p = .02, but receptive vocabulary was not, χ2 = 0.85, df = 2, p = .65.  
The model accounted for between 30.7% and 36.1% of the variance, with 0% of full memory, 
70.6% of partial memory and 78.9% of no memory successfully predicted.  In comparison to no 
memory for the line-up instructions, the odds ratio of a partial memory was 1.42, whilst the 
odds ratio for a full understanding was 1.48. 
 
For the TD children the overall model did not significantly predict memory for the non-biased 
line-up instructions, χ2 = 2.08, df = 4, p = .72 and receptive and expressive vocabulary were not 
significant predictors (χ2 = 1.66, df = 2, p = .43 and χ2 = 1.16, df = 2, p = .56).  The model 
accounted for between 5.1% and 6.4 % of the variance, with 0% of full memory, 12.5% of 




Table 5.5  Summary of regressions predicting memory for the non-biased identification line-up instructions for the adults with ID and TD children 
Note:  R2 = Adults with ID:  .31 (Cox & Snell), .36 (Nagelkerke), TD Children:  .05 (Cox & Snell), .06 (Nagelkerke) 
 Adults with ID  TD Children 
 
B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
 B (SE) Wald df 
 
Sig. Exp B 95% confidence 
interval 
      Lower Upper       Lower Upper 
Full memory vs. No memory 








0.39 (0.22) 3.14 1 .08 1.48 0.96 2.27  -0.18 (0.41) 0.19 1 .66 0.83 .37 1.88 
Partial memory vs. No memory         









0.35 (0.15) 5.24 1 .02 1.42 1.05 1.91  0.15 (0.17) 0.78 1 .38 1.17 .83 1.63 
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In summary, for the adults with ID, verbal memory, facial memory and receptive vocabulary 
were all significant predictors of the amount of total correct information recalled in the 
detailed witness interview, whilst MA and verbal and facial memory were all significant 
predictors for the TD children.  There was no significant relationship between a measure of 
confabulation and the number of confabulations produced during the detailed witness 
interview and neither were measures of MA and facial memory significant predictors of line-up 
identification accuracy for either group.  Expressive vocabulary was not a significant predictor 
of understanding of the purpose of the identification line-ups for either of the two groups, 
whilst receptive vocabulary was a significant predictor for the adults with ID only.  In relation 
to memory for the non-biased identification line-up instructions, receptive vocabulary was not 
a significant predictor for either of the two groups, however, expressive vocabulary was a 
significant predictor for the adults with ID only.   
 
5.5 Discussion 
This preliminary study sought to investigate whether measures relating to MA, memory (verbal 
and facial), language (receptive and expressive) and confabulation might prove effective 
predictors of eyewitness recall in adults with ID and MA matched TD children.  It further 
examined the potential for measures relating to MA and facial memory to predict line-up 
identification accuracy, as well as the predictive usefulness of receptive and expressive 
vocabulary in both understanding the actual purpose of the line-up and in recall for the non-
biased line-up instructions. 
 
Results demonstrated that, for both groups, verbal memory and facial memory were 
significant positive predictors of the total amount of correct information recalled in a detailed 
witness interview.  However, differences in the significance of other predictors varied 
according to group.  Whilst receptive vocabulary was a significant negative predictor for the 
adults with ID, it did not predict recall in the TD children.  Conversely, MA was a significant 
positive predictor of recall in the TD children, but not in the adults with ID.  These findings 
provide only partial support for those predicted.  In addition, there was no significant 
relationship between confabulation scores on the GSS2 and the number of confabulations 
produced in the detailed witness interviews, which was not in line with the tentative 
predictions. 
 
In relation to the identification line-ups, the results revealed that, for both groups, neither 
facial memory nor MA were significant predictors of line-up identification accuracy for either 
of the two films, which again, was not in line with predicted findings.  Whilst, for the adults 
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with ID, receptive vocabulary was a significant predictor of understanding the line-up’s 
purpose, neither of the language measures (receptive nor expressive vocabulary) were 
significant predictors for the TD children.  Furthermore, although expressive vocabulary was a 
significant predictor of memory for the non-biased line-up instructions in the adults with ID, 
neither of the language measures were significant predictors in the TD children.  The findings 
in relation to understanding of the line-up’s purpose and memory for the non-biased line-up 
instructions provide only partial support for those tentatively predicted. 
 
The finding that verbal and facial memory were significant predictors of the amount of 
information recalled in the detailed witness interview for both groups supports the research of 
Henry et al. (2017) who reported that these two cognitive variables also predicted 
performance on a brief eyewitness interview in children with and without autism.   The finding 
regarding verbal memory (memory for stories) predicting recall performance in individuals 
with ID has been reported in other research, for example Henry and Gudjonsson (2003), and it 
is perhaps not an unsurprising finding given that recall of an eyewitness event is akin to 
recalling a story.  However, the finding in relation to facial memory has only been reported in 
one other study, that of Henry et al. (2017), although this is likely underpinned by the fact that 
many other research studies have tended to focus on measures of verbal memory instead of 
facial.  As to why facial memory is a significant predictor of eyewitness recall is not overtly 
clear.  The participants were asked to describe the individuals from the eyewitness films, but 
the majority of these descriptions were limited to length and colour of hair rather than 
detailed facial descriptions.  Perhaps the facial memory assessment is tapping into a more 
general aspect of visual memory ability, e.g., being able to remember visual details and spatial 
location information.  This in some ways would make sense, since the ability to recognise a 
face relies not just on distinguishing the specific characteristics of that face, e.g., nose, mouth, 
eyebrows etc., but also on being able to determine where on the face these characteristics 
should sit in relation to the other characteristics (Wyer, Hollins, Pahl & Roper, 2015).  
Additional research would therefore be beneficial in order to explore this interesting finding in 
further detail. 
 
In relation to age (in this case MA) predicting eyewitness recall in TD children, this accords well 
with previous findings in the eyewitness literature regarding age-related differences in 
eyewitness performance in this group, e.g., Brown and Lamb (2015); Geddie at al. (2000).  
Substituting CA for MA did not alter the significance of the findings in relation to predicting 
recall of correct information in the TD children, which appears to suggest that MA in this group 
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is perhaps a measure of developmental change, evidenced by the fact that the older children 
tended to recall more total correct information than the younger children.  
 
The fact that none of the language measures (receptive or expressive vocabulary) were 
significant predictors of recall in the TD children is surprising.  Burgwyn-Bailes et al. (2001) 
found that receptive vocabulary predicted recall in this group (albeit only after a lengthy 
delay), whilst Kulkofsky (2010) reported that TD children with better receptive language 
demonstrated better recall skills.   However, it is important to note that both of these studies 
included children much younger than those who took part in the current study.  It is therefore 
possible that, as children’s language skills develop and their age increases, receptive 
vocabulary becomes less significant as a predictor of recall, whilst age becomes more 
significant.   This would account for age rather than receptive vocabulary being a significant 
predictor in the current study, i.e., the children here were older than those in either of the 
aforementioned studies.  Indeed, Burgwyn-Bailes et al. (2001) reported that although 
receptive vocabulary was associated with recall in the younger children, it became less useful 
as a predictor for the older children. 
 
The finding that receptive vocabulary was a significant negative predictor of recall for the 
adults with ID is interesting, especially as Belva et al. (2012) in their research exploring 
communication deficits in adults with profound ID, reported that the receptive vocabulary 
skills of this group were superior to their expressive skills. However, the participants in Belva et 
al.’s (2012) study had more severe levels of ID than those in the current study, and as 
previously noted (see section 5.2.1 above), there are likely to be differences in cognitive 
abilities both within and between various levels of severity of ID.   Schalick, Westbrook and 
Young (2012) point out that it is important to consider the context in which the receptive 
vocabulary skills are being employed.  They maintain that whilst some individuals with ID may 
exhibit adept receptive communication skills in relation to information with which they are 
familiar (e.g., people and places), this does not mean they understand all forms of 
communication in all contexts.  In the current study where the adults with ID were in an 
unfamiliar context, i.e., they were being asked to recall information about a novel event by an 
unfamiliar person, their use of receptive communication skills may not have been optimal.  
Further research might thus prove helpful in order to understand more about the proficiency 
of this group’s receptive language skills in both familiar and unfamiliar contexts.  This is 
something which could have practical implications for the interviewing of adults with ID. 
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Gudjonsson and Clare (1995) in their study of the relationship between confabulation and 
cognitive measures, came to the conclusion that distortions and fabrications, which together 
make up the confabulation score on the GSS2, each measure different aspects of 
confabulation.  They therefore proposed that these elements should be considered separately 
rather than in combination.  In relation to the current study, this could mean that although 
when taken as a whole these two elements (distortions and fabrications) did not correlate with 
the confabulations produced in the detailed witness interview, the individual elements might 
instead prove to be significant correlates.  To ascertain if this were the case, correlations were 
therefore carried out separately for these individual elements (distortions and fabrications), 
however, neither of them were significantly correlated with the number of confabulations 
produced in the detailed witness interview.  
 
It was anticipated that facial memory and MA would, to some extent, predict identification 
accuracy on the line-ups, but this did not prove to be the case.   As such these findings are not 
in line with those of Anderson et al. (2014) who found that scores on a test of facial 
recognition predicted line-up identification accuracy.  However, there are a number of distinct 
differences between this study and that of Anderson et al. (2014): the population samples 
were very different, i.e., Anderson et al.’s (2014) participants were young adults (students) 
without ID; facial memory was assessed using the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine & 
Nakayam, 2006); whilst the identification line-ups consisted of only six people.  It is therefore 
difficult to draw any direct comparison between the findings of the Anderson et al. (2014) 
study and the current one.  It is possible that the task of identifying a perpetrator from an 
identification line-up is also drawing upon other cognitive abilities, which were not accounted 
for nor assessed in the current study, for example attention, societal pressures or decision 
making.  Perhaps the issue may also lie with the actual identification task itself, for example a 
lack of understanding of the nature of the task or issues with the decision-making skills 
required to make an identification.  Certainly, all of these possibilities require further 
exploration.   
 
It is curious that none of the language measures (receptive or expressive vocabulary) were 
significant predictors of understanding the line-up’s purpose for the TD children and yet 
receptive vocabulary was a significant predictor for the adults with ID.  For the adults with ID, 
these findings are an accurate reflection of the fact that receptive vocabulary underlies an 
individual’s ability to understand spoken words, so it makes sense that receptive vocabulary 
would in some way be related to understanding the purpose of the line-up.  However, this 
does not explain why the same findings were not seen in the TD children.  On reviewing the 
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receptive vocabulary scores of the adults with ID it is evident that these were higher than 
those of the TD children.   Whilst the two groups were matched for MA, perhaps the higher 
scores on the receptive vocabulary test (PPVT) for the adults with ID are evidence that 
experience confers an advantage on vocabulary and as such, this is reflected in the predictive 
usefulness of this measure in understanding the purpose of the line-up for this group. 
 
Furthermore, although expressive vocabulary was a significant predictor of memory for the 
non-biased line-up instructions in the adults with ID, neither of the language measures were 
significant predictors in the TD children.  Again, this finding in relation to the adults with ID is a 
common sense one, in that being able to accurately recall the line-up instructions verbally 
reflects expressive vocabulary skills.  Yet, expressive vocabulary was not predicting the recall of 
the line-up instructions for the TD children.  Thus perhaps, as with understanding the purpose 
of the line-up, other factors were influential here.  It is possible that recall of the line-up 
instructions could have been influenced by either a lack of attention, which in turn could have 
affected encoding, or a failure in memory retrieval.  Whatever the explanation, it is clear that 
this is an area that would benefit from further research. 
 
The current research has a number of strengths and limitations.  Not only is it the first study to 
look at individual predictors of eyewitness performance in adults with ID, but it has also been 
conducted using, as far as reasonably possible, ecologically valid methods, whilst including a 
comparative control group (MA matched TD children).  In addition, the findings have 
confirmed those from previous research in relation to children with ID (Henry et. al., 2017).  Of 
course, one of the main limitations with the research reported here, is the nature of the 
eyewitness event, which depicted a very mild disability hate crime.  The experience of 
witnessing a real crime is likely to be much more distressing, potentially leading to emotional 
and psychological distress.  It is also noted that criticism has been levelled at the use of the 
GSS2 with adults with ID (Beail, 2002).  One of the key arguments is that this group are at a 
distinct disadvantage in relation to the recall of the narrative element of the GSS2, due to 
deficits in memory.  It is further asserted that the GSS2 is a test of semantic memory rather 
than episodic or autobiographical event memory, which is the type of memory that would be 
used in an investigative interview.  Undoubtedly, these are all very valid concerns.  However, 
only the confabulation scores from the GSS2 were used in this preliminary investigation of 
their predictive usefulness, which is far removed from a much more detailed assessment of 
interrogative suggestibility for actual use in a forensic or legal context.   
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As mentioned in previous chapters, and as highlighted at various points above, it is possible 
that other factors, which were not accounted for in the current study, were exerting an 
influence on the variables measured.  Including other cognitive measures, such as a test of 
attention or an assessment of individual differences in susceptibility to social pressure, might 
have helped explain some of the non-significant findings in the current study.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The findings reported in this preliminary study have demonstrated that, with regards to 
eyewitness recall, whilst age (MA) is a significant predictor in TD children and receptive 
vocabulary in adults with ID, verbal and facial memory are useful predictors in both adults with 
ID and TD children.  In a forensic and legal setting obtaining these cognitive measures (which 
are fairly quick and straightforward to obtain using standardised assessments), perhaps 
through the assistance of a Registered Intermediary (RI), may prove useful in helping 
professionals predict eyewitness performance in these two vulnerable groups.  It is evident 
however, that further research is required, not only in relation to identifying exactly which 
cognitive factors might prove useful as predictors of identification accuracy, but also in 





















Mock Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Evidence 
from Adults with Intellectual Disabilities  
 
6.1 Abstract 
Whilst in general there is very little research on juror perceptions of individuals with ID, what 
research does exist has tended to focus on children with ID.  Findings from the handful of 
studies involving adults with ID appear to suggest that, even though they are perceived to be 
honest and truthful, they are not perceived to be accurate, credible or competent as 
eyewitnesses.   The current study therefore sought to build upon and expand existing research.  
Mock jurors were presented with videotaped eyewitness evidence from one of three adult 
witnesses with ID, which varied according to level of recall (low, medium and high).  Mock 
jurors were either informed that the witness might have an ID or not provided with any 
information.  After viewing the eyewitness evidence, the mock jurors were asked to rate the 
witnesses using a 10-item credibility questionnaire.  Results demonstrated that whilst the 
adults with ID were perceived to be honest and believable, they were not perceived to be 
reliable as eyewitnesses.  Although providing mock jurors with information about the witness 
did not have an effect on perceived credibility, credibility ratings increased in line with level of 
recall (amount of information recalled) for the low and medium recall conditions.  This 
demonstrates that the provision of information about a witness potentially having an ID does 
not have a negative impact on perceived credibility, although in some instances (in this case 
when comparing low and medium recall) the level of detail contained in eyewitness evidence 
can affect credibility ratings.  From a practical perspective, criminal justice professionals, with 
the assistance of Registered Intermediaries, should perhaps consider providing jurors with 
detailed diagnostic information in cases involving a witness with ID. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
Jurors play an extremely important role in the criminal justice system (CJS), being tasked, as 
ordinary members of the public, with weighing up eyewitness evidence and using rules of law 
to make an informed decision about a defendant’s culpability (Bornstein & Greene, 2011).  
Jurors’ decisions may be influenced by a number of wide-ranging factors, including personal 
attitudes, consistency of testimony, witness confidence, level of testimony detail, as well as 
witness characteristics relating to speech, age, cognitive ability and non-verbal cues (Devine, 
Clayton, Dunford, Seying & Price, 2001).   
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The factors that jurors take into account when reaching a decision are therefore of particular 
interest to researchers.  However, Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 precludes access 
to real jurors and the jury decision making process in actual court cases.  To overcome this issue 
researchers instead use jury eligible participants, referred to as ‘mock jurors’, from the general 
population to help them gain an insight into the factors that influence jurors’ perceptions of 
witness credibility and ultimately juror decisions regarding a perpetrator’s guilt. 
 
6.2.1 Stereotypes and Attitudes 
As members of the general public, jurors and indeed their decisions, are open to influence from 
pre-existing stereotypical beliefs and attitudes (Devine et al., 2001).  On a general level, jurors 
may possess preconceived ideas regarding the functioning of memory, the behaviours that 
accompany lying and how witnesses are expected to conduct themselves, whilst at a more 
specific level, they may have deep-rooted, often negative beliefs, regarding the abilities of, and 
the prevalence of criminal behaviour amongst, populations from various socio-economic or 
ethnic backgrounds (Espinoza, Willis-Esqueda, Toascano & Coons, 2015).  Such negative 
stereotypical beliefs and attitudes extend to individuals with physical and intellectual disabilities 
(Furnham & Pendred, 1983) and are thus likely to transpose into the jury system.   In a study 
which sought to explore the effect of stereotypical beliefs about individuals with ID on 
perceptions of their eyewitness evidence, Stobbs and Kebbell (2003) presented mock jurors with 
written eyewitness evidence from a witness who had been involved in a robbery.  Mock jurors 
were assigned to one of three groups in which information about the witness had been 
manipulated such that they were either an adult from the general population, an adult with mild 
ID, or an adult with mild ID with information from an expert witness.  Once they had read the 
transcript the mock jurors were asked to complete a credibility questionnaire, rating aspects of 
the witness and their evidence such as credibility, accuracy, truthfulness and competency.  It 
was found that, regardless of whether the mock juror had been provided with information from 
the expert witness, the witness with ID was perceived to be just as honest and truthful as the 
adult from the general population.  However, despite the testimony being identical, the witness 
with ID was perceived to be less accurate, less credible and less competent compared to the 
adult from the general population.   
 
Similar findings have also been reported in research involving child witnesses with ID.   For 
example, Brown and Lewis (2013) presented mock jurors with evidence from children, in which 
information relating to the child’s age and cognitive ability was manipulated.  The child witness 
was described as either being TD and the relevant age provided (i.e., 5 or 7 years old) or 
possessing an ID and an indication of their mental age (MA) specified (i.e., a chronological age 
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(CA) of 7 years with a MA of 5 years).   It was found that the child witness with ID, although 
perceived to be trustworthy, was not perceived to be very accurate, reliable or competent.  
However, on a more positive note, the researchers noted that the mock jurors had actually 
adopted a developmental approach in assessing the child with ID, i.e., they had rated the child 
based on their MA, meaning there were no differences in ratings of cognitive competence 
between the child described as a TD 5 year old or a child with ID with a MA of 5 years. 
 
6.2.2 Consistency of Evidence 
In a study exploring the effect of inconsistent evidence on juror decisions, Berman et al. (1995) 
presented mock jurors with video-recorded direct and cross-examination of a ‘mock’ eyewitness 
who had been subjected to an armed robbery.  The inconsistency of the eyewitness evidence 
was manipulated, to include contradictions between a previous interview and evidence 
provided at cross-examination (e.g., whether the perpetrator had a briefcase or a bag).  The 
researchers reported that inconsistent evidence led jurors to perceive the eyewitness as less 
credible and the defendant as less guilty.  The inconsistency of testimony has also been found 
to affect its perceived accuracy, for example Potter and Brewer (1999) asked police officers, 
lawyers and mock jurors to rate the extent to which they believed a number of witness 
behaviours were effective predictors of eyewitness accuracy.  They found that inconsistent 
information was perceived as being one of the most powerful indicators.  This is particularly 
relevant in relation to witnesses with ID, who are often perceived to be more likely to acquiesce 
and thus change their responses, particularly during repeat interviews or with the use of repeat 
questions (see Cederborg et al., 2008 as well as Cederborg, Danielsson, La Rooy & Lamb, 2009 
for differing findings in this area).  However, in spite of Berman et al.’s (1995) findings it is 
important to note that inconsistent eyewitness testimony is seldom a reliable indicator of 
inaccuracy (Fisher, Brewer & Mitchell, 2009). 
 
6.2.3 Witness Confidence 
Research that has examined the effect of witness confidence on perceptions of credibility has 
found that the confidence of an eyewitness can have an impact on both believability as well as 
perceptions of testimony accuracy (Beaudry et al., 2015; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986). 
 
Moreover, it has been proposed that witness confidence may be so influential in perceived 
credibility that even when a witness’s account is inconsistent, the witness is still deemed to be 
credible if they are perceived to be confident.  In a study by Brewer and Burke (2002) the 
researchers manipulated both the consistency of eyewitness evidence (introducing 
contradictions between the defense and prosecution cross-examinations) as well as the 
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witness’s confidence (introducing hesitations, e.g., ‘um’ and ‘ah’ and altering the language used, 
e.g., ‘very sure’ instead of ‘reasonably sure’ etc.) and asked mock jurors to rate how confident 
the witness was during the presentation of their evidence.  The mock jurors were further 
requested to indicate the percentage probability of the defendant having committed the alleged 
crime and provide a verdict (guilty vs. not guilty).  It was discovered that regardless of 
consistent/inconsistent evidence, it was a witness’s perceived confidence that had the biggest 
and most influential impact on mock juror decisions.  This, they suggest, could be due to witness 
confidence mitigating the effects of inconsistent eyewitness evidence, such that inconsistency 
is less influential when a witness is perceived to be confident in their account.   
 
Lack of perceived confidence is therefore likely to be an issue for adults with ID.  This group are 
likely to feel anxious and lack confidence when coming into contact with authoritative figures, 
due to both a lack of worldly experience and an imbalance of power resulting from their reliance 
on others for the provision of care and assistance with everyday tasks (McCormack et al., 2005; 
O’Callaghan & Murphy, 2007).   This lack of confidence may be relayed in the way they present 
themselves and the behaviours they exhibit when providing evidence. 
 
6.2.4 Level of Testimony Detail 
The amount of detail that a witness recalls can also have an impact on perceived credibility of 
eyewitness evidence and thus juror decisions.  Bell and Loftus (1988) found that mock jurors 
perceived witnesses to be more credible and returned more guilty verdicts when the witness’s 
evidence contained a greater degree of detail.  They proposed that this was likely a result of 
mock jurors reasoning that a witness who recalled more details therefore had a better memory 
for the eyewitness event.   These findings regarding credibility were corroborated in a study by 
Heath, Grannemann, Sawa and Hodge (1997) who manipulated the amount and type of details 
contained in eyewitness evidence and asked mock jurors to provide ratings for the witnesses’ 
credibility.  They found that perceived credibility ratings increased in line with the number of 
details recalled, which, as per Bell and Loftus (1988), the researchers believed was due to jurors’ 
associating more detailed eyewitness evidence with an enhanced memory for the event.    
However, it is important to note that even though a witness may recall more information about 
an event, there is no guarantee that this information is accurate.  Unlike experimental research 
where it is possible to establish the ‘groundtruth’, it is usually not possible to do so with a real 
crime.    
 
As evidence from witnesses with ID may contain less detail, this may cause problems in relation 
to perceived reliability and accuracy.  This is a factor which Henry et al. (2011) noted as having 
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played a role in their research when mock jurors rated the transcripts of children with ID as less 
credible than those without, despite jurors not being informed that some of the witnesses had 
an ID.  These findings were provided with further support in a more recent study involving 
children with autism, where the child whose evidence contained more detail was perceived to 
be more credible than the child whose evidence was less detailed (Crane et al. 2018). 
 
6.2.5 Witness Characteristics 
Individual characteristics of the witness such as speech, age and cognitive ability may also play 
a key role in perception of credibility and thus juror decisions.  A witness whose evidence is 
littered with hesitations and mumbled speech may unwittingly convey a negative message 
regarding the accuracy and reliability of their eyewitness evidence.  Schmidt and Brigham (1986) 
found that witnesses of varying ages (5, 10 and 15 years) who adopted a powerful style of speech 
in their eyewitness evidence, i.e., direct eye contact, few hesitations and clear speech, were 
perceived by mock jurors to be more truthful and more credible than those who adopted a -
powerless style, i.e., poor eye contact and more hesitations such as ‘ah’ and ‘um’. These findings 
were further supported by Ruva and Bryant (2004) and more recently by Jules and McQuiston 
(2013) who also found an increase in credibility ratings for those witnesses employing a powerful 
compared to a powerless style of speech in their eyewitness evidence.   As speech production 
problems are prevalent amongst individuals with ID, this can result in an overall reduction in 
intelligibility (Coppens-Hofman et al., 2016) as well as perceived confidence, which in turn may 
have an impact on the perceived credibility of this group as eyewitnesses.  Furthermore, 
recalling information about a witnessed event is likely to place even greater pressure on this 
group’s available cognitive resources, which could result in attempts to reduce this load in order 
to focus on more important tasks.  This may lead to overt behaviours such as gaze aversion and 
staring into space, all aspects of witness behaviour which are likely to be interpreted by mock 
jurors as an indication of inaccurate evidence and deceit.   
 
It is important to note that jurors may not always be provided with information about a witness’s 
diagnosis or disability: for example the witness may not have revealed this information to their 
lawyer, or they may not want to disclose this information for fear it will have a potentially 
negative impact (Cooper & Allely, 2017).  However, such a disclosure may actually be helpful for 
jurors when making a judgement regarding a witness’s evidence, particularly in instances where 
the credibility of a witness is called into question.  Crane et al. (2018) reported that jurors who 
were informed that a child witness had autism and provided with additional information about 
autism, rated the child as more credible compared to jurors who were not provided with such 
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information.  However, other research, for example Peled et al. (2004), has found that informing 
mock jurors that a witness has ID can have a negative impact on ratings of perceived credibility.    
 
All of the above factors can result in jurors rejecting what might otherwise be tangible evidence, 
leading to cases involving witnesses with ID being dismissed and preventing this vulnerable 
group from receiving proper access to justice.  It is thus extremely important that we have a 
much clearer understanding of not only how witnesses with ID are perceived by jurors, but also 
the factors that might affect perceptions of credibility and judgements of this group’s eyewitness 
evidence.   However, there is a paucity of research that specifically focuses on adults with ID 
whilst at the same time utilising a realistic sample of participants as mock jurors (i.e., not 
undergraduate students) and ecologically valid materials.   
 
The current study aims to address some of the above issues.  It will examine mock juror’s 
perceptions of eyewitness evidence from adults with mild to moderate non-specific ID utilising 
a wider range of jury eligible participants, with evidence presented by means of ecologically valid 
video-recordings instead of written transcripts (video-recordings are commonly used to present 
evidence from vulnerable witnesses in England and Wales under the Special Measures set out 
in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999).    To ascertain if the amount of detail 
contained in eyewitness evidence has an impact on perceived accuracy, reliability and overall 
credibility, mock jurors will be shown a single eyewitness evidence recording (from the 
interviewing study described in chapter 3) from one of three different adult witnesses with ID, 
which vary in relation to the amount of detail recalled (low, medium and high).   As mock jurors 
may have stereotypical beliefs regarding the abilities of individuals with ID, provision of 
information regarding the witness potentially having an ID (the term ‘learning disability’ will be 
used in the study as opposed to ‘intellectual disability’ because it is felt this is a term the mock 
jurors will be more familiar with), together with a relevant definition, will be manipulated to 
determine if this has an effect on credibility ratings.  The mock jurors will be asked to rate the 
eyewitness evidence video using a 10-item credibility questionnaire, and credibility ratings will 
be reviewed to determine if, as per other research, adults with ID are perceived to be honest 
and believable, but their eyewitness evidence is perceived to be inaccurate and unreliable. 
 
The following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
• The mock jurors will perceive the adults with ID to be honest and believable but not 
accurate or reliable as eyewitnesses. 
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• Providing the mock jurors with information advising that the witness may have an ID, 
together with a definition of the term ID, will result in ratings of their eyewitness 
evidence as less credible. 
 
• Mock jurors’ credibility ratings will increase in line with the adult witness’s level of recall 




A total of 120 participants from the general population took part in the study (60 males and 60 
females aged between 18 years and 75 years (M = 48.13 years, SD = 11.10 months)).  These 
adults were recruited from family, friends, acquaintances and former work colleagues of the 
researcher.  Since these participants were required to assume the role of ‘mock jurors’, it was 
essential that they met the current eligibility criteria for serving on a jury in the United Kingdom 
(see Appendix M). 
 
The mock-jurors were quasi-randomly assigned (according to age and gender) to watch one of 
three video recordings containing eyewitness evidence (‘Adult A’, ‘Adult B’ or ‘Adult C’) and to 
one of two experimental conditions: ‘Uninformed’ or ‘Informed’, see below for further 
information regarding these conditions.  Table 6.1 provides details of mock juror demographics 
across each of the conditions, in addition to ratings of prior knowledge/experience of ID. 
 
There was no significant difference in mock juror mean ages across the 6 conditions, F(5,114) = 
0.027, p = 1.00, neither was there a significant difference in ratings of knowledge and experience 













Table 6.1   Mock juror demographics (N = 120) 
Video Condition 
 














































A review of existing mock juror literature revealed that the norm regarding the total sample 
size is approximately 120, with around 20 participants in each condition.   
 
 A post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to examine the 
statistical power required for a small (w = .10), medium (w = .25), and large (w = .40) effect size 
with an alpha level of p < .05 (Cohen, 1992).   
 
For a MANOVA with 120 participants, examining the effect of the two independent variables 
(eyewitness’ level of recall and information provided to the mock jurors) on the credibility 
ratings (accuracy, convincingness, witness’ confidence (in their account), competency, 
honesty, believability, completeness of account, level of overall cognitive functioning, 
capability to testify and overall performance/credibility as a witness), the statistical power 
required was .99 for detecting a small effect, 1.0 for detecting a medium effect and 1.0 for 
detecting a large effect.  Thus, there was sufficient power to detect medium and large effect 




A between-subjects design was employed for this study. There were two independent variables: 
the eyewitness’ level of recall for the witnessed event (i.e., amount of information recalled) and 
the information provided to participants regarding the background of the witness (before 
viewing the eyewitness evidence).  The eyewitness’ recall for the witnessed event had three 
levels: low recall (‘Adult A’), medium recall (‘Adult B’) and high recall (‘Adult C’).  The information 
provided to participants had two levels: no information provided regarding the eyewitness 
possibly having an ID (Uninformed) and information provided suggesting the eyewitness may 
have an ID (Informed). The dependent variables consisted of the ratings from the mock juror 
perception questionnaire (accuracy, convincingness, witness’ confidence (in their account), 
competency, honesty, believability, completeness of account, level of overall cognitive 
functioning, capability to testify and overall performance/credibility as a witness) all measured 
using a 10-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 10 = extremely). 
 
6.3.3 Materials 
6.3.3.1 Eyewitness Evidence Videos 
Three video-recorded eyewitness evidence recordings (one each from three different 
participants) from the detailed investigative interviews conducted as part of the study described 
in Chapter 3 were chosen from the sample of adults with ID.  The eyewitness evidence recordings 
related to Film B.  The recordings were chosen according to the eyewitness’ level of recall (for 
the eyewitness event) such that one contained a low level, one a medium level and one a high 
level of recall (this level of recall was assessed by comparing these participants’ recall to the 
level of recall across the whole group of adults with ID).  Evidence relating to Film B was utilised 
because recall for this film was significantly higher than that for Film A, t(39) = -4.58, p < .001.  
The three participants had given permission for their video interviews to be used in further 
research.  Full details relating to each adult’s age (MA and CA), gender, IQ, length of eyewitness 










Table 6.2  Details relating to witness characteristics and eyewitness evidence for the (three) 
adults with ID 
*Total information recalled: correct, incorrect, source monitoring errors and confabulations 
 **Percentage accuracy of information recalled: total correct as a % of total information recalled 
 
 
6.3.3.2 Credibility Questionnaire 
The credibility questionnaire, based on that previously used by Crane et al. (2018), consisted of 
a set of 10 questions which asked the mock jurors to rate aspects of the eyewitness evidence 
from the adults with ID on a 10-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 10 = extremely).  The credibility 
aspects the mock jurors were asked to rate were: accuracy, convincingness, witness’ confidence 
(in their account), competency, honesty, believability, completeness of account, level of overall 
cognitive functioning, capability to testify and overall performance as a witness.  The mock jurors 
were also asked to state whether or not they believed the witness had a learning disability, 
provide ratings regarding their own level of knowledge/experience of learning disabilities and 
asked an ‘optional’ question as to how the witness’s credibility might be improved (see Appendix 
M for a copy of the mock juror credibility questionnaire). 
 
The credibility questionnaire was available as either a paper version (for those mock jurors 
tested on a face-to-face basis) or an electronic (Qualtrics) version (for those mock jurors tested 
via Skype).  The number of participants who were tested face-to-face was 105, whilst the 
number tested via Skype was 15. 
 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was carried out to test the efficacy of both the paper and electronic (Qualtrics) 
versions of the credibility questionnaire.   







Chronological Age 28 yrs 1 m 35 yrs 11 m 47 yrs 7 m 
Mental Age 5 yrs 8 m 6 yrs 1m 5 yrs 11 m 
Gender Female Male Female 
SB-5 (ABIQ) 50 50 50 
Length of eyewitness 
evidence 
3 mins 6 secs 5 mins 42 secs 6 mins 20 secs 
Amount of 
information recalled* 
15 30 42 
Accuracy of 
information recalled** 
93% 83% 86% 
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There were six participants in total: one for each of the experimental conditions.  Four 
participants completed the electronic version of the questionnaire and two completed the paper 
version.  There were three females and three males, aged between 46 years and 61 years (M = 
52.86, SD = 6.20). After being provided with information pertinent to their condition, they each 
viewed one of the three videos (according to their allocated condition) and were asked to 
complete the credibility questionnaire.   
 
As the pilot study did not highlight any potential issues with the questions contained in the 
credibility questionnaire this was the version used in the study.  The only minor adjustment 
made was to include a question in the demographics section of the questionnaire which asked 
whether the participant had ever served on a real jury, for this reason the pilot data study was 
not included in the final sample. 
 
6.3.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested either individually or in very small groups (maximum of 4) and this took 
place either face-to-face or via Skype.  In advance of this study each participant was asked to 
ensure that they were eligible for jury service (participants were provided with the jury eligibility 
criteria as part of the study information) and their eligibility was re-confirmed at the start of the 
session.  Participants were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix N), provide some 
demographic information and also asked to indicate whether or not they had ever served on a 
real jury (See Appendix M). 
 
Prior to viewing the eyewitness evidence videos, the mock jurors were informed that they would 
be shown a video of an adult eyewitness being interviewed about a ‘mock’ hate crime they had 
seen.  They were further advised that as part of the interviewing process, a truth and lies exercise 
had been undertaken to ascertain that the witness demonstrated a clear understanding of the 
distinction between the two terms.  Mock jurors in the ‘uninformed’ condition were not 
provided with any information regarding the possibility that the witness may have ID nor were 
they given a definition of ID.  The mock jurors in the ‘informed’ condition were however, advised 
that the adult witness ‘may have a learning disability’ and provided with a definition of learning 
disability (this definition was an abbreviated version of Mencap’s definition of a learning 
disability: ‘a learning disability is a reduced intellectual ability and difficulty with everyday 
activities, which affects someone for their whole life. People with a learning disability are likely 
to take longer to learn and may need support to develop new skills, understand complex 
information and in their ability to interact with other people’ (Mencap, 2019). 
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After watching one of the videos (of Adult A, B or C) the mock jurors were asked to complete 
the credibility questionnaire described in section 6.2.3.2 above, following which they were 




Prior to running any detailed analyses, statistical checks were undertaken in relation to non-
normality and homogeneity of variance.  Ratings for accuracy, convincingness, witness’ 
confidence (in their account), appearance of honesty and believability all demonstrated varying 
levels of negative skew.  However, all of these ratings were included in the MANOVAs as this 
statistical test is robust to non-normality as long as there is a sample size of at least 20 in the 
smallest cell (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2013). 
 
Multicollinearity  
In order to ensure that none of the variables were highly correlated, i.e., there was no 
multicollinearity, a correlation matrix was produced using all of the dependent variables from 
the credibility questionnaire.  As none of the correlations were over .80 (Field, 2009), all of the 
variables were included in the MANOVAs.  
 
Data was analysed using two separate MANOVAs: one to examine the effect of age, gender and 
knowledge / experience of ID on credibility ratings and the other to examine the effect of 
information provided to the mock jurors (Uninformed vs Informed) together with level of recall 
(low, medium, high).  Significant MANOVAs were followed up with ANOVAs, whilst planned 
contrasts were conducted to examine the effect of the main independent variables, i.e., 
information provided to the mock jurors and level of recall, on the perceived credibility ratings.   
See Table 6.3 below for mean credibility ratings for each adult with ID (across the three recall 
conditions, i.e., low, medium and high) and for each information condition (informed and 
uninformed). 
 
A Spearman’s Correlation was employed to explore the relationship between serving on a real 
jury and overall perceived credibility. 
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Table 6.3  Mean (SD) credibility ratings (on a 10-point Likert scale*) for perceptions of the adults with ID across the two conditions (Uninformed, Informed) (n = 120) 
*1 =   Not at all, 10 = Extremely
 Adult A (low recall) Adult B (medium recall) Adult C (high recall)  
Measure Uninformed 
(n = 20) 
Informed          
(n = 20) 
Total          
(Uninformed 
+ Informed) 
(n = 40) 
Uninformed 
(n = 20) 
Informed          
(n = 20) 
Total             
(Uninformed 
+ Informed)  
(n = 40) 
Uninformed 
(n = 20) 
Informed 
(n = 20) 
Total           
(Uninformed 
+ Informed)         
(n = 40) 
Overall total          
(n = 120)        
Accuracy of 
account 
5.10 (1.65) 6.10 (2.05) 5.60 (1.91) 6.75 (1.21) 6.50 (1.32) 6.62 (1.25) 6.50 (1.57) 6.90 (1.12) 6.70 (1.36) 6.31 (1.60) 
Convincingness 
of witness 
5.00 (1.69) 6.20 (2.17) 5.60 (2.01) 7.10 (1.29) 6.45 (2.01) 6.78 (1.70) 6.25 (1.68) 7.15 (1.35) 6.70 (1.57) 6.36 (1.84) 
Witness 
confidence  
4.40 (1.88) 5.60 (1.98) 5.00 (2.00) 6.85 (1.84) 6.60 (2.14) 6.73 (1.97) 6.10 (1.62) 6.70 (1.46) 6.40 (1.55) 6.04 (1.98) 
Competency of 
witness  
4.25 (1.45) 5.80 (1.85) 5.02 (1.82) 6.05 (1.47) 5.90 (1.80) 5.98 (1.63) 5.85 (1.69) 6.55 (1.54) 6.20 (1.64) 5.73 (1.76) 
Appearance of 
honesty  
7.40 (1.43) 8.65 (1.27) 8.03 (1.48) 9.10 (0.91) 8.15 (1.84) 8.63 (1.51) 8.35 (1.31) 8.40 (1.39) 8.37 (1.33) 8.34 (1.45) 
Believability  6.40 (1.64) 6.95 (1.57) 6.68 (1.61) 7.90 (1.12) 7.15 (2.08) 7.53 (1.69) 7.25 (1.80) 7.75 (1.48) 7.50 (1.65) 7.23 (1.68) 
Completeness 
of account 
3.50 (1.43) 4.00 (1.92) 3.75 (1.69) 5.55 (1.76) 4.95 (2.16) 5.25 (1.97) 5.50 (1.76) 5.50 (1.19) 5.50 (1.49) 4.83 (1.88) 
Overall level of 
cognitive 
functioning 
4.30 (2.06) 4.85 (1.79) 4.58 (1.92) 5.65 (1.63) 5.05 (2.11) 5.35 (1.89) 5.40 (1.85) 6.40 (1.50) 5.73 (1.75) 5.22 (1.90) 
Capability to 
testify 
4.85 (1.93) 5.45 (2.04) 5.15 (1.98) 6.53 (1.50) 6.05 (2.54) 6.20 (2.07) 6.05 (2.06) 6.80 (1.36) 6.23 (1.79) 5.86 (2.0) 




4.65 (1.50) 5.50 (1.61) 5.08 (1.59) 6.45 (1.57) 5.80 (2.22) 6.13 (1.92) 6.35 (1.69) 6.82 (1.03) 6.57 (1.53) 5.93 (1.79) 
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Chi-square tests were carried out to explore the association between guessing that the witness 
had an ID and type of information provided, as well as the association between this variable and 
level of recall.   
 
A Bonferroni correction of p < .025 (the usual p value (.05) divided by number of tests used, i.e., 
two) was applied to the MANOVA and follow-up univariate ANOVA test results.  
 
6.4.1 Effect of Mock Juror Age, Gender and Knowledge/Experience of Intellectual Disability 
To explore the effect of age, gender and knowledge/experience of ID on witness credibility 
ratings, a MANOVA was conducted with age, gender and knowledge/experience of ID entered 
as the independent variables and credibility ratings entered as the dependent variables.  
 
Using Pillai’s trace, the MANOVA indicated no significant effect of age, V = 7.40, F(440, 120) = 
0.77, p = .96 or gender V = 0.72, F(10, 3) = 0.77 p = .67, on mock juror credibility ratings. 
 
Again, using Pillai’s trace it was also found that mock jurors’ knowledge and experience of ID did 
not have a significant effect on credibility ratings, V = 3.89, F(90, 99) = 0.84, p = .80.   
 
6.4.2 Effect of Serving on a Real Jury 
Of the 120 mock jurors only 18 (15%) reported having ever served on a real jury.  A Spearman’s 
Correlation revealed that there was no significant relationship between serving on a real jury 
and overall perceived credibility of the witness r = .03, p = .77. 
 
6.4.3 Perceived Credibility Across All Three Witnesses 
Analysis of the credibility ratings across all three witnesses (i.e., all three recall levels: low, 
medium and high) revealed that the mock jurors perceived the adults with ID to be very honest 
(M = 8.34, SD = 1.45) and very believable (M = 7.23, SD = 1.68).  However, the adult witnesses’ 
accounts were not perceived to be very complete (M = 4.83, SD = 1.88).  Competency ratings 
were also fairly low (M = 5.73, SD = 1.76), as were ratings regarding the witnesses’ overall level 
of cognitive functioning (M = 5.22, SD = 1.90).  Credibility ratings for accuracy (M = 6.31, SD = 
1.60) and convincingness (M = 6.36, SD = 1.84) were comparable, as were ratings regarding the 
witness’s capability to testify (M = 5.86, SD = 2.00) and how good the witness was overall/overall 
credibility (M = 5.93, SD = 1.79).    
 
 To check that the overall total credibility rating (M = 5.93, SD = 1.79) was an effective measure 
of the perceived credibility/performance of the adults with ID (as opposed to measuring a 
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variable which had not been accounted for), a total credibility rating was calculated (M = 6.21, 
SD = 1.43) by combining all of the ratings for each dependent variable (apart from overall 
performance).  These two ratings were subsequently entered into a Pearson correlation.   This 
showed that there was a significant positive correlation between the overall total credibility 
rating and the calculated total credibility rating, r (120) = 0.846, p < .001. 
 
6.4.4 Information Provided to Mock Jurors (Informed vs Uninformed) and Level of Recall 
(Low, Medium, High) 
To examine the overall effect on credibility ratings of the type of information provided to mock 
jurors, i.e.,  advising that the witness may have an ID and providing a definition of ID (Informed) 
versus not providing the mock juror with any information (Uninformed), as well as the adults’ 
level of recall (low, medium, high), a MANOVA was conducted with type of information and level 
of recall entered as the independent variables and credibility ratings entered as the dependent 
variables.   
 
Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that the type of information provided had no effect on mock 
jurors’ credibility ratings, V = 0.10, F(10, 105) = 1.22, p = .29.    
 
Using Pillai’s trace, a significant effect for level of recall was found, V = 0.33, F(20, 212) = 2.10, p 
= .005. A separate follow-up one-way between participants ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
of level of recall on eight out of the ten credibility ratings: accuracy7 (F(2, 117) = 6.42, p = .002, r   
= .32), convincingness8 (F(2, 117) = 5.52, p = .005, r  = .30), witness’ confidence (in their account) 
(F(2, 117) = 9.98, p < .001, r  = .37), competency (F(2, 117) = 5.41, p = .006, r  = .28), completeness 
of account (F(2, 117) = 12.01, p  < .001, r  = .41), cognitive functioning (F(2, 117) = 4.00, p = .022, 
r  = .24), capability to testify (F(2, 117) = 3.96, p = .022, r  = .24) and overall performance  (F(2, 
117) = 8.28, p < .001, r  = .35).  There was no significant effect of level of recall on ratings of 
believability (F(2, 117) = 3.43, p = .04) or honesty (F(2, 117) = 1.74, p = .18). 
 
When examining overall perceived credibility of each witness (total ratings excluding overall 
performance) a one-way between participants ANOVA indicated that there was a significant 
effect of level of recall on this credibility characteristic, F(2, 117) = 8.65, p < .001, r  = .36, 
representing a medium effect size. The adult with low recall was perceived as less credible 
overall than the adults with medium and high recall. 
 
 
7 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data 
8 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data 
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There was no significant interaction between the type of information provided to the mock 
jurors (Informed vs. Uninformed) and level of recall (low, medium, high), V = 0.22, F(20, 212) = 
1.32, p = .17. 
 
Planned contrasts were conducted to examine whether credibility ratings increased in line with 
level of recall.  These revealed a significant linear trend, i.e., an increase in ratings, for low versus 
medium recall for all ten of the credibility characteristics9: accuracy10 (t(67.46) = -2.84, p = .003, 
r = .33), convincingness11 (t(75.94) = -2.82, p = .003, r = .31), witness’ confidence (in their account) 
(t(117) = -4.16, p < .001, r = .17), competency (t(117) = 2.51, p = .007, r = .23), honesty (t(117) = 
-1.86, p = .033, r = .17), believability (t(117) = -2.31, p = .012, r = .21),  completeness of account 
(t(117) = 3.88, p < .001, r = .34),  level of cognitive functioning (t(117) = -1.87, p = .032, r = .17),  
capability to testify (t(117) = -2.41, p = .009, r = .67), and overall performance (t(117) = -2.78, p 
= .003, r = .25).   
 
There was no comparative significant linear trend in increased credibility ratings for medium 
versus high recall for any of the credibility characteristics. 
 
6.4.5 Guessing the Witness had an Intellectual Disability 
Out of a total of 120 mock jurors, 95% (114) stated that they believed the witness had an ID, 
which included 57 from the ‘Informed’ condition and 57 from the ‘Uninformed’ condition. The 
number of participants (out of a possible 40 for each recall condition: low, medium and high) 
who guessed that the witness had an ID was 36 for the adult with low recall, and 39 for the other 
two recall conditions, i.e., medium and high.   
 
Chi-square tests revealed no significant association between either guessing that the witness 
had an ID and the type of information provided to mock jurors (Informed vs Uninformed), 
Fisher’s Exact test p = .66, or guessing that the witness had an ID and level of recall (low, medium 




9 As the hypothesis tested was one-tailed and the planned contrasts only provide p values for a two-
tailed hypothesis, all p values were divided by 2 to provide one-tailed significance values (Field, 2009). 
10  The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, thus the alternative values (for 
equal variances not assumed) have been used in the reporting of the contrasts and calculation of effect 
sizes. 
11 The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, thus the alternative values (for 
equal variances not assumed) have been used in the reporting of the contrasts and calculation of effect 
sizes. 
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6.5  Discussion 
Two key aims of this study were to explore mock jurors’ perceptions of adults with ID to 
determine if they are perceived to be accurate, credible and reliable as witnesses, as well as 
establishing whether providing information about the witness potentially having an ID, together 
with a relevant definition, would also have an effect on mock juror credibility ratings.  A further 
aim of the study was to examine if the amount of detail contained in eyewitness evidence has 
an impact on mock juror credibility ratings.  As predicted, mock jurors perceived the adults with 
ID to be very honest and believable. However, ratings for accuracy and completeness were not 
particularly high, suggesting that the mock jurors did not perceive the adults with ID to be 
reliable as eyewitnesses.  Whether or not the mock jurors were provided with information about 
the adult witness had no effect on credibility ratings, thus providing no support for the 
hypothesis that informing the mock jurors that the witness may have an ID would lead to 
perceptions of the witness as less credible.  With regards to the level of recall (amount of detail), 
as this increased from low to medium so too did mock juror ratings for all of the credibility 
characteristics.  However, there was no comparative increase in ratings for medium versus high 
recall.  As it was predicted that the higher the recall, the higher the credibility ratings, these 
findings provide only partial support for those predicted. 
 
The high ratings for perceived honesty and believability and low ratings for accuracy provide 
further support for Stobbs and Kebbell’s (2003) study, as they also reported that in spite of the 
witnesses with ID being perceived as honest and believable, the mock jurors struggled to accept 
this group’s evidence as accurate.  In the current study, even when the witness’s account did 
not contain a large amount of detail, i.e., in the low recall condition, the witness was still 
perceived to be very honest.  
 
The fact that the provision of information did not have a negative effect on credibility ratings is 
a finding which is in contrast to Peled et al. (2004).  However, one important difference between 
this and the Peled et al. (2004) study is that the current research used video-recorded 
eyewitness evidence as opposed to written transcripts, so perhaps the mode of presentation 
had an effect on perceived credibility.  It is possible that being able to actually see the witness 
had a beneficial effect on perceived credibility, as it is a much more personal experience 
compared to reading a written transcript. 
 
As to why credibility ratings increased when comparing low to medium recall and not for 
medium to high recall it is possible that differences in perceived consistency and the witness’s 
perceived lack of self-confidence in what they were saying were more pronounced when 
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comparing the adults in the low and medium recall conditions.  In reviewing the video-taped 
eyewitness evidence for adult A it is clear that this witness was much less consistent in their 
responses to the questions asked by the interviewer and changed their responses on a number 
of occasions.  Perhaps this led to them being perceived as much less accurate and thus less 
credible than the other two witnesses.  This would fit well with previous findings regarding the 
negative effect of inconsistent testimony on perceived credibility (Berman et al., 1995), as well 
as the impact of witness confidence on believability and accuracy (Beaudry et al., 2015; Whitley 
& Greenberg, 1986).  It is, however, interesting to note that even though the witness may have 
been perceived as less accurate, in reality their eyewitness evidence was actually more accurate 
than that of either adult B or C.  
 
Whilst a prediction was not made as to whether a mock juror’s knowledge/experience of ID 
would affect witness credibility ratings, in some respects it would have been expected that this 
variable (dependent upon whether the existing knowledge/experience was negative or positive) 
would have influenced credibility ratings, but this was not the case.  These findings contradict 
those reported by Crane et al. (2018) who found a significant positive relationship, albeit only 
for one of the two child witnesses with autism (who displayed more non-stereotypical autistic 
behaviours), between ratings of overall credibility and knowledge/experience of autism.   The 
results in the current study might be explained by the fact that the number of mock jurors who 
rated themselves as being very knowledgeable/experienced in relation to ID (based on a rating 
of 8 and above) was only 17%.  Moreover, this is perhaps quite a difficult quantity to assess, 
particularly as it relates to self-perception and is thus open to substantial interpretation. 
 
It was evident that the mock jurors were highly aware that the adults had ID, as the majority of 
them guessed this was the case and moreover, the numbers who speculated that this was true 
was the same in both the informed and uninformed conditions.  It is possible that the adults 
with ID were emitting subtle non-verbal cues which led the mock jurors to make this assumption.  
If the effects of stereotypical biases regarding this group were thus operating in an equivalent 
manner across the conditions, this in turn could explain the equivalent ID guessing rates.   
 
When examining ID guessing rates across the witnesses, the number of mock jurors who guessed 
that the witness had an ID was slightly lower for the witness with the lowest recall (adult A) 
compared to the adults with medium and high recall.  Perhaps the way in which adult A 
presented themselves was in some way different to the other two witnesses.  Indeed, the fact 
that just as many people believed adults B (medium recall) and C (high recall) to have an ID might 
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help explain why ratings for many of the credibility characteristics for these two witnesses were 
fairly similar. 
 
Each witness had a distinctive style of speech (varying levels of speech production problems), 
which at times affected clarity.  Whilst this did not affect comprehension of the information 
recalled, the style of speech may have relayed subtle information regarding the witness’s 
cognitive abilities, which in turn may have contributed to the high number of mock jurors 
perceiving the adults to have an ID.  This fact is important given that Schmidt and Brigham (1986) 
found that style of speech used in eyewitness evidence had an impact on perceived truthfulness 
and thus credibility.  Further research would be needed with additional adult witnesses with ID 
before conclusions about the credibility of this vulnerable group could be drawn. 
 
In reviewing the strengths and limitations of the current study it is important to note that much 
of the previous research in this area has relied on the use of written transcripts (e.g. Peled et al., 
2004; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003), whereas the current study employed video-taped eyewitness 
evidence, which is more ecologically valid as this is the way in which evidence is likely to be 
presented to jurors in a real trial.  Furthermore, another strength of this study is the use of a 
more representative sample of jury eligible participants across all ages, as opposed to the use of 
undergraduate students, which has been a common occurrence in previous mock juror research 
(e.g., Peled et al., 2004).  
 
Of note is the fact that there was a gender difference between the adult witnesses, i.e., adults 
A and C were female and adult B was male.  This may raise concerns about the effect of these 
gender differences on the perceived credibility ratings of the individual witnesses.   However, as 
other research has found that witness gender has no effect on perceptions of witness credibility 
(Maeder, Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2012), this factor was not deemed to be influential in the current 
study. 
 
In addition, it is also accepted that the current research merely used one witness (adult with ID) 
in each condition and thus it is possible that some characteristics or qualities pertinent to a 
particular witness (other than gender) had more of an influence on their perceived credibility 
than the amount of information recalled.  Whilst this may raise concerns around adequate 
stimulus sampling (Wells & Windshitl, 1999), it is however, important to note that the researcher 
attempted to minimise the impact of potential individual differences between the adults with 
ID (whose eyewitness evidence was utilised in the study), by matching them as closely as 
possible both on MA and IQ.  Moreover, it should also be pointed out that a considerable amount 
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of the literature in this area merely includes one witness in a given condition (e.g., Bottoms, 
Nysse-Carris, Harris & Tyda, 2003; Brown & Lewis, 2013; Peled et al., 2004). 
 
The current study did not include an assessment of existing attitudes to adults with ID, so it is 
difficult to ascertain which mock jurors may have held negative stereotypes of this group and 
the effect this may have had on perceived credibility.  Such an assessment has been utilised in 
other research involving witnesses with ID, for example Bottoms et al. (2003), and has 
demonstrated how those mock jurors who have a more positive attitude to this group perceive 
them to be more credible. This is something that could be investigated further in future 
research. 
 
The information that was provided to the mock jurors regarding the adults with ID, i.e., advising 
that the witness may have an ID together with a definition, was merely generic and not specific 
to each witness.  Providing information about a witness’s diagnosis and any potential cognitive 
deficits, as well as an explanation as to how this might affect their eyewitness testimony, could 
prove extremely useful to jurors.  Such information could be provided through ecologically valid 
means, for example through the assistance of a Registered Intermediary. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The study described here has demonstrated that mock jurors do perceive adult witnesses with 
ID to be honest and believable.  However, one of the key issues is that they do not perceive this 
group to be accurate and reliable, which consequently leads to doubt concerning their 
credibility.  It has also shown that providing mock jurors with information regarding the 
possibility that a witness may have an ID, does not have a negative impact on credibility ratings.  
Furthermore, an increase in the amount of detail contained in eyewitness evidence may not 
always lead to a corresponding increase in credibility ratings: there may be other factors, such 
as witness behaviours, which influence perceived credibility.   
 
It is therefore evident that more needs to be done to ensure that eyewitness evidence from 
adults with ID is given the due regard and consideration by jurors that would be afforded any 
other witness.  As jurors, like any member of the general population, are likely to enter a 
courtroom with certain stereotypes and prejudices it is essential that future research also 
includes both an investigation of these juror characteristics, as well as procedures to lessen their 








Adults with ID are at an increased risk of coming into contact with the CJS, through either 
being victims or witnesses of abuse (Reiter et al., 2007; Sullivan & Knutson, 2000) and yet very 
little is currently known about their skills as eyewitnesses.  The cognitive deficits that this 
group are reported to experience, for example in relation to attention (Sterr, 2004), memory 
(Nolan et al., 1985; Swanson & Siegel, 2001) and language (e.g., Abbeduto & Hesketh, 1997; 
Hatton, 1998; Murfett et al., 2008) are highly likely to have an impact on various aspects of 
eyewitness performance.  Moreover, both professionals within the CJS (Brennan & Brennan, 
1994; Nathanson & Platt, 2005) as well as members of the general public (e.g., Stobbs & 
Kebbell, 2003) hold stereotypical beliefs regarding the abilities of adults with ID, which could 
affect the perceived credibility and reliability of eyewitness evidence from this group.  The key 
aims of the research presented in chapter 3 were to examine the ability of this group to recall 
information about two separate but similar eyewitness events, whilst also incorporating, for 
the first time (as far as the researcher is aware) the use of repeat interviews.   In chapter 4, a 
study was presented that sought to ascertain whether adults with ID could accurately identify 
perpetrators from ecologically valid video identification line-ups.   An investigation of 
individual differences in cognitive abilities and their potential usefulness as predictors of 
eyewitness performance formed the basis of the exploratory research presented in chapter 5.    
The perceived credibility of (ecologically valid) video-taped eyewitness evidence from adults 
with ID was explored in the mock juror study described in chapter 6, which also examined the 
effect of level of detail recalled, and provision of witness information, on credibility ratings.  
The present chapter will provide a synthesis of the findings from across these four 
experimental chapters, together with an evaluation of their contribution to existing literature 
and theory.  In addition, it will also examine the practical implications of the current findings in 
relation to the criminal justice system and highlight possible directions for future research. 
    
7.2 Summary of Key Findings 
The results of the research presented in chapter 3 demonstrated that when asked to recall 
information about two separate but similar eyewitness events in a brief statement taking 
interview, adults with ID were able to recall just as much information as MA matched TD 
children.  Moreover, not only were accuracy rates higher for the adults with ID, but this group 
also recalled less incorrect and confabulated information and demonstrated fewer source 
monitoring errors (SMEs) than the TD children.   When the groups were interviewed using a 
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detailed witness interview protocol following a delay of one week, the adults with ID recalled 
just as much correct and incorrect information as the TD children and as with the brief 
statement taking interview, the accuracy of the information recalled was higher for the adults 
with ID.  Also, in line with the brief statement taking interview, it was found that, in contrast to 
the TD children, the adults with ID recalled less confabulated information and made fewer 
SMEs.  In a repeat detailed witness interview, which took place following a further delay of one 
week, the amount of correct and incorrect information recalled by both groups was shown to 
be comparative.  Although accuracy levels were similar, as with the two previous interviews, 
the adults with ID recalled less confabulated information and fewer source monitoring errors 
than the TD children.  In relation to the actual effect of the repeat detailed witness interview 
on information recalled, across both groups more correct information was recalled in the first 
detailed witness interview than in the repeat interview.  Whilst the repeat interview led to a 
decrease in SMEs for adults with ID, an increase was seen in TD children and there was a slight 
increase in confabulations for both groups.   The number of changed responses (when 
comparing the information from the first and repeat detailed witness interviews) overall was 
low, however, the TD children were more likely than the adults with ID to change their 
responses in the repeat detailed witness interview.   
 
Unlike other research in this area, the study described in chapter 4, employed ecologically 
valid video identification line-ups to explore identification accuracy in adults with ID.   Using 
both PP and PA identification line-ups it was found that, in comparison to the TD children the 
adults with ID made more false identifications and fewer correct identifications on the PP line-
ups and were less likely to make correct rejections on the PA line-ups, i.e., they still made a 
choice when the perpetrator was not in the line-up.  Both groups appeared to struggle with 
remembering the non-biased line-up instructions which were presented to them in advance of 
viewing the video identification line-ups.  However, the adults with ID demonstrated a better 
understanding of the line-up’s purpose than the TD children.  
 
Individual differences in a number of cognitive measures hold the potential for being useful as 
predictors of eyewitness performance in adults with ID, as was evident from the novel study 
reported in chapter 5.   Both verbal memory (memory for stories) and facial memory (memory 
for faces) were found to be positive predictors of recall of correct information in both adults 
with ID and TD children, whilst the very accessible measure of age, i.e., MA, was found to be a 
positive predictor of recall in TD children, but not in adults with ID.  Alternatively, receptive 
vocabulary was found to be a negative predictor of correctly recalled information in adults 
with ID, but was not a predictor (negative or positive) in TD children.  Rather surprisingly, facial 
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memory was not predictive of line-up identification accuracy for either group.  Although 
expressive vocabulary was a positive predictor of memory for the non-biased line-up 
instructions (advising that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the line-up) in the 
adults with ID and receptive vocabulary was a positive predictor of understanding the purpose 
of the line-up, none of the language measures predicted either of these two aspects in TD 
children. 
 
Mock jurors perceived adults with ID to be honest and believable but not particularly reliable 
as eyewitnesses, as was evident from the research presented in chapter 6.  When jurors were 
provided with information advising that the witness may have a learning disability (and 
provided with a definition of learning disability), this did not have an effect on perceived 
credibility ratings.   The amount of information (low, medium or high) that the three adults 
with ID recalled had an effect on how they were perceived by the mock jurors.  When 
comparing the individual credibility ratings (accuracy, convincingness, witness confidence, 
competency, honesty, believability, completeness of account, level of cognitive functioning, 
capability to testify and overall performance) for each of the three adults, these increased in 
line with level of recall for the low and medium recall conditions only, i.e., there was no 
comparative increase between the witnesses with medium and high recall.   
 
7.3 Contribution to Existing Literature 
The research presented in this thesis has demonstrated that adults with ID can provide 
quantifiable amounts of accurate information about two separate witnessed events.  
Moreover, it has also been established that when examining the ability of adults with ID to 
discriminate between two similar events, as might be the case in instances of repeat abuse, 
adults with ID do not confuse the event details, i.e., they are no more prone to committing 
SMEs than TD children.  Furthermore, when matched for MA the recall abilities of adults with 
ID are comparative (and in some instances superior) to those of TD children, thus extending 
the findings of other research in this area, which has mainly focused on children with ID (e.g., 
Henry & Gudjonsson, 1999, 2003; Michel et al., 2000). 
 
Concerns regarding the negative impact of repeat interviews on recall in this group appear to 
be unfounded.  The adults with ID produced very few changed responses during the repeat 
detailed witness interview and moreover, there was very little impact on the amount and 
accuracy of information recalled.  These findings, while being consistent with those regarding 
the use of repeat interviews in children with ID (Cederborg et al., 2008), have additionally 
demonstrated that using repeat interviews with adults with ID results in the recall of new 
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information, which is of investigative relevance, without a detrimental impact on 
confabulations and contradictions. 
 
When reviewing the next part of the investigation process, the identification of perpetrators, 
the findings from chapter 4 revealed that this was a task that adults with ID found particularly 
challenging.   Unlike previous research which has relied on photographic line-ups, this study 
used ecologically valid PACE Code D compliant video-identification line-ups and found that not 
only did this group often fail to make correct identifications on a PP line-up, but they also 
made a choice (i.e., a false identification) on a PA line-up.   The findings regarding the 
performance of this group were, overall, in line with those of Ternes and Yuille (2008), who 
also used a sequential mode of presentation with adults with ID (albeit their participants were 
shown the line-ups once only and not twice as in the current research). 
 
The adults with ID both struggled to recall the non-biased line-up instructions they were 
provided with in advance of viewing the line-ups and did not truly understand the purpose of 
the line-up identification task itself, both issues which were also highlighted in the research of 
Ericson and Isaacs (2003) and Wilcock and Henry (2017).   Casual observations of the adults 
with ID during the identification line-ups appeared to indicate that the process was extremely 
taxing, cognitively, for this group.  A number of the adults looked away from the line-ups and 
had to be prompted to continue focusing on the screen, possibly indicating that the length of 
time it took to administer the line-ups was far too long.  These observations fit well with 
research regarding the existence of deficits in everyday attention in this group (Sterr, 2004). 
 
As far as the researcher is aware, the study described in chapter 5 is the first of its kind to 
examine the value that individual differences in cognitive measures might hold in relation to 
predicting eyewitness performance in adults with ID.  Whilst generally there is very little 
research that has explored the relationship between these two areas, the findings that verbal 
memory (memory for stories) and facial memory (memory for faces) predicted recall in a 
detailed witness interview provide support for Henry et al. (2017), who also reported that 
these cognitive measures predicted recall of correct information in children with and without 
autism.  Notwithstanding this, the research in chapter 5 has extended Henry et al.’s (2017) 
findings to a population which differs both in age and aetiology. 
 
The mock juror research presented in chapter 6 both adds to, and expands on, the limited 
available research on the perceived credibility and reliability of eyewitness evidence from 
adults with ID.   It provides support for the findings of Stobbs and Kebbell (2003) as the 
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research in this thesis also found that this group, whilst perceived as honest and believable, 
are not perceived to be accurate or reliable as eyewitnesses.  It further expands this research 
as it used much more ecologically valid methods of presenting eyewitness evidence, i.e., video-
taped evidence as opposed to written transcripts, and employed a much more representative 
and realistic sample of jury eligible participants compared to a number of other studies (e.g., 
Brown & Lewis, 2013; Peled et al., 2004).  It also sought to explore how the amount of 
information contained in eyewitness evidence might affect perceived credibility, something 
which has often only been referred to anecdotally in other mock juror studies, rather than 
being investigated in a direct manner.   The effect of providing information about a witness 
having an ID on credibility ratings has previously only been examined in children with ID, thus, 
once again, this research has contributed to the eyewitness literature by extending the 
knowledge to another population. 
 
7.4 Contribution to Theory 
One of the main contributions that the studies described in this thesis have made to the theory 
underpinning research in individuals with ID, is in relation to the debate concerning the 
cognitive development of this group.  This debate is probably most pertinent to cognitive 
development in children with ID, however, it is of relevance to the current research, due to the 
use of a MA matching process.  There are two main theories of cognitive development in 
individuals with ID, usually referred to as the ‘difference’ and ‘developmental’ approaches.  For 
difference theorists, cognitive development in children with ID is qualitatively different to that 
of TD children, whereas for developmental theorists, children with ID proceed through the 
same stages of development as TD children, although at a much slower pace (Mundy & Kasari, 
1990).  The opposing views of these two perspectives leads them to advocate very different 
approaches to the use of comparison groups in research involving individuals with ID.  For 
difference theorists CA comparisons are more appropriate, whereas for those who favour the 
developmental approach, MA comparisons are more effective.  
 
In the research presented in chapters 3 and 4, where the adults with ID were matched for MA 
with TD children, the amount of information recalled about two eyewitness events was 
comparative across the two groups. However, overall the identification accuracy of the adults 
with ID was deficient compared to the TD children.   Whilst the findings from chapter 3 appear 
to support the developmental approach to cognitive development in individuals with ID, 
chapter 4’s findings do not.   Perhaps the reason for this lies in the fact that these two tasks 
may be quite different in nature.  Traditional laboratory-based memory research, utilising tests 
of intentional memory, report findings indicating deficits in the performance of individuals 
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with ID compared to TD peers (e.g., Baumeister, Runcie & Gardepe, 1984; Winters & Attlee, 
1974).  However, research that has included tests of incidental memory (e.g., Burack & Zigler, 
1990) has found no differences in performance when comparing individuals with ID to TD 
peers, thus leading researchers to suggest that the performance of individuals with ID may be 
optimal on tasks involving everyday memory.  Witnessing a crime in real-life is highly likely to 
be a test of true incidental memory, especially if it is not particularly clear initially that what 
has been witnessed is actually a crime.  Laboratory based research on eyewitness memory 
may, to varying extents, tap into intentional rather than incidental memory.  Participants are 
much more likely to be paying attention because they are in an unfamiliar or novel situation, 
even if, as was the case in the current research, participants are not informed that they will be 
later questioned about the films.  Perhaps in the current instance recalling information about 
the two eyewitness films was underpinned more by incidental encoding whilst identifying the 
perpetrators from the line-ups may have been underpinned more by intentional encoding.  
This could, amongst a number of other factors, provide a partial explanation for the deficient 
performance of the adults with ID on the identification task.     
 
It is also possible that there are significant qualitative differences in the recall and 
identification tasks, which place demands on different cognitive abilities.  Most notably the 
cognitive abilities associated with (verbal) recall are distinct from those associated with (facial) 
recognition (Eysenck & Keane, 2010).  This may also explain why, in the study presented in 
chapter 5, the cognitive factors which were significant predictors of recall in the interviews 
were not significant predictors of line-up identification accuracy. 
 
Furthermore, the findings from the interviewing research presented in chapter 3 contribute to 
existing theory regarding the occurrence of reminiscence.  Reminiscence is deemed to occur 
when repeated recall attempts lead to the recall of new, previously undisclosed information 
(Howe, 1991).   There are a number of theories as to why reminiscence occurs with repeated 
recall.  For example, the stimulus sampling theory suggests that reminiscence occurs because 
different pieces of information are picked out from our memories during different recall 
attempts (Estes, 1955).  Thus, as the number of recall attempts increase, so too do the number 
of items extracted from memory (Smith & Vela, 1991).  Alternatively, the recall time 
hypothesis, as proposed by Roediger and Thorpe (1978) maintains that the amount of time 
assigned to the task of recalling information about an event builds up with each recall attempt, 
such that recall on a subsequent occasion is afforded more time than the first recall attempt, 
i.e., the total amount of time has been amassed.   
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Regardless of the theory underlying the reminiscence effect, it was evident from the current 
research that for both the adults with ID and TD children the repeat detailed witness interview 
facilitated the recall of new details, i.e., it prompted reminiscence across both groups.   This 
suggests that during the first detailed witness interview the groups were not actually recalling 
all the event details stored in memory, so the repeat interview had a beneficial effect in that it 
prompted the participants to recall more.  Evidence of a reminiscence effect in repeat 
interviews has previously been reported in research involving children with ID (Cederborg et 
al., 2008; Henry & Gudjonsson, 2003), but has now been extended to adults with ID.  As 
already highlighted in chapter 3, the recall of any new details could potentially provide fresh 
leads in an investigation process, demonstrating the benefits of conducting repeat interviews 
with both adults with ID and TD children. 
 
The research presented in chapter 3 may also contribute to existing theories regarding source 
monitoring, particularly the source monitoring framework proposed by Johnson et al. (1993).  
According to this framework, an individual’s memory of an event is associated with several 
characteristics that may be specific to that event, for example, information which may be 
emotional (e.g., feelings), perceptual (e.g., sounds or taste) or spatial (e.g., location of an 
object or person) etc.  All of these characteristics, or pieces of information, are underpinned by 
specific cognitive processes.   When asked to recall information about an event, these 
characteristics act as sources of evidence for that memory.   As such this process, and thus the 
actual memory, can be affected by SMEs, i.e., problems in being able to determine the source 
or origin of the memory.  SMEs can occur for a number of reasons, for example due to existing 
schemas, similarity of memories, cognitive deficits or misinformation (Johnson, 1997).   
Although it is important to point out that levels of SMEs overall were low, where these did 
occur it is possible that this was a due to a combination of these factors, in other words, a 
result of cognitive deficits plus similarity of the events plus existing schemas.  Indeed, it was 
evident during the interviews that participants were relying on existing schemas to fill in any 
gaps in memory, particularly in relation to film A, which was first aid based, as several 
participants referred to the male perpetrator as a ‘Dr’ or wearing a ‘Dr’s coat’. 
 
7.5 Implications for the Criminal Justice System 
The findings from the research presented in this thesis hold a number of important practical 
implications for the Criminal Justice System (CJS).   First and foremost, they provide evidence 
that should allay the concerns of criminal justice professionals regarding the reliability of 
adults with ID as eyewitnesses.   As has been highlighted in chapter 3, adults with ID are 
capable of recalling substantial amounts of accurate information about an eyewitness event, 
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without confabulation.  In instances where events might be similar, for example with repeated 
abuse, the findings also reveal that this group is not only able to differentiate between two 
separate events, but are also able to recall forensically relevant information about these 
events, without confusing the sources of information.   Concerns are often raised with regards 
to the use of repeat interviews, usually centring around a combination of factors, such as the 
consolidation of inaccurate information from previous interviews and an increase in source 
monitoring errors resulting from the delay between each interview (Brown et al., 2015).  
However, such concerns appear unwarranted.  The adults with ID not only produced very few 
contradictory responses in the repeat detailed witness interview, but they were also less likely 
to change their responses in comparison to the TD children.  Moreover, of particular relevance 
to the investigation process was the discovery that the repeat interviews led to the recall of 
new details (reminiscence), which in real life might facilitate new lines of enquiry and help 
provide a more comprehensive account of the witnessed event (La Rooy et al., 2010).   
 
The finding regarding performance akin to MA level, i.e., the comparative recall abilities of the 
adults with ID and MA matched TD children, could have practical implications for the CJS.  It 
demonstrates just how important it is that professionals within the CJS take into account the 
MA of witnesses when interviewing them during the investigation process (or questioning 
them in court), such that they should ensure that the language and questions used are 
appropriate for the MA and not CA of a witness with ID.  Information regarding the MA of the 
witness could be provided by a Registered Intermediary (RI), a trained individual whose role is 
to ‘enable complete, coherent and accurate communication to take place between the witness 
and the police or court’ (Ministry of Justice, 2019, p. 7).   As a RI is usually involved in preparing 
reports and carrying out assessments of how best to support a vulnerable witness (Cooper & 
Mattison, 2017), an assessment of MA could be included in this process.   Furthermore, part of 
the RIs role is to provide advice to criminal justice professionals, such as police officers, 
barristers and judges, on the most effective means of communication with a vulnerable 
witness, which includes recommendations regarding the types of questions that should be 
asked and the vocabulary that should be employed.  It would therefore be interesting to carry 
out research that explores the impact this actually has on the accuracy and completeness of 
eyewitness evidence from adults with ID. 
 
The fact that line-up identification accuracy was so impoverished in the adults with ID, and 
that they struggled to recall the non-biased line-up instructions whilst displaying a pronounced 
lack of understanding of the line-up’s purpose, are likely to be of immense concern to many 
criminal justice professionals.  The implications of these findings, coupled with those from 
167 
previous research in this area (e.g., Ericson & Isaacs, 2003; Wilcock & Henry, 2017), suggest 
that adults with ID may require considerable support when asked to identify a perpetrator 
from a line-up and that this support needs to be tailored to the individual requirements of the 
witness.  These findings also suggest that identifying a perpetrator, by means of the standard 
line-up identification process as specified in PACE Code D, is challenging for this group.   A 
number of options could be explored here, for example the use of a RI to provide additional 
support, or the inclusion of a practice line-up, both strategies which have been found to be 
effective in TD children (Parker & Ryan, 1993; Wilcock et al., 2018). 
 
In relation to certain cognitive measures being effective predictors of eyewitness performance, 
whether in relation to recall in a witness interview or identification accuracy on line-ups, the 
preliminary findings from chapter 5 hold the potential for being very helpful to criminal justice 
professionals.  Although much more research is necessary to identify other predictive 
relationships, being able to utilise easily accessible information such as MA, or obtaining 
measures on easy-to-administer standardised tests, could prove extremely valuable to criminal 
justice professionals when making informed assessments about the reliability of eyewitness 
evidence.   Once again, this information could be obtained through the assistance of a RI. 
 
In spite of mock jurors perceiving adults with ID to be honest and believable, they do not 
perceive their eyewitness evidence to be accurate and reliable and yet, as the findings from 
chapter 3 have revealed, this group can and do recall just as much information, with 
comparative (and sometimes even higher) levels of accuracy, as MA matched TD children.  The 
practical implications of these findings for the judicial process are far-reaching, as they suggest 
that jurors may be dismissing credible evidence from adults with ID based on existing negative 
stereotypical views regarding this group’s cognitive abilities and credibility as eyewitnesses.  
This signals the need for jurors to be provided with detailed information about a witness who 
has ID so that they can make informed decisions regarding the reliability of their eyewitness 
evidence.  As one of the responsibilities of the RI is to conduct a detailed assessment of a 
vulnerable witness’s communication needs, the information which forms part of this 
assessment could be utilised to brief the jurors about a witness’s cognitive abilities. 
 
7.6 Limitations 
Like much of the eyewitness literature, the events used as ‘mock’ crimes contained no violent 
or aggressive content, thus the participants would not have experienced any emotional 
distress.  This is a salient point given that adults with ID are particularly vulnerable to crimes 
involving abuse (Reiter et al., 2007; Mansell et al., 1999; Westcott & Jones, 1999) which will be 
168 
extremely distressing and psychologically harmful. This lack of ecological validity with regards 
to the ‘mock’ crime event is unavoidable in research utilising an eyewitness paradigm, where 
ethical limitations preclude the use of events which may serve to replicate the psychological 
and emotional impact associated with being involved in a real crime. 
 
Another limitation is that the current research did not include a measure of basic numeracy 
skills.  This might have been useful in relation to the adults with ID, particularly with regards to 
identifying any individuals who may have benefitted from additional support on the 
identification line-ups.  Some individuals with ID may not be very adept in this area and this 
may be especially true for those with more moderate ID, who may not only struggle with 
counting skills generally, but also in relation to the ordering of numbers, i.e., identifying a 
number before or after a given number (Bashash, Outhred & Bochner, 2003).  Annexe A of 
PACE Code D (2017) advises that ‘the eye-witness shall be asked to say whether the individual 
they saw in person on a specified earlier occasion has been shown and, if so, to identify them 
by number of the image’, a task which may be problematic for some witnesses with ID who 
possess deficient numeracy skills.  In the identification study presented in chapter 4 the 
researcher did realise that this may be an issue for some of the adults with ID.  If the 
participant appeared to be struggling to make a choice, the researcher presented the 
participant with a simultaneous matrix of the (still) images from the line-ups, which proved 
useful as it helped the participant to make a decision.  Allowing participants to view a 
simultaneous matrix of still images after viewing the line-up twice through sequentially is a 
method which has been employed in other research and has been found to be effective in 
increasing correct identifications on PP line-ups. 
 
It is also accepted that restricting the sample to adults with mild and moderate ID, excludes a 
large majority of individuals, i.e., those with more severe levels of ID, from taking part in this 
research.    The rationale behind this decision is explained in chapter 2, although one of the 
main reasons for adopting this approach was the fact that this group are not homogenous.  As 
already pointed out in chapter 5, ID is effectively an ‘umbrella term’, used to describe a group 
of individuals who have a wide-range of cognitive abilities.   If individuals from across the 
whole spectrum had been included in the research, regardless of diagnoses or cognitive ability, 
this would potentially not only have made the statistical analysis extremely difficult, i.e., the 
data would likely have been very badly skewed with extreme lows and highs, but it would also 
have made the drawing of conclusions rather difficult.  
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All of the research undertaken for this thesis was carried out by one individual (the 
researcher), which may raise concerns in relation to researcher bias.  However, all of the 
procedures were standardised in an attempt to overcome potential bias issues.  Furthermore, 
the investigative interviews were not conducted by a police officer, which again may be 
identified as a potential limitation due to concerns regarding a lack of ecological validity.  
Again, attempts were made to overcome this issue by ensuring that the interviews utilised 
were based on current police practice. 
 
7.7 Directions for Future Research  
Pertinent to several of the chapters in this thesis, i.e., chapters 3, 4 and 5, is the suggestion 
that future research include a test of everyday attention.  The ability to attend to information 
is not only a critical cognitive skill essential for everyday life (Eysenck & Keane, 2010), but it 
also plays a fundamental role in eyewitness memory, underpinning both the encoding of 
information as well as its subsequent recall.  Despite the common-sense assumption that 
attention will be related to eyewitness performance, the inclusion of such measures in the 
eyewitness literature has often been overlooked.  This is all the more important in the current 
instance due to the deficits in attention this group may experience (Sterr, 2004).  Certainly, it 
was evident during the identification line-ups that several of the adults with ID were struggling 
to maintain attention, resulting in the researcher having to remind them to look at the screen.  
Not only would the addition of a measure of attention be useful in determining any possible 
relationship between attention and eyewitness recall or line-up identification performance, 
but it would also be useful in determining whether this cognitive ability also has the potential 
to be a useful predictor of eyewitness performance in adults with ID. 
 
Of relevance to a number of chapters in this thesis, especially chapters 3 and 4, is the inclusion 
of a CA matched group.  One of the intentions at the outset of the research described in this 
thesis, was the inclusion of a sample of adults without ID, i.e., a CA matched group.  However, 
due to a number of methodological issues (see chapter 2 for a discussion of these issues) and 
their resultant impact on timescales, the decision was taken not to recruit this sample.  
Nevertheless, the addition of a CA matched group might be something worth considering in 
future research.  In view of the findings that the TD children produced more SMEs than the 
adults with ID, and the fact that improvements in source monitoring abilities appear to be 
developmental (Sprondel et al., 2001), it would be interesting to compare the source 
monitoring abilities of adults with ID with a CA matched group.  Such a comparison might 
provide an insight into whether monitoring the source of information is influenced more by 
cognitive processes or societal influences (e.g., knowledge and experience).  If, for example, 
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societal influences were more influential, the two groups might be expected to be comparative 
in their source monitoring abilities.  However, if cognitive processes were more influential, it 
might be expected that the source monitoring abilities of the adults with ID would be deficient 
compared to their CA counterparts.   
 
It is evident that, in general, the area of interviewing adults with ID for investigative purposes 
is extremely under-researched.  As it is not just individuals with mild and moderate ID who are 
at an increased risk of coming into contact with the CJS, it would be useful to widen the remit 
of further research to include individuals with more severe and profound levels of ID.  Whilst 
this approach would undoubtedly prove very challenging on a number of levels, e.g., obtaining 
informed consent, overcoming communication difficulties, sourcing standardised assessments 
suitable for varying abilities etc., it would ensure that such individuals are not excluded from 
research and that we have knowledge on how best to support these most vulnerable of 
individuals in order that they too can achieve access to justice. 
 
It would also be beneficial to increase the delays between the witnessed event and interviews, 
perhaps to several weeks or months, as this would enable an examination of the impact that 
increased delays might have on the recall of the adults with ID.  This would be particularly 
useful in relation to instances of historical abuse, where a considerable amount of time might 
have elapsed between the abuse and actual disclosure (and thus interview).  Research on the 
length of time between the event itself and disclosure in actual cases of abuse has revealed 
substantial variation.  For example, in a 15-year longitudinal study of allegations of abuse in 
Ireland, McCormack et al. (2005) discovered that only around half of the allegations were 
disclosed within a month of the alleged instance taking place.  Furthermore, Goodman et al. 
(1992) found that out of 218 TD child sexual assault victims, 15% took over 6 months to 
disclose the abuse.  It would thus be useful to carry out further research to explore the effect 
that delayed interviewing might have on the amount and accuracy of information recalled in 
adults with ID. 
 
In addition, it would be extremely prudent to investigate the use of RIs when interviewing 
adults with ID, something that has not yet been explored.  Whilst the use of RIs is becoming 
more common place within the CJS, field reviews of their effectiveness are limited.  However, 
it has been reported that the use of RIs has been paramount in the ability of vulnerable 
individuals to play an active role in the CJS (Henderson, 2015).  Research that has explored the 
effectiveness of having RIs present during interviews with children with ID has found them to 
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be extremely beneficial, facilitating an increase in the amount and accuracy of information 
recalled (Henry et. al., 2017).    
 
As identification accuracy rates were so low in the adults with ID it is evident that this is an 
area in dire need of further research.  In the first instance, research should focus on identifying 
the factors that explain what makes this task so challenging for adults with ID.  Once these are 
ascertained, suggestions as to how to assist this group in being able to accurately identify 
perpetrators from identification line-ups can be offered and subsequently investigated 
through further research.  Some possible strategies that would be worthwhile investigating 
include practice line-ups, visual prompts, the addition of a simultaneous matrix and support 
from a RI. 
 
The inclusion of a practice line-up would provide the adults with ID with an opportunity to 
have a run through of the identification procedure before the main identification line-up, thus 
potentially helping them to better understand the demands of the task.  In a meta-analysis 
which included research studies employing practice line-ups, Pozzulo and Lindsay (1998) 
reported that practice line-ups lead to an increase in correct identification rates in TD children.  
It may therefore be worthwhile exploring the use of such line-ups in adults with ID, perhaps 
with a slight delay of a day or so between the practice line-up and actual line-ups to counter 
the increased demand on attentional resources.  
 
The use of visual aids might also prove beneficial in helping both groups (the adults with ID and 
TD children) better understand the identification task.  Bailey, Willner and Dymond (2011) 
found that visual aids had a positive effect on the decision-making abilities of adults with ID, 
allowing them to weigh up information in order to make a choice.  The use of a simple visual or 
pictorial aid might therefore prove helpful in undertaking the identification task and this is 
something that could be explored in further research.  
 
With reference to poor memory for the line-up instructions in the adults with ID (advising that 
the perpetrator may or may not be present), as well as potential social pressure associated 
with providing a ‘don’t know’ response, it might be fruitful to investigate the use of a visual 
prompt.  This could take the form of a ‘mystery man’, i.e., an image of a silhouetted figure with 
a question mark over the top, that participants could use to indicate that they do not 
recognise/see the perpetrator in the line-up.  Havard and Memon (2013) used such a ‘mystery 
man’ in a study aimed at reducing false identifications in (TD) children on target absent video 
identification line-ups.  They found that including the ‘mystery man’ reduced the number of 
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false identifications on a PA line-up from 75% to 40% and moreover, there was no reduction in 
accuracy on the PP line-ups.  In the current research none of the adults with ID made a 
correction rejection on the PA line-ups, so this appears to be a particular issue for this group 
which requires further exploration. 
 
It may also be advantageous to carry out a study exploring the use of a simultaneous matrix, 
i.e., presenting all of the images simultaneously in a static photo matrix, to ascertain if this 
helps to improve identification accuracy rates in adults with ID.  As this group are prone to 
both working memory (Swanson & Siegel, 2001) and attention deficits (Sterr, 2004), having to 
watch the identification line-ups twice through before making a decision may be especially 
problematic for some individuals with ID.  To assist them with their line-up decision, they could 
be shown the sequential line-up twice and then be presented with the simultaneous matrix.   
Whilst such an adaptation would still ensure that the line-ups were PACE Code D compliant, it 
would undoubtedly help to lessen the cognitive demands associated with making a choice on 
an identification line-up.  On the recommendation of a RI, Wilcock et al. (2018) presented TD 
children with a simultaneous matrix after they had viewed a sequential line-up once, and 
found that this procedure led to an improvement in identification accuracy rates on both PP 
and PA line-ups. 
 
Exploring the efficacy of RI assistance during the line-up identification process would also 
prove valuable.   Although there is currently no research that has examined the potential 
usefulness of RI support during the identification procedure in adults with ID, Wilcock et. al. 
(2018) reported that RI assistance (including adaptations to the line-up process and provision 
of a variety of response options) increased identification accuracy for TD children on both PP 
and PA line-ups.   
 
It is clear from the findings of the research carried out in chapter 5 that being able to predict 
eyewitness performance from individual differences on a number of cognitive measures holds 
a lot of potential with regards to being helpful to criminal justice professionals.  It is likely that 
there are a wide range of cognitive factors and thus variables underpinning the ability of 
eyewitnesses to both recall information about, as well as subsequently identify perpetrators 
from, a witnessed event.   Perhaps further studies could examine factors such as personality 
traits or metamemory and their links to recall or identification accuracy.  For example, there is 
some evidence, albeit not very strong, to suggest a positive relationship between the 
personality trait of openness and correct responses on a recognition task (Curley, MacLean & 
Murray, 2017).  Thus, identifying these cognitive variables and assessing their potential 
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usefulness as predictors of different aspects of eyewitness performance, could prove helpful to 
those working in the CJS, particularly if the predictors are accessible, quick and easy to use.   
 
The findings of the mock juror study described in chapter 6 have highlighted the requirement 
for more research in this area to help ensure that evidence from adults with ID is not dismissed 
due to misperceptions of unreliability and inaccuracy.  With this in mind, it might be helpful to 
try and disentangle the factors that play a role in how jurors perceive and thus make decisions 
about the eyewitness evidence of adults with ID.  Identifying such factors and understanding 
more about how they might impact on perceptions of credibility, particularly where the effect 
is negative, would in turn help inform suggestions as to how to temper their influence.  One 
such factor which may play a role in the perceived credibility of eyewitness evidence from this 
group, is a mock juror’s existing attitudes.  It might therefore be useful to include an 
assessment of existing attitudes to individuals from this group in future research in order to 
provide some clarity on the role this factor might play in perceived credibility.  Rather 
interestingly, research that has examined the impact of mock juror attitudes on perceptions of 
a young sexual abuse victim with ID, found that jurors with more liberal attitudes to individuals 
with ID (i.e., who perceived this group to be similar to themselves in relation to personal 
objectives and possession of the same rights and freedoms) were more likely to find the 
defendant guilty.  In addition, these mock jurors also viewed the victim to be very believable 
and credible, i.e., unlikely to have invented the sexual abuse (Bottoms et al., 2003). 
 
It may also be highly beneficial to explore the usefulness of providing tailored diagnostic 
information to jurors about a witness with ID, with particular reference to the effect this has on 
perceived credibility of their eyewitness evidence.  The diagnostic information could, once again, 
be provided by a RI as a result of their routine assessment of a witness.   
 
7.8 Conclusion 
Adults with ID are often perceived to be inaccurate and unreliable as eyewitnesses, by both 
those within and outside of the CJS, thereby preventing this vulnerable group from receiving fair 
and proper access to justice.   This may partially be attributable to the fact that adults with ID 
are a group frequently on the periphery of society, thus the general population remain ignorant 
of their skills and abilities through a lack of social cohesiveness.  Moreover, the limited research 
in this area means there is very little information to inform the views and opinions of the general 
population, leading to a heavy reliance on stereotypes.  As a result, the commonly held negative 
stereotypical views and attitudes regarding this group are perpetuated, consequently making 
research in this area all the more crucial.   What is important however, is that researchers do 
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not reject the idea of conducting studies with individuals with ID solely because of the unique 
and challenging methodological issues associated with such research.   
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that the research presented in this thesis has not only gone some 
way towards contributing to the limited existing studies regarding the eyewitness skills of 
adults with ID, but has also helped to highlight gaps that still exist and thus identify areas 

































Abbeduto, L., & Hesketh, L. J. (1997). Pragmatic development in individuals with mental 
retardation: Learning to use language in social interactions. Mental Retardation & 
Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 3(4), 323-333.  doi:10.1002/(SICI)1098-
2779(1997)3:4%3C323::AID-MRDD7%3E3.0.CO;2-O 
Agnew, S. E., & Powell, M. B. (2004). The effect of intellectual disability on children's recall of 
an event across different question types. Law and Human Behavior, 28(3), 273. 
doi:10.1023/B:LAHU.0000029139.38127.61 
Allexander, J. M., & Schwanenflugel, P. J. (1994). Strategy regulation: The role of intelligence, 
metacognitive attributions, and knowledge base. Developmental Psychology, 30(5), 
709-723. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.30.5.709 
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(5th ed.). Washington, DC: APA. 
Andersen, S. M., Carlson, C. A., Carlson, M. A., & Gronlund, S. D. (2014). Individual differences 
predict eyewitness identification performance. Personality and Individual Differences, 
60, 36-40. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.011 
Bailey, R., Willner, P., & Dymond, S. (2011). A visual aid to decision-making for people with 
intellectual disabilities. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 32(1), 37-46. 
doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2010.08.008 
Bashash, L., Outhred, L., & Bochner, S. (2003). Counting skills and number concepts of students 
with moderate intellectual disabilities. International Journal of Disability, Development 
and Education, 50(3), 325-345. doi:10.1080/1034912032000120480 
Baumeister, A. A., Runcie, D., & Gardepe, J. (1984). Processing of information in iconic 
memory: Differences between nonretarded and retarded subjects. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 93(4), 433-447. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.93.4.433 
Bayliss, D. M., & Jarrold, C. (2015). How quickly they forget: The relationship between 
forgetting and working memory performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41(1), 163-177. doi:10.1037/a0037429 
176 
Beail, N. (2002). Interrogative Suggestibility, Memory and Intellectual Disability. Journal of 
Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 15(2), 129-137. doi:10.1046/j.1468-
3148.2002.00108.x 
Beaudry, J. L., Lindsay, R. C. L., Leach, A. M., Mansour, J. K., Bertrand, M. I., & Kalmet, N. 
(2015). The effect of evidence type, identification accuracy, line-up presentation, and 
line-up administration on observers' perceptions of eyewitnesses. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 20(2), 343-364. doi:10.1111/lcrp.12030 
Behrman, B., & Davey, S. (2001). Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival 
Analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 25(5), 475-491. doi:10.1023/A:1012840831846 
Behrmann, M., & Avidan, G. (2005). Congenital prosopagnosia: face-blind from birth. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 180-187. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.011 
Bell, B. E., & Loftus, E. F. (1988). Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and Mock Juror 
Judgments. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 18(14), 1171-1192. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1988.tb01200.x 
Bellugi, U., Lai, Z., & Wang, P. (1997). Language, communication, and neural systems in 
Williams syndrome. Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research 
Reviews, 3(4), 334-342. doi:10.1002/(sici)1098-2779(1997)3:4<334:aid-
mrdd8>3.0.co;2-n 
Belva, B. C., Matson, J. L., Sipes, M., & Bamburg, J. W. (2012). An Examination of Specific 
Communication Deficits in Adults with Profound Intellectual Disabilities. Research in 
Developmental Disabilities: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 33(2), 525-529. doi: 
10.1016/j.ridd.2011.10.019 
Benton, A. L., Hamsher, K. deS., Varney, N. R., & Spreen, O. (1983). Contributions to 
Neuropsychological Assessment: A Clinical Manual. New York: Oxford University Press 
Berman, G. L., Narby, D. J., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Effects of inconsistent eyewitness statements 
on mock-jurors' evaluations of the eyewitness, perceptions of defendant culpability 
and verdicts. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 79-88. doi:10.1007/BF01499074 
Bettenay, C., Ridley, A. M., Henry, L. A., & Crane, L. (2014). Cross-examination: The Testimony 
of Children With and Without Intellectual Disabilities. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
28(2), 204-214. doi:10.1002/acp.2979 
177 
Bindemann, M., Brown, C., Koyas, T., & Russ, A. (2012). Individual differences in face 
identification postdict eyewitness accuracy. Journal of Applied Research in Memory 
and Cognition, 1(2), 96-103. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2012.02.001 
Bjorklund, D. F., Schneider, W., Cassel, W. S., & Ashley, E. (1994). Training and extension of a 
memory strategy: Evidence for utilization deficiencies in the acquisition of an 
organizational strategy in high- and low-IQ children. Child Development, 65(3), 951-
965. doi:10.2307/1131430 
Bornstein, B. H., & Greene, E. (2011). Jury Decision Making: Implications For and From 
Psychology. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(1), 63-67. 
doi:10.1177/0963721410397282 
Bornstein, M. H., & Putnick, D. L. (2012). Stability of language in childhood: A multiage, 
multidomain, multimeasure, and multisource study. Developmental Psychology, 48(2), 
477-491. doi:10.1037/a0025889 
Bottoms, B. L., & Goodman, G. S. (1994). Perceptions of Children's Credibility in Sexual Assault 
Cases. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24(8), 702-732. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.1994.tb00608.x 
Bottoms, B. L., Nysse-Carris, K. L., Harris, T., & Tyda, K. (2003). Jurors' perceptions of 
adolescent sexual assault victims who have intellectual disabilities. Law and Human 
Behavior, 27(2), 205-227. doi:10.1023/A:1022551314668 
Bower, G. (1967). A multicomponent theory of memory trace. In K. W. Spence and J. T. Spence 
(Eds), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 1, New York: Academic Press. 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1996). Mere memory testing creates false memories in children. 
Developmental Psychology, 32(3), 467-478. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.32.3.467 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2012). Reliability of Children’s Testimony in the Era of 
Developmental Reversals. Developmental Review, 32(3), 224-267. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2012.06.008 
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., Howe, M. L., & Kingma, J. (1990). The Development of Forgetting 
and Reminiscence. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 
55(3/4), 1-93. doi:10.1111/1540-5834.ep11892174 
178 
Bramão, I., Karlsson, A., & Johansson, M. (2017). Mental reinstatement of encoding context 
improves episodic remembering. Cortex, 94 (Supplement C), 15-26. 
doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2017.06.007 
Brennan, M., & Brennan, R. (1994). Cleartalk: Police Responding to Intellectual Disability. NSW: 
Charles Sturt University, School of Education. 
Brewer, N., & Burke, A. (2002). Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness 
Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments. Law and Human Behavior, 26(3), 353. 
doi:10.1023/A:1015380522722 
Brigham, J. C., Van Verst, M., & Bothwell, R. K. (1986). Accuracy of Children's Eyewitness 
Identifications in a Field Setting. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 7(4), 295-306. 
doi:10.1207/s15324834basp0704_4 
British Institute of Learning Disabilities (2011). Information about learning disabilities. 
Available at: http://www.bild.org.uk/resources/faqs/#What-are-the-possible-causes-
of-a-persons-learning-disability 
Brock, J., & Jarrold, C. (2005). Serial order reconstruction in Down syndrome: evidence for a 
selective deficit in verbal short-term memory. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry & Allied Disciplines., 46(3), 304-316. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00352.x 
Brown, C., & Geiselman, E. R. (1990). Eyewitness testimony of mentally retarded: Effect of the 
cognitive interview. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 6(2), 14-22. doi: 
10.1007/BF02806593 
Brown, D., & Lewis, C. (2013). Competence is in the Eye of the Beholder: Perceptions of 
intellectually disabled child witnesses. International Journal of Disability, Development 
and Education, 60(1), 3-17. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757132 
Brown, D., & Pipe, M. (2003). Individual differences in children's event memory reports and 
the narrative elaboration technique. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(2), 195-206. 
doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.2.195 
Brown, D. A., & Lamb, M. E. (2015). Can Children Be Useful Witnesses? It Depends How They 
Are Questioned. Child Development Perspectives, 9(4), 250-255. 
doi:10.1111/cdep.12142 
179 
Brown, D. A., Lamb, M. E., Lewis, C., Pipe, M., Orbach, Y., & Wolfman, M. (2013). The NICHD 
Investigative Interview Protocol: An analogue study. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 19(4), 367-382. doi:10.1037/a0035143 
Brown, D. A., & Lewis, C. N. (2013). Competence is in the Eye of the Beholder: Perceptions of 
intellectually disabled child witnesses. International Journal of Disability, Development 
and Education, 60(1), 3-17. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757132 
Brown, D. A., Lewis, C. N., & Lamb, M. E. (2015). Preserving the past: an early interview 
improves delayed event memory in children with intellectual disabilities. Child 
Development, 86(4), 1031-1047. doi: 10.1111/cdev.12364 
Brown, D. A., Lewis, C. N., Lamb, M. E., & Stephens, E. (2012). The influences of delay and 
severity of intellectual disability on event memory in children. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 80(5), 829-841. doi:10.1037/a0029388 
Brown, E., Deffenbacher, K., & Sturgill, W. (1977). Memory for faces and the circumstances of 
encounter. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62(3), 311-318. doi:10.1037/0021-
9010.62.3.311 
Brown, H., Stein, J. and Turk, V. (1995). The sexual abuse of adults with learning disabilities: 
report of a second two-year incidence survey. Mental Handicap Research, (8), 3-24. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.1995.tb00139.x 
Bruck, M., & Ceci, S. J. (1999). The suggestibility of children's memory. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 50(1), 419-439. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.419 
Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Hembrooke, H. (2002). The nature of children’s true and false 
narratives. Developmental Review, 22(3), 520-554. doi:10.1016/                               
S0273-2297(02)00006-0 
Bull, R. (1995). Interviewing witnesses with communicative disability. In R. Bull & D. Carson 
(Eds.), Handbook of psychology in legal contexts. (pp. 247–260). Chichester: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Bull, R. (2013). Research on Trying to Improve the Quality of Information Elicited from 
Vulnerable Witnesses. International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 
60(1), 53-57. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757142 
180 
Burack, J. A., Russo, N., Flores, H., Iarocci, G., & Zigler, E. (2012). The more you know the less 
you know, but that's OK: Developments in the developmental approach to intellectual 
disability. In J. A. Burack, R. M. Hodapp, G. Iarocci, & E. Zigler (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of intellectual disability and development. (pp. 3-10). New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Burack, J. A., & Zigler, E. (1990). Intentional and incidental memory in organically mentally 
retarded, familial retarded, and nonretarded individuals. American Journal of Mental 
Retardation, 94(5), 532-540.  
Burgwyn-Bailes, E., Baker-Ward, L., Gordon, B. N., & Orstein, P. A. (2001). Children's memory 
for emergency medical treatment after one year: the impact of individual difference 
variables on recall and suggestibility. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15(7), S25-s48. 
doi.org/10.1002/acp.833 
Cambridge, P., Beadle-Brown, J., Milne, A., Mansell, J., & Whelton, B. (2006). Exploring the 
incidence, risk factors, nature and monitoring of adult protection alerts. University of 
Kent: Tizard 
Cambridge, P., Mansell, J., Beadle-Brown, J., Milne, A., & Whelton, B. (2011). A study of adult 
protection referrals in two local authorities: an overview of findings for managers and 
practitioners. Journal of Adult Protection, 13(5), 238-250. doi: 10.1108 
/14668201111178157 
Cardone, D., & Dent, H. (1996). Memory and interrogative suggestibility: The effects of 
modality of information presentation and retrieval conditions upon the suggestibility 
scores of people with learning disabilities. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 1 (Part 
2), 165-177. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.1996.tb00316.x 
Carey, S., Diamond, R., & Woods, B. (1980). Development of face recognition-a maturational 
component? Developmental Psychology, 16(4), 257-269. doi:/10.1037/0012-
1649.16.4.257 
Carney, D. P. J., Brown, J. H., & Henry, L. A. (2013). Executive function in Williams and Down 
syndromes. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 34(1), 46-55. doi: 
10.1016/j.ridd.2012.07.013 
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: a historical review and 
synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 403-439. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.403 
181 
Ceci, S. J., Huffman, M. L. C., Smith, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1994). Repeatedly Thinking about a Non-
event: Source Misattributions among Preschoolers. Consciousness and Cognition, 3(3-
4), 388-407. doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1994.1022 
Ceci, S. J., Ross, D. F., & Toglia, M. P. (1987). Suggestibility of children's memory: psycholegal 
implications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116, 38-49. 
doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.116.1.38 
Cederborg, A. C., Danielsson, H., La Rooy, D. & Lamb, M. (2009). Repetition of contaminating 
question types when children and youths with intellectual disabilities are interviewed. 
Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 53(5), 440-449. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-
2788.2009.01160.x 
Cederborg, A. C., La Rooy, D., & Lamb, M. E. (2008). Repeated Interviews with Children Who 
have Intellectual Disabilities. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 
21(2), 103-113. doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.2007.00372.x 
Cederborg, A. C., & Lamb, M. (2008). Interviewing alleged victims with intellectual disabilities. 
Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 52(1), 49-58. doi:10.1111/j.1365-
2788.2007.00976.x 
Chae, Y., & J. Ceci, S. (2005). Individual differences in children's recall and suggestibility: The 
effect of intelligence, temperament, and self-perceptions. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 19, 383-407. doi:10.1002/acp.1094 
Chapman, R. S. (1997). Language development in children and adolescents with Down 
syndrome. Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 3(4), 
307-312. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1098-2779(1997)3:4<307::AID-MRDD5>3.0.CO;2-K 
Clare, I. C., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1993). Interrogative suggestibility, confabulation, and 
acquiescence in people with mild learning disabilities (mental handicap): Implications 
for reliability during police interrogations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32(3), 
295-301. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1993.tb01059.x 
Clark, S. E. (2005). A re-examination of the effects of biased lineup instructions in eyewitness 
identification. Law and Human Behavior, 29(5), 575-604. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-
7121-1 
182 
Clarke, J., Prescott, K., & Milne, R. (2013). How effective is the cognitive interview when used 
with adults with intellectual disabilities specifically with conversation recall? Journal of 
Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 26(6), 546-556. doi:10.1111/jar.12049 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155-159. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.112.1.155 
College of Policing (2017).  Investigate Interviewing. Available at: 
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigative-
interviewing/#peace-framework 
Collins, D., & Henry, L. (2016). Eyewitness recall and suggestibility in individuals with Down 
syndrome. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 60(12), 1227-1231. 
doi:10.1111/jir.12310 
Coolican, H. (2009). Research Methods and Statistics in Psychology. London: Hodder Education. 
Cooper, P., & Allely, C. (2017). You can’t judge a book by its cover: Evolving professional 
responsibilities, liabilities and ‘judgecraft’ when a party has Asperger’s Syndrome. 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 68(1), 35–58.  
Cooper, P., & Mattison, M. (2017). Intermediaries, vulnerable people and the quality of 
evidence: An international comparison of three versions of the English intermediary 
model. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 21(4), 351-370. 
doi:10.1177/1365712717725534 
Coppens-Hofman, M. C., Terband, H., Snik, A. F. M., & Maassen, B. A. M. (2016). Speech 
Characteristics and Intelligibility in Adults with Mild and Moderate Intellectual 
Disabilities. Folia Phoniatrica et Logopaedica, 68(4), 175-182. doi:10.1159/000450548 
Costanzo, F., Varuzza, C., Menghini, D., Addona, F., Gianesini, T., & Vicari, S. (2013). Executive 
functions in intellectual disabilities: A comparison between Williams syndrome and 
Down syndrome. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 34(5), 1770-1780. 
doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2013.01.024 
Coxon, P., & Valentine, T. (1997). The effects of the age of eyewitnesses on the accuracy and 
suggestibility of their testimony. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11(5), 415-430.doi: 
10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199710)11:5<415::AID-ACP469>3.0.CO;2-A 
183 
Crane, L., Wilcock, R., Maras, K. L., Chui, W., Marti-Sanchez, C., & Henry, L. A. (2018). Mock 
juror perceptions of child witnesses on the autism spectrum: The impact of providing 
diagnostic labels and information about autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders. (Elec Pub), 1 – 11. doi:10.1007/s10803-018-3700-0 
Curley, L. J., MacLean, R., & Murray, J. (2017). The Relationship between the Big 5 Personality 
Traits and Eyewitness Recognition. Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis, 
13(2), 57-72.  
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1990). Juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification 
evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 14(2), 185-191. doi:10.1007/BF01062972 
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Stuve, T. E. (1988). Juror decision making in eyewitness 
identification cases. Law and Human Behavior, 12(1), 41-55. doi:10.1007/BF01064273 
Dalton, A. J., & McVilly, K. R. (2004). Ethics Guidelines for International, Multicenter Research 
Involving People with Intellectual Disabilities. Journal of Policy & Practice in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 1(2), 57-70. doi:10.1111/j.1741-1130.2004.04010.x 
Dando, C., Wilcock, R., & Milne, R. (2008). The cognitive interview: Inexperienced police 
officers' perceptions of their witness/victim interviewing practices. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 13(1), 59-70. doi:10.1348/135532506X162498 
Dando, C. J., Ormerod, T. C., Wilcock, R., & Milne, R. (2011). When help becomes hindrance: 
Unexpected errors of omission and commission in eyewitness memory resulting from 
change temporal order at retrieval? Cognition, 121(3), 416-421. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.015 
Darling, S., Martin, D., Hellmann, J. H., & Memon, A. (2009). Some witnesses are better than 
others. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(4), 369-373. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.04.010 
Davies, G. M., Westcott, H. L., & Horan, N. (2000). The impact of questioning style on the 
content of investigative interviews with suspected child sexual abuse victims. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 6(2), 81-97. doi:10.1080/10683160008410834 
Davis, J. M., McKone, E., Dennett, H., O'Connor, K. B., O'Kearney, R., & Palermo, R. (2011). 
Individual Differences in the Ability to Recognise Facial Identity Are Associated with 
Social Anxiety. PLOS ONE, 6(12), e28800. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028800 
184 
Davis, J. P., Valentine, T., Memon, A., & Roberts, A. J. (2015). Identification on the street: a 
field comparison of police street identifications and video line-ups in England. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 21(1), 9-27. doi:10.1080/1068316X.2014.915322 
Davis, M. R., McMahon, M., & Greenwood, K. M. (2005). The efficacy of mnemonic 
components of the cognitive interview: towards a shortened variant for time-critical 
investigations. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19(1), 75-93. doi:10.1002/acp.1048 
de Heering, A., Houthuys, S., & Rossion, B. (2007). Holistic face processing is mature at 4 years 
of age: Evidence from the composite face effect. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 96(1), 57-70. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2006.07.001 
Deffenbacher, K. A., Bornstein, B. H., McGorty, E. K., & Penrod, S. D. (2008). Forgetting the 
Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness's Memory Representation. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Applied, 14(2), 139-150. doi:10.1037/1076-
898X.14.2.139 
Detterman, D. K., & Daniel, M. H. (1989). Correlations of mental tests with each other and with 
cognitive variables are highest for low IQ groups. Intelligence, 13(4), 349-359. 
doi:10.1016/S0160-2896(89)80007-8 
Devine, D., Clayton, L., Dunford, B., Seying, R., & Pryce, J. (2001). Jury decision making: 45 
years of empirical research on deliberating groups. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 
7, 622-727. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.7.3.622 
Devlin, L. P. (1976). Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the 
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases. London: 
HMSO  
Dobson, E., & Rust, J. O. (1994). Memory for objects and faces by the mentally retarded and 
nonretarded. The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 128(3), 315-322. 
doi:10.1080/00223980.1994.9712735 
Doob, A. N., & Kirshenbaum, H. M. (1973). Bias in police lineups - partial remembering. Journal 




Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2006). The Cambridge Face Memory Test: Results for 
neurologically intact individuals and an investigation of its validity using inverted face 
stimuli and prosopagnosic participants. Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 576-585. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.07.001 
Dunlevy, J. R., & Cherryman, J. (2013). Target-Absent Eyewitness Identification Line-Ups: Why 
Do Children Like to Choose. Psychiatry, Psychology & Law, 20(2), 284-293. 
doi:10.1080/13218719.2012.671584 
Dunn, L. M., Dunn, D. M., & Styles, B. (2009). British Picture Vocabulary Scale (3rd ed.). London, 
UK: GL Assessment. 
Dunn, L. M., Dunn, D. M., & Pearson, A. (2007). PPVT-4: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. 
Minneapolis, MN: Pearson Assessments. 
Dunning, D., & Stern, L. B. (1992). Examining the Generality of Eyewitness Hypermnesia: A 
Close Look at Time Delay and Question Type. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6(7), 643-
657. doi:10.1002/acp.2350060707 
Ebbesen, E. B., & Rienick, C. B. (1998). Retention Interval and Eyewitness Memory for Events 
and Personal Identifying Attributes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(5), 745-762. doi: 
10.1037/0021-9010.83.5.745 
Ebbinghaus, H. (2013). Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology. Annals of 
Neurosciences, 20(4), 155-156. doi:10.5214/ans.0972.7531.200408 
Emerson, E. & Hatton, C. (2008). People with Learning Disabilities in England. Centre for 
Disability Research. Lancaster University, UK 
Enns, J. T., & Akhtar, N. (1989). A developmental study of filtering in visual attention. Child 
Development, 60(5), 1188-1199. doi:10.2307/1130792 
Ericson, K., & Issacs, B. (2003). Eyewitness identification accuracy: A comparison of adults with 
and those without intellectual disability. Mental Retardation, 41(3), 161-173. doi: 
10.1352/0047-6765(2003)41<161:EIAACO>2.0.CO;2 
Espinoza, R. K. E., Willis-Esqueda, C., Toscano, S., & Coons, J. (2015). The Impact of Ethnicity, 
Immigration Status, and Socioeconomic Status on Juror Decision Making. Journal of 
Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, 13(3), 197-216. doi:10.1080/15377938.2014.984044 
186 
Estes, W. K. (1955). Statistical theory of spontaneous recovery and regression. Psychological 
Review, 62(3), 145-154. doi:10.1037/h0048509 
Eysenck, M. W., & Keane, M. T. (2010). Cognitive Psychology: A Student's Handbook. Hove, 
East Sussex Psychology Press 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power 
analysis program for the social, behavioural, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175 – 191. doi:10.3758/bf03193146 
Field, A. P. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS. London: SAGE Publications. 
Fielding, N. G., & Conroy, S. (1992). Interviewing child victims: police and social work 
investigations of child sexual abuse. Sociology, 26(1), 103-124. doi:  
10.1177/0038038592026001007 
Finkelhor, D., Ormrod, R., Turner, H., & Hamby, S. L. (2005). The Victimization of Children and 
Youth: A Comprehensive, National Survey. Child Maltreatment, 10(1), 5-25. 
doi:10.1177/1077559504271287 
Fischer, B. A. (2006). A Summary of Important Documents in the Field of Research Ethics. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32(1), 69-80. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbj005 
Fisher, R. P., Brewer, N., & Mitchell, G. (2009). The relation between consistency and accuracy 
of eyewitness testimony: Legal versus cognitive explanations. In R. Bull, T. Valentine, & 
T. Williamson (Eds.), Handbook of psychology of investigative interviewing: Current 
developments and future directions (p. 121–136). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd. 
Fisher, R. P., & Geiselman, R. E. (1992). Memory-enhancing Techniques for Investigative 
Interviewing: The Cognitive Interview. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 
Fisher, R. P., Geiselman, R. E., & Amador, M. (1989). Field test of the Cognitive Interview: 
enhancing the recollection of actual victims and witnesses of crime. The Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 74(5), 722-727. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.74.5.722 
Fitzgerald, R. J., & Price, H. L. (2015). Eyewitness Identification Across the Life Span: A Meta-
Analysis of Age Differences. Psychological Bulletin, 114(6), 1228-1265. 
doi:10.1037/bul0000013 
187 
Fivush, R., Gray, J. T., & Fromhoff, F. A. (1987). Two-year-olds talk about the past. Cognitive 
Development, 2(4), 393-409. doi:10.1016/S0885-2014(87)80015-1 
Fivush, R., & Schwarzmueller, A. (1995). Say it once again: effects of repeated questions on 
children's event recall. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8(4), 555-580. 
doi:10.1007/BF02102889 
Fivush, R. & Schwarzmueller, A. (1998). Children remember childhood: implications for 
childhood amnesia. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12, 455-473. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199810)12:5<455::AID-ACP534>3.0.CO;2-H 
Flin, R. (1980). Age effects in children's memory for unfamiliar faces. Developmental 
Psychology, 16(4), 373-374. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.16.4.373 
Flin, R., Boon, J., Knox, A., & Bull, R. (1992). The effect of a five-month delay on children's and 
adults' eyewitness memory. British Journal of Psychology, 83 (Pt 3), 323-336. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1992.tb02444.x 
Furnham, A., & Pendred, J. (1983). Attitudes towards the mentally and physically disabled. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 56(2), 179-187. doi:10.1111/j.2044-
8341.1983.tb01545.x 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., & Allan, K. (2003). Memory conformity: can eyewitnesses influence 
each other's memories for an event? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17(5), 533-543. 
doi:10.1002/acp.885 
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., Allan, K., & Wright, D. B. (2004). Say it to my face: Examining the 
effects of socially encountered misinformation. Legal & Criminological Psychology, 
9(2), 215-227. doi:10.1348/1355325041719428 
Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The Structure of Working 
Memory From 4 to 15 Years of Age. Developmental Psychology, 40(2), 177-190. 
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.40.2.177 
Gawrylowicz, J., Gabbert, F., Carson, D., Lindsay, W. R., & Hancock, P. J. B. (2013). Face 
Recognition and Description Abilities in People with Mild Intellectual Disabilities. 
Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 26(5), 435-446. 
doi:10.1111/jar.12028 
188 
Geddie, L., Fradin, S., & Beer, J. (2000). Child characteristics which impact accuracy of recall 
and suggestibility in preschoolers: is age the best predictor? Child Abuse & Neglect, 
24(2), 223-235. doi:10.1016/S0145-2134(99)00133-7 
Geiselman, E., Fisher, R. P., Firstenberg, I., Hutton, L. A., Sullivan, S. J., Avetissian, I. V., & Prosk, 
A. L. (1984). Enhancement of Eyewitness Memory - An Empirical Evaluation of the 
Cognitive Interview. Journal of Police Science & Administration, 12(1), 74-80. 
doi:10.1.1.615.6444 
Geiselman, R. E., & Callot, R. (1990). Reverse versus Forward Recall of Script-based Texts. 
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4(2), 141-144. doi:10.1002/acp.2350040206 
Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., MacKinnon, D. P., & Holland, H. L. (1986). Enhancement of 
Eyewitness Memory with the Cognitive Interview. The American Journal of Psychology, 
99(3), 385-401. doi:10.2307/1422492 
Gentle, M., Milne, R., Powell, M., & Sharman, S. (2013). Does the Cognitive Interview Promote 
the Coherence of Narrative Accounts in Children With and Without an Intellectual 
Disability? International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 60(1), 30-
43. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757138 
Godden, D. R., & Baddeley, A. D. (1975). Context-dependent memory in two natural 
environments: on land and underwater: British Journal of Psychology, 66(3), 325–331.      
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1975.tb01468.x. 
Goodman, G. S., Golding, J. M., Helgeson, V. S., Haith, M. M., & Michelli, J. (1987). When a child 
takes the stand: Jurors' perceptions of children's eyewitness testimony. Law and 
Human Behavior, 11(1), 27-40. doi:10.1007/BF01044837 
Goodman, G. S., & Reed, R. S. (1986). Age differences in eyewitness testimony. Law and 
Human Behavior, 10(4), 317-332. doi:10.1007/BF01047344 
Goodman, G. S., Rudy, L., Bottoms, B. L., & Aman, C. (1990). Children's concerns and memory: 
Issues of ecological validity in the study of children's eyewitness testimony. Knowing 
and remembering in young children.  In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Emory 
symposia in cognition, Vol. 3. Knowing and remembering in young children (p. 249 –
284). Cambridge University Press   
 
189 
Goodman, G. S., Taub, E. P., Jones, D. P. H., England, P., Port, L. K., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. (1992). 
Testifying in criminal court: emotional effects on child sexual assault victims. 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57(5), 1-159. 
doi:10.2307/1166127 
Gordon, B. N., Jens, K. G., Hollings, R., & Watson, T. E. (1994). Remembering activities 
performed versus those imagined: Implications for testimony of children with mental 
retardation. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 23(3), 239-248. 
doi:10.1207/s15374424jccp2303_2 
Greenhoot, A. F., Ornstein, P. A., Gordon, B. N., & Baker-Ward, L. (1999). Acting out the details 
of a pediatric check-up: The impact of interview condition and behavioral style on 
children's memory reports. Child Development, 70(2), 363-380. doi:10.1111/1467-
8624.00027 
Grote-Garcia, S. A. (2011). Schemas. In S. Goldstein & J. A. Naglieri (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Child 
Behavior and Development (pp. 1287-1288). Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Gudjonsson, G., & Clare, I. (1995). The relationship between confabulation and intellectual 
ability, memory, interrogative suggestibility and acquiescence. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 19, 333-338. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(95)00070-M 
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1988). The relationship of intelligence and memory to interrogative 
suggestibility: The importance of range effects. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
27(2), 185-187. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1988.tb00772.x 
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1997). The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales Manual. Hove, East Sussex: 
Psychology Press. 
Gudjonsson, G. H., & Henry, L. (2003). Child and adult witnesses with intellectual disability: The 
importance of suggestibility. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 8(2), 241-252. 
doi:10.1348/135532503322363013 
Hatton, C. (1998). Pragmatic language skills in people with intellectual disabilities: A review. 
Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability, 23(1), 79-100. 
doi:10.1080/13668259800033601 
Havard, C., & Memon, A. (2013). The Mystery Man Can Help Reduce False Identification for 
Child Witnesses: Evidence from Video Line‐ups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(1), 
50-59. doi:10.1002/acp.2870 
190 
Havard, C., Memon, A., Clifford, B., & Gabbert, F. (2010). A comparison of video and static 
photo lineups with child and adolescent witnesses. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
24(9), 1209-1221. doi:10.1002/acp.1645 
Havard, C., Memon, A., Laybourn, P., & Cunningham, C. (2012). Own-age bias in video lineups: 
a comparison between children and adults. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18(10), 929-944. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2011.598156 
Hayne, H., & Jack, F. (2011). Childhood amnesia. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive 
Science, 2(2), 136-145. doi:10.1002/wcs.107 
Heal, L. W., & Sigelman, C. K. (1995). Response biases in interviews of individuals with limited 
mental ability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 39(4), 331-340. doi: 
10.1111/j.1365-2788.1995.tb00525.x 
Heath, W. P., Grannemann, B. D., Sawa, S. E., & Hodge, K. M. (1997). Effects of detail in 
eyewitness testimony on decisions by mock jurors. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 
25(3/4), 51. doi:10.1300/J076v25n03_04 
Henderson, E. (2015). ‘A very valuable tool’: Judges, advocates and intermediaries discuss the 
intermediary system in England and Wales. The International Journal of Evidence & 
Proof, 19(3), 154-171. doi:10.1177/1365712715580535 
Henry, L., Ridley, A., Perry, J., & Crane, L. (2011). Perceived credibility and eyewitness 
testimony of children with intellectual disabilities. Journal of Intellectual Disability 
Research, 55(4), 385-391. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2788.2011.01383.x 
Henry, L., & Wilcock, R. (2013). Witnesses with Intellectual Disabilities. International Journal of 
Disability, Development & Education, 60(1), 1-2. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757126 
Henry, L. A. (2001). How does the severity of a learning disability affect working memory 
performance? Memory, 9(4-6), 233-247. doi:10.1080/09658210042000085 
Henry, L. A., Bettenay, C., & Carney, D. P. J. (2011). Children with Intellectual Disabilities and 
Developmental Disorders. In M. E. Lamb, D J. La Rooy, L. C. Malloy and C Katz (Eds.)   
Children's Testimony (pp. 251-283). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
191 
Henry, L. A., Crane, L., Nash, G., Hobson, Z., Kirke-Smith, M., & Wilcock, R. (2017). Verbal, 
Visual, and Intermediary Support for Child Witnesses with Autism During Investigative 
Interviews. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47(8), 2348-2362. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-017-3142-0 
Henry, L. A., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (2003). Eyewitness memory, suggestibility, and repeated 
recall sessions in children with mild and moderate intellectual disabilities. Law and 
Human Behavior, 27(5), 481. doi:10.1023/A:1025434022699 
Henry, L. A., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (2007). Individual and developmental differences in 
eyewitness recall and suggestibility in children with intellectual disabilities. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 21(3), 361-381. doi:10.1002/acp.1280 
Henry, L. A., & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1999). Eyewitness memory and suggestibility in children with 
mental retardation. American Journal on Mental Retardation, 104(6), 491-508. doi: 
10.1352/0895-8017(1999)104<0491:EMASIC>2.0.CO;2 
Hershkowitz, I., & Terner, A. (2007). The Effects of repeated interviewing on children's forensic 
statements of sexual abuse. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21(9), 1131-1143. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1319 
Hobson, Z. J., & Wilcock, R. (2011). Eyewitness Identification of Multiple Perpetrators. 
International Journal of Police Science & Management, 13(4), 286-296. 
doi:10.1350/ijps.2011.13.4.253 
Hodapp, R. M., Griffin, M. M., Burke, M. M., & Fisher, M. H. (2011). Intellectual Disabilities. In 
R. J. Sternberg & S. B. Kaufman (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of intelligence (pp. 
193-209). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Horner-Johnson, W., & Bailey, D. (2013). Assessing Understanding and Obtaining Consent From 
Adults With Intellectual Disabilities for a Health Promotion Study. Journal of Policy & 
Practice in Intellectual Disabilities, 10(3), 260-265. doi:10.1111/jppi.12048 
Horowitz, S. W. (2009). Direct mixed and open questions in child interviewing: An analog study. 
Legal & Criminological Psychology, 14(1), 135-147. doi:10.1348/135532508X298441 
Hosch, H. (1994). Individual differences in personality and eyewitness identification. In D. F. 
Ross, J. D. Read, & M. P. Toglia (Eds.), Adult Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends and 
Developments (pp. 328-347). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
192 
Howe, M. L. (1991). Misleading Children's Story Recall: Forgetting and Reminiscence of the 
Facts. Developmental Psychology, 27(5), 746-763.  
Howitt, D. (2009). Introduction to forensic and criminal psychology. Harlow: Pearson Education 
Huizinga, M., Dolan, C. V., & van der Molen, M. W. (2006). Age-related change in executive 
function: Developmental trends and a latent variable analysis. Neuropsychologia, 
44(11), 2017-2036. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.01.010 
Humphries, J. E., Holliday, R. E., & Flowe, H. D. (2012). Faces in Motion: Age-Related Changes in 
Eyewitness Identification Performance in Simultaneous, Sequential, and Elimination 
Video Lineups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 26(1), 149-158. doi:10.1002/acp.1808 
Iacono, T., & Carling-Jenkins, R. (2012). The human rights context for ethical requirements for 
involving people with intellectual disability in medical research. Journal of Intellectual 
Disability Research, 56(11), 1122-1132. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2788.2012.01617.x 
Iacono, T., & Murray, B. (2003). Issues of Informed Consent in Conducting Medical Research 
Involving People with Intellectual Disability. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 16(1), 41-51. doi:10.1046/j.1468-3148.2003.00141.x 
Innocence Project (2017). [Online]. Available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Jack, F., Leov, J., & Zajac, R. (2014). Age-related Differences in the Free-recall Accounts of Child, 
Adolescent, and Adult Witnesses. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(1), 30-38. 
doi:10.1002/acp.2951 
Janicki, M. P., & Dalton, A. J. (1993). Alzheimer disease in a select population of older adults 
with mental retardation. The Irish Journal of Psychology, 14(1), 38-47. 
doi:10.1080/03033910.1993.10557913 
Janicki, M. P., & Dalton, A. J. (2000). Prevalence of Dementia and Impact on Intellectual 
Disability Services. Mental Retardation, 38(3), 276-288. doi:10.1352/0047-
6765(2000)038<0276:PODAIO>2.0.CO;2 
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., & Phillips, C. (2007). Long-Term Memory for Verbal and Visual 
Information in Down Syndrome and Williams Syndrome: Performance on the Doors 
and People Test. Cortex, 43(2), 233-247. doi:10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70478-7 
193 
Johnson M. K. (1997). Source monitoring and memory distortion. Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 352(1362), 1733–1745. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.1997.0156 
Johnson , M. K., Hayes , S.M. , D’Esposito , M. , & Raye , C.L. (2000). Confabulation. In J. G. L. S. 
C. Boller (Ed.), Handbook of Neuropsychology. Vol. 2, pp. 383 – 407. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3 
Johnston, R. A., & Ellis, H. D. (1995). Age Effects in the Processing of Typical and Distinctive 
Faces. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 48(2), 447-465. 
doi:10.1080/14640749508401399 
Jules, S. J., & McQuiston, D. E. (2013). Speech style and occupational status affect assessments 
of eyewitness testimony. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(4), 741-748. 
doi:10.1111/jasp.12002 
Karageorge, A., & Zajac, R. (2011). Exploring the effects of age and delay on children's person 
identifications: Verbal descriptions, lineup performance, and the influence of 
wildcards. British Journal of Psychology, 102(2), 161-183. 
doi:10.1348/000712610X507902 
Keast, A., Brewer, N., & Wells, G. L. (2007). Children’s metacognitive judgments in an 
eyewitness identification task. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 97(4), 286-
314. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2007.01.007 
Kebbell, M. R., & Davies, G. M. (2006). Practical psychology for forensic investigations and 
prosecutions (Vol. 31). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Kebbell, M. R., & Milne, R. (1998). Police officers' perceptions of eyewitness performance in 
forensic investigations. The Journal of Social Psychology, 138(3), 323-330. 
doi:10.1080/00224549809600384 
Kebbell, M. R., Milne, R., & Wagstaff, G. F. (1999). The cognitive interview: A survey of its 
forensic effectiveness. Psychology, Crime & Law, 5(1-2), 101-115. 
doi:10.1080/10683169908414996 
194 
Kirchhoff, B. A. (2009). Individual differences in episodic memory: the role of self-initiated 
encoding strategies. The Neuroscientist: A Review Journal Bringing Neurobiology, 
Neurology And Psychiatry, 15(2), 166-179. doi:10.1177/1073858408329507 
Köhnken, G. (1995). Interviewing Adults. In Carson, D., & Bull, R. (Ed.), Handbook of Psychology 
in Legal Contexts (pp. 215 - 233). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Köhnken, G., Milne, R., Memon, A., & Bull, R. (1999). The cognitive interview: A meta-analysis. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 5(1-2), 3-27. doi:10.1080/10683169908414991 
Kulkofsky, S. (2010). The effects of verbal labels and vocabulary skill on memory and 
suggestibility. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 31(6), 460-466. 
doi:10.1016/j.appdev.2010.09.002 
La Rooy, D., Katz, C., Malloy, L. C., & Lamb, M. E. (2010). Do we need to rethink guidance on 
repeated interviews? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16(4), 373-392. 
doi:10.1037/a0019909 
La Rooy, D., Lamb, M., & Pipe, M. (2009). Repeated interviewing: A critical evaluation of the 
risks and potential benefits.  In K. Kuehnle & M. Connell (Eds.), The evaluation of child 
sexual abuse allegations: A comprehensive guide to assessment and testimony (pp. 
327-361). New Jersey: Wiley.  
La Rooy, D., Pipe, M., & Murray, J. E. (2005). Reminiscence and hypermnesia in children’s 
eyewitness memory. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 90(3), 235-254. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2004.11.002 
Lamb, M. E., Orbach, Y., Hershkowitz, I., Horowitz, D., & Abbott, C. B. (2007). Does the type of 
prompt affect the accuracy of information provided by alleged victims of abuse in 
forensic interviews? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21(9), 1117-1130. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1318 
Lamb, M. E., Sternberg, K. J., & Esplin, P. W. (2000). Effects of Age and Delay on the Amount of 
Information Provided by Alleged Sex Abuse Victims in Investigative Interviews. Child 
Development, 71(6), 1586-1596. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00250 
Laws, G., & Bishop, D. V. M. (2004). Verbal deficits in Down's syndrome and specific language 
impairment: a comparison. International Journal of Language & Communication 
Disorders, 39(4), 423-451. doi:10.1080/13682820410001681207 
195 
Learning Disability Today (2015). Extent of sexual abuse of adults with learning disabilities 
revealed. Available at: https://www.learningdisabilitytoday.co.uk/extent-of-sexual-
abuse-of-adults-with-learning-disabilities-revealed 
Lin, L. P., Yen, C. F., Kuo, F. Y., Wu, J. L., & Lin, J. D. (2009). Sexual assault of people with 
disabilities: Results of a 2002-2007 national report in Taiwan. Research in 
Developmental Disabilities, 30(5), 969-975. doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2009.02.001 
Lindsay, D. S., Johnson, M. K., & Kwon, P. (1991). Developmental changes in memory source 
monitoring. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 52(3), 297-318. 
doi:10.1016/0022-0965(91)90065-Z 
Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of 
the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Learning Behavior, 13, 585 -589.  
Lorsbach, T. C., & Ewing, R. H. (1995). Source Monitoring in Children with Learning Disabilities. 
International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 42(3), 241-257. 
doi:10.1080/0156655950420306 
Lowenstein, J. A., Blank, H., & Sauer, J. D. (2010). Uniforms affect the accuracy of children's 
eyewitness identification decisions. Journal of Investigative Psychology & Offender 
Profiling, 7(1), 59-73. doi:10.1002/jip.104 
Maeder, E. M., Pozzulo, J. D., & Dempsey, J. (2012). Judging the witness: Do gender and 
occupation type matter for juror decision making? American Journal of Forensic 
Psychology, 30(3), 45-58.  
Malpass, R. S., & Devine, P. G. (1981). Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the 
Absence of the Offender. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66(4), 482-489. doi: 
10.1037/0021-9010.66.4.482 
Malpass, R. S., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (1999). Measuring line-up fairness. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 13(Spec Issue), S1-S7. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199911)13:1+<S1::AID-
ACP678>3.0.CO;2-9 
Mansell, S., Sobsey, D., & Calder, P. (1992). Sexual abuse treatment for persons with 
developmental disabilities. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 23(5), 404-
409. doi:10.1037/0735-7028.23.5.404  
196 
McCarthy, M. & Thompson., D. (1997). A prevalence study of sexual abuse of adults with 
intellectual disabilities referred for sex education. Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities, 10(2), 105-124. doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.1997.tb00012.x 
McCormack, B., Kavanagh, D., Caffrey, S., & Power, A. (2005). Investigating Sexual Abuse: 
Findings of a 15-Year Longitudinal Study. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 18(3), 217-227. doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.2005.00236.x 
McDonnell, A., Breen, E., Deveau, R., Goulding, E., & Smyth, J. (2014). How nurses and carers 
can avoid the slippery slope to abuse. Learning Disability Practice, 17(5), 36-39. 
doi:10.7748/ldp.17.5.36.e1516 
McLean, M. (1995). Quality investigation? Police interviewing of witnesses. Medicine, Science, 
and the Law, 35, 116-122. doi:10.1177/002580249503500205 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2006). Recognising Faces Seen Alone or with Others: When 
Two Heads Are Worse than One. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(7), 957-972. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1243 
Mehrani, M. B., & Peterson, C. (2018). Responses to interview questions: A cross-linguistic 
study of acquiescence tendency. Infant and Child Development, 27(2), e2063. 
doi:10.1002/icd.2063 
Memon, A. (1998). Recovered memories: Psychological issues and legal questions. In A. 
Memon, A. Vrij & R. Bull. (Eds.), Psychology and Law: Truthfulness, Accuracy and 
Credibility (pp. 147-169). Chichester, London: McGraw-Hill. 
Memon, A. (1998). Telling it all: The cognitive interview. In A. Memon, A. Vrij & R. Bull. (Eds.), 
Psychology and Law: Truthfulness, Accuracy and Credibility (pp. 170-187). Chichester, 
London: McGraw-Hill. 
Memon, A., Bartlett, J., Rose, R., & Gray, C. (2003). The Aging Eyewitness: Effects of Age on 
Face, Delay, and Source-Memory Ability. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, 58(6), 
338-345. doi:10.1093/geronb/58.6.P338 
Memon, A., Meissner, C. A., & Fraser, J. (2010). The Cognitive Interview: A meta-analytic 
review and study space analysis of the past 25 years. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 16(4), 340-372. doi:10.1037/a0020518 
197 
Memon, A., & Wright, D. (1999). The search for John Doe 2: Eyewitness testimony in the 
Oklahoma bombing. Psychologist, 12, 292-295.  
Mencap. (2001). Behind closed doors: Preventing sexual abuse against adults with a learning 
disability. London: Mencap 
Mencap. (2013). Make it Clear: A guide to making easy read information. London: Mencap  
Mencap. (2017). Your guide to communicating with people with a learning disability. London: 
Mencap 
Mencap. (2019). What is a learning disability? London 
Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice. (2007). London: TSO. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/497253/Mental-capacity-act-code-of-practice.pdf 
Mervis, C. B., & Klein-Tasman, B. P. (2004). Methodological Issues in Group-Matching Designs: 
α Levels for Control Variable Comparisons and Measurement Characteristics of Control 
and Target Variables. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(1), 7-17. 
doi:10.1023/B:JADD.0000018069.69562.b8 
Michel, M. K., Gordon, B. N., Ornstein, P. A., & Simpson, M. A. (2000). The abilities of children 
with mental retardation to remember personal experiences: Implications for 
testimony. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29(3), 453-463. doi: 
10.1207/S15374424JCCP2903_16 
Miller, A. L., Gross, M. P., & Unsworth, N. (2019). Individual differences in working memory 
capacity and long-term memory: The influence of intensity of attention to items at 
encoding as measured by pupil dilation. Journal of Memory and Language, 104, 25-42. 
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2018.09.005 
Milne, R., and Bull, R. (1999). Investigative interviewing: Psychology and practice. Chichester: 
Wiley.  
Milne, R., and Bull, R. (2006). Interviewing Victims of Crime, Including Children and People with 
Intellectual Disabilities. In M. R. Kebbell & G. M. Davies (Eds.)  Practical Psychology for 
Forensic Investigations and Prosecutions (pp. 7 - 23). Chichester: Wiley  
198 
Milne, R., Clare, I. C. H., & Bull, R. (1999). Using the cognitive interview with adults with mild 
learning disabilities. Psychology, Crime & Law, 5(1-2), 81-99. 
doi:10.1080/10683169908414995 
Milne, R., Sharman, S. J., Powell, M. B., & Mead, S. (2013). Assessing the Effectiveness of the 
Cognitive Interview for Children with Severe Intellectual Disabilities. International 
Journal of Disability, Development & Education, 60(1), 18-29. 
doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757137 
Ministry of Justice. (2011) Achieving best evidence in criminal proceedings: Guidance on 








Mondloch, C. J., Le Grand, R., & Maurer, D. (2002). Configural Face Processing Develops more 
Slowly than Featural Face Processing. Perception, 31(5), 553-566. doi/10.1068/p3339 
Morgan, C. A., Hazlett, G., Baranoski, M., Doran, A., Southwick, S., & Loftus, E. (2007). Accuracy 
of Eyewitness Identification is significantly associated with performance on a 
standardized test of face recognition. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 
30(3), 213-223. doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2007.03.005 
Mundy, P. & Kasari, C. (1990). The similar-structure hypothesis and differential rate of 
development in mental retardation. In R. M. Hodapp, J. A. Burack and E. Zigler (Eds), 
Issues in the developmental approach to mental retardation (pp. 71 - 89). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  
Murfett, R., Powell, M. B., & Snow, P. C. (2008). The effect of intellectual disability on the 
adherence of child witnesses to a "story grammar" framework. Journal of Intellectual 
& Developmental Disability, 33(1), 2-11. doi:10.1080/13668250701829811 
 
199 
Narby, D. J., Cutler, B. L. and Penrod, S. D. (1996). The effects of witness, target, and situational 
factors on eyewitness identifications. In S. L. Sporer, R. S. Malpass and G. Koehnken 
(Eds) Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification (pp. 23 - 52). Mawah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Nathanson, R., & Platt, M. D. (2005). Attorneys' perceptions of child witnesses with mental 
retardation. The Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 33(1), 5-42. doi: 
10.1177/009318530503300102 
Nolan, J. D., Cottle, D., & Walker, M. (1985). Conceptual Organization and Memory in 
Nonretarded, Mildly Retarded, and Moderately Retarded Adults. Journal of 
Psychology, 119(3), 261-264. doi:10.1080/00223980.1985.10542896 
O’Callaghan, A. C., & Murphy, G. H. (2007). Sexual relationships in adults with intellectual 
disabilities: understanding the law. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 51(3), 
197-206. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2788.2006.00857.x 
Odinot, G., Memon, A., La Rooy, D., & Millen, A. (2013). Are Two Interviews Better Than One? 
Eyewitness Memory across Repeated Cognitive Interviews. PLOS ONE, 8(10), e76305. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076305 
Odinot, G., & Wolters, G. (2006). Repeated recall, retention interval and the accuracy–
confidence relation in eyewitness memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(7), 973-
985. doi:10.1002/acp.1263   
Parker, J. F., & Ryan, V. (1993). An attempt to reduce guessing behavior in children's and 
adults' eyewitness identifications. Law and Human Behavior, 17(1), 11-26. doi: 
10.1007/BF01044534 
Paterson, H. M., & Kemp, R. I. (2006). Comparing methods of encountering post-event 
information: the power of co-witness suggestion. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(8), 
1083-1099. doi:10.1002/acp.1261 
Peled, M., Iarocci, G., & Connolly, D. (2004). Eyewitness testimony and perceived credibility of 
youth with mild intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 48(7), 
699-703. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2788.2003.00559.x 
Perlman, N. B., Ericson, K. I., Esses, V. M., & Isaacs, B. J. (1994). The developmentally 
handicapped witness: Competency as a function of question format. Law and Human 
Behavior, 18(2), 171-187. doi:10.1007/BF01499014 
200 
Peterson, C., & Grant, M. (2001). Forced-Choice: Are Forensic Interviewers Asking the Right 
Questions? Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 33(2), 118-127. 
doi:10.1037/h0087134 
Pipe, M., Sutherland, R., Webster, N., Jones, C., & La Rooy, D. (2004). Do early interviews affect 
children's long-term event recall? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 18(7), 823-839. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1053 
Pipe, M., Thierry, K. L., & Lamb, M. E. (2007). The development of event memory: Implications 
for child witness testimony. In M. P. Toglia, J. D. Read, D. F. Ross, & R. C. L. Lindsay 
(Eds.) The handbook of eyewitness psychology, Vol I: Memory for events. (pp. 453-478). 
Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Plotnikoff, J. & Woolfson, R. (2009). Measuring up?: evaluating implementation of Government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings. NSPCC. 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice. (2017). London: Home Office. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/police-and-criminal-evidence-act-1984-
pace-codes-of-practice 
Poole, D. A., & White, L. T. (1993). Two years later: Effect of question repetition and retention 
interval on the eyewitness testimony of children and adults. Developmental 
Psychology, 29(5), 844-853. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.29.5.844 
Potter, R., & Brewer, N. (1999). Perceptions of witness behaviour–accuracy relationships held 
by police, lawyers and mock-jurors. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 6(1), 97-103. 
doi:10.1080/13218719909524952 
Pozzulo, J. D., & Balfour, J. (2006). Children's and adults' eyewitness identification accuracy 
when a culprit changes his appearance: Comparing simultaneous and elimination 
lineup procedures. Legal & Criminological Psychology, 11(1), 25-34. 
doi:10.1348/135532505X52626 
Pozzulo, J. D., Dempsey, J. L., Bruer, K., & Sheahan, C. (2011). The Culprit in Target-Absent 
Lineups: Understanding Young Children’s False Positive Responding. Journal of Police 
and Criminal Psychology, 27, 55-62. doi:10.1007/s11896-011-9089-8 
Pozzulo, J. D., & Dempsey, J. (2006). Biased Lineup Instructions: Examining the Effect of 
Pressure on Children's and Adults' Eyewitness Identification Accuracy. Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, 36(6), 1381-1394. doi:10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00064.x 
201 
Pozzulo, J. D., & Dempsey, J. L. (2009). Witness Factors and Their Influence on Jurors’ 
Perceptions and Verdicts. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(9), 923-934. 
doi:10.1177/0093854809338450 
Pozzulo, J. D., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (1998). Identification accuracy of children versus adults: A 
meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 22(5), 549-570. 
doi:10.1023/A:1025739514042 
Quas, J. A., Malloy, L. C., Melinder, A., Goodman, G. S., D'Mello, M., & Schaaf, J. (2007). 
Developmental differences in the effects of repeated interviews and interviewer bias 
on young children's event memory and false reports. Developmental Psychology, 43(4), 
823-837. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.4.823 
Reiter, S., Bryen, D. N. & Shachar, I. (2007). Adolescents with intellectual disabilities as victims 
of abuse. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities, 11, 371-388. 
doi:10.1177/1744629507084602 
Reynolds, C., & Bigler, E. D. (2007). Test of memory and learning (2nd edition). Austin, TX: Pro-
Ed. 
Reynolds, G. D., & Romano, A. C. (2016). The Development of Attention Systems and Working 
Memory in Infancy. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 10, Article 15. 
doi:10.3389/fnsys.2016.00015 
Riggins, T., Blankenship, S. L., Mulligan, E., Rice, K., & Redcay, E. (2015). Developmental 
Differences in Relations Between Episodic Memory and Hippocampal Subregion 
Volume During Early Childhood. Child Development, 86(6), 1710-1718. 
doi:10.1111/cdev.12445 
Roberts, K. P., & Blades, M. (1999). Children's Memory and Source Monitoring of Real-Life and 
Televised Events. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 20(4), 575-596. 
doi:10.1016/S0193-3973(99)00030-1 
Rocha, E. M., Marche, T. A., & Briere, J. L. (2013). The Effect of Forced-Choice Questions on 
Children's Suggestibility: A Comparison of Multiple-Choice and Yes/No Questions. 
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 45(1), 1-11. doi:10.1037/a0028507 
Roebers, C. M., & Schneider, W. (2001). Individual Differences in Children's Eyewitness Recall: 
The Influence of Intelligence and Shyness. Applied Developmental Science, 5(1), 9-20. 
doi:10.1207/S1532480XADS0501_2 
202 
Roebers, C. M., & Schneider, W. (2001). Memory for an observed event in the presence of 
prior misinformation: Developmental patterns of free recall and identification 
accuracy. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 19(4), 507-524. 
doi:10.1348/026151001166227 
Roebers, C. M., & Schneider, W. (2002). Stability and consistency of children’s event recall. 
Cognitive Development, 17(1), 1085-1103. doi:10.1016/S0885-2014(02)00075-8 
Roediger, H. L., & Thorpe, L. A. (1978). The role of recall time in producing hypermnesia. 
Memory & Cognition, 6(3), 296-305. doi:10.3758/BF03197459 
Roid, G. H. (2003). Stanford Binet intelligence scales (5th edition). Austin, TX: Pro-Ed. 
Rose, R. A., Bull, R., & Vrij, A. (2005). Non-biased lineup instructions do matter – a problem for 
older witnesses. Psychology, Crime & Law, 11(2), 147-159. 
doi:10.1080/10683160512331316307 
Russ, A. J., Sauerland, M., Lee, C. E., & Bindemann, M. (2018). Individual differences in 
eyewitness accuracy across multiple lineups of faces. Cognitive Research: Principles 
and Implications, 3(1), Article 30. doi:10.1186/s41235-018-0121-8 
Russell, R., Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2009). Super-recognizers: people with extraordinary 
face recognition ability. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 252-257. 
doi:10.3758/PBR.16.2.252 
Rutter, M. (1994). Comorbidity: Meanings and Mechanisms. Clinical Psychology: Science and 
Practice, 1(1), 100-103. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2850.1994.tb00012.x 
Ruva, C. L., & Bryant, J. B. (2004). The Impact of Age, Speech Style, and Question Form on 
Perceptions of Witness Credibility and Trial Outcome. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 34(9), 1919-1944. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02593.x 
Salmon, K., & Pipe, M. (2000). Recalling an event one year later: the impact of props, drawing 
and a prior interview. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(2), 99-120. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(200003/04)14:2<99::AID-ACP639>3.0.CO;2-5 
Salmon, K., Roncolato, W., & Gleitzman, M. (2003). Children's reports of emotionally laden 
events: adapting the interview to the child. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17(1), 65-79. 
doi:10.1002/acp.845 
203 
Schalick, W., Westbrook, C., & Young, B. (2012). Communication with Individuals with 
Intellectual Disabilities and Psychiatric Disabilities: A Summary of the Literature. SSRN 
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2159227 
Schmidt, C. W., & Brigham, J. C. (1996). Jurors' perceptions of child victim-witnesses in a 
simulated sexual abuse trial. Law and Human Behavior, 20(6), 581-606. 
doi:10.1007/BF01499233 
Shapiro, P. N., & Penrod, S. (1986). Meta-analysis of facial identification studies. Psychological 
Bulletin, 100(2), 139-156. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.100.2.139 
Sharp, H. (2001). Steps towards justice for people with learning disabilities as victims of crime: 
The important role of the police. British Journal of Learning Disabilities, 29(3), 88-92. 
doi:10.1046/j.1354-4187.2001.00135.x 
Shuster, E. (1998). The Nuremberg Code: Hippocratic ethics and human rights. The Lancet, 
351(9107), 974-977. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(05)60641-1 
Smith, S. M., & Vela, E. (1991). Incubated reminiscence effects. Memory & Cognition, 19(2), 
168-176. doi:10.3758/bf03197114 
Smith, S. M., & Vela, E. (2001). Environmental context-dependent memory: A review and 
meta-analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(2), 203-220. doi:10.3758/bf03196157 
Sprondel, V., Kipp, K. H., & Mecklinger, A. (2011). Developmental Changes in Item and Source 
Memory: Evidence From an ERP Recognition Memory Study With Children, 
Adolescents, and Adults. Child Development, 82(6), 1638-1953. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2011.01642.x 
Steblay, N. (1997). Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review of Lineup 
Instruction Effects. Law and Human Behavior, 21(3), 283-297. doi: 
10.1023/A:1024890732059 
Steblay, N. M. (1992). A meta-analytic review of the weapon focus effect. Law and Human 
Behavior, 16(4), 413-424. doi:10.1007/BF02352267 
Sterr, A. M. (2004). Attention performance in young adults with learning disabilities. Learning 
and Individual Differences, 14(2), 125-133. doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2003.10.001 
204 
Stobbs, G., & Kebbell, M. R. (2003). Jurors' Perception of Witnesses with Intellectual 
Disabilities and the Influence of Expert Evidence. Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities, 16(2), 107-114. doi:10.1046/j.1468-3148.2003.00151.x 
Sullivan, P. M. & Knutson, J. F. (2000). Maltreatment and disabilities: A population-based 
epidemiological study. Child Abuse and Neglect, 24, 1257-1273. doi:10.1016/s0145-
2134(00)00190-3 
Swanson, H. L., & Siegel, L. (2001). Learning disabilities as a working memory deficit. Issues in 
Education, 7(1), 1-48.  
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6th Edition). Boston: 
Pearson Education. 
Ternes, M., & Yuille, J. C. (2008). Eyewitness memory and eyewitness identification 
performance in adults with intellectual disabilities. Journal of Applied Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities, 21(6), 519-531. doi:10.1111/j.1468-3148.2008.00425.x 
The British Psychological Society. (2014). Code of Human Research Ethics. Available at: 
https://www.bps.org.uk/news-and-policy/bps-code-human-research-ethics-2nd-
edition-2014 
Thornberry, C., & Olson, K. (2005). The Abuse of Individuals with Developmental Disabilities. 
Developmental Disabilities Bulletin, 33(1-2), 1-19.  
Tuckey, M. R., & Brewer, N. (2003). How schemas affect eyewitness memory over repeated 
retrieval attempts. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17(7), 785-800. doi:10.1002/acp.906 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 
1-25. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic 
memory. Psychological Review, 80(5), 352-373. doi:10.1037/h0020071 
Unsworth, N. (2019). Individual differences in long-term memory. Psychological Bulletin, 
145(1), 79-139. doi:10.1037/bul0000176 
Vicari, S., Brizzolara, D., Carlesimo, G. A., Pezzini, G., & Volterra, V. (1996). Memory Abilities in 
Children with Williams Syndrome. Cortex, 32(3), 503-514. doi:10.1016/S0010-
9452(96)80007-4 
205 
Volpini, L., Melis, M., Petralia, S., & Rosenberg, M. D. (2016). Measuring Children's 
Suggestibility in Forensic Interviews. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 61(1), 104-108. 
doi:10.1111/1556-4029.12987 
Vrij, A., Hope, L., & Fisher, R. P. (2014). Eliciting Reliable Information in Investigative 
Interviews. Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(1), 129-136. 
doi:10.1177/2372732214548592 
Waterhouse, G. F., Ridley, A. M., Bull, R. & Wilcock, R. (in press). A Study Space Analysis for 
Multiple Interviewing of Child Witnesses. Child Abuse Review.  
Waterhouse, G. F. (2016). Investigating the Forensic Interviewing of Children: Multiple 
Interviews and Social Support. (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). London South Bank 
University.   
Waterhouse, G. F., Ridley, A. M., Bull, R., La Rooy, D., & Wilcock, R. (2016). Dynamics of 
repeated interviews with children. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30(5), 713-721. 
doi:10.1002/acp.3246 
Wechsler, D., & Zhou, X. (2011). Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence (2nd ed.). 
Bloomington, MN: Pearson. 
Weisz, J. R. (1990). Cultural-familial mental retardation: A developmental perspective on 
cognitive performance and "helpless" behaviour. In R. M. Hodapp, J. A. Burack, & E. 
Zigler (Eds.).  Issues in the developmental approach to mental retardation. (pp. 137-
168). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press. 
Wells, G., Small, M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R., Fulero, S., & Brimacombe, C. (1998). Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads. Law and 
Human Behavior, 22(6), 603-647. doi:10.1023/A:1025750605807 
Wells, G. L. (1978). Applied eyewitness-testimony research: System variables and estimator 
variables. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(12), 1546-1557. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.36.12.1546 
Wells, G. L., Memon, A., & Penrod, S. D. (2006). Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative 
Value. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 7(2), 45-75. doi:10.1111/j.1529-
1006.2006.00027.x 
206 
Wells, G., & Windschitl, P. (1999). Stimulus Sampling and Social Psychological Experimentation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1115-1125. 
doi:10.1177/01461672992512005 
 
West, R. L., & Stone, K. R. (2013). Age Differences in Eyewitness Memory for a Realistic Event. 
The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, 69(3), 338-347. doi:10.1093/geronb/gbt014 
 
Westcott, H. L., & Jones, D. P. H. (1999). Annotation: The abuse of disabled children. Journal of 
Child Psychology & Psychiatry & Allied Disciplines, 40, 497-506. doi:10.1111/1469-
7610.00468 
Whitley Jr, B. E., & Greenberg, M. S. (1986). The Role of Eyewitness Confidence in Juror 
Perceptions of Credibility. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16(5), 387-409. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1986.tb01148.x 
Wilcock, R., Bull, R., & Milne, B. (2008). Witness identification in criminal cases: psychology and 
practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wilcock, R., & Henry, L. (2013). The Performance of Eyewitnesses with Intellectual Disabilities 
on Photographic Identification Line-ups. International Journal of Disability, 
Development & Education, 60(1), 44-52. doi:10.1080/1034912X.2013.757141 
Wilcock, R. A., Bull, R., & Vrij, A. (2007). Are old witnesses always poorer witnesses? 
Identification accuracy, context reinstatement, own-age bias. Psychology, Crime & 
Law, 13(3), 305-316. doi:10.1080/10683160600822212 
Wilcock, R., & Kneller, W. (2011). A comparison of presentation methods of video 
identification parades. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(6), 835-840. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1754 
Williams, V., Abbott, D., Rodgers, J., Ward, L. and Watson, D. (2007). Money, Rights and Risks - 
A scoping review of financial issues for people with learning disabilities in the UK. 
Dorking, UK: Friends Provident Foundation. 
Wilmer, J. B. (2017). Individual Differences in Face Recognition: A Decade of Discovery. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 26(3), 225-230. doi:10.1177/0963721417710693 
Wilmer, J. B., Germine, L. T., & Nakayama, K. (2014). Face recognition: a model specific ability. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 769. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00769 
207 
Winters, J. J., & Attlee, L. C. (1974). The von Restorff effect and measures of organization in 
normals and retardates. Memory & Cognition, 2(2), 301-305. doi:10.3758/BF03209000 
Wong, C. K., & Read, J. D. (2011). Positive and negative effects of physical context 
reinstatement on eyewitness recall and identification. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
25(1), 2-11. doi:10.1002/acp.1605 
World Health Organisation. (2016). International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10th Revision. Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en. 
Wright, D. B., Memon, A., Skagerberg, E. M., & Gabbert, F. (2009). When Eyewitnesses Talk. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(3), 174-178. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2009.01631.x 
Wright, D. B., & Schwartz, S. L. (2010). Conformity effects in memory for actions. Memory & 
Cognition, 38(8), 1077-1086. doi:10.3758/mc.38.8.1077 
Wyer, N. A., Hollins, T. J., Pahl, S., & Roper, J. (2015). The hows and whys of face memory: level 
of construal influences the recognition of human faces. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 
1524. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01524 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act. (1999).  Available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/23/contents 
Ypsilanti, A., Grouios, G., Alevriadou, A., & Tsapkini, K. (2005). Expressive and receptive 
vocabulary in children with Williams and Down syndromes. Journal of Intellectual 
Disability Research, 49(5), 353-364. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2788.2005.00654.x 
Zajac, R., & Karageorge, A. (2009). The wildcard: A simple technique for improving children’s 
target absent lineup performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 358-368. doi: 
10.1002/acp.1511 
Zhang, H. H., Roberts, K. P., & Teoh, Y. S. (2019). Children's recall and source monitoring of a 
repeated event using a timeline as an interview aid. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
33(2), 176-187. doi:10.1002/acp.3451 
Zhu, Q., Song, Y., Hu, S., Li, X., Tian, M., Zhen, Z., & Liu, J. (2010). Heritability of the specific 





Note:  All written information created for the adults with ID was produced in accordance with 
the advice provided in Mencap’s ‘Make it Clear’ guide to producing easy read information 
(Mencap, 2013).  The font type, size and specific formatting of the documents provided in 
these Appendices does not reflect that used in the actual research study. 
 
Appendix A 
Capacity to Consent Form 
 
 (Based on the Two-Stage Test of Capacity as Defined by the  
Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (2007)) 
 
The two-stage test of capacity 
 
Stage 1 - Does the individual have an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, 
their mind or brain?  
 
Stage 2 - Does the impairment or disturbance mean that the individual is unable to make a 
specific decision when they need to? Can they: 
 
(a) understand information about the decision to be made? 
(b) retain that information in their mind? 
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the decision-making process? 
(d) communicate their decision? 
 
Assessment of Capacity to Provide Informed Consent  




Parent/Carer/Guardian’s name:  
 
Date of assessment: 
 
Outcome of assessment (delete as appropriate):  Individual has capacity to provide 
informed consent / individual does not have the capacity to provide informed consent  
 
Stage 1 Questions (Does the individual have an impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, their mind or brain?) 
Does the individual have an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, their 
mind or brain? 
 
Yes / No (researcher to delete as appropriate) 
 





Stage 2 Questions (Does the impairment or disturbance mean that the individual is unable 
to make a specific decision when they need to?) 
(a) Understanding information about the decision to be made and (b) retaining that 
information in mind 
 








(c) Using or weighing information as part of the decision-making process 
 
What are the good things about taking part in this project? 
 
 
When I say that you have a choice about taking part in this project what does this mean to 
you? 
 











(d) Communicating their decision 
 
Would you like to help me with my project? 
 
Yes / No (researcher to delete as appropriate) 
 
 









Participant Information Sheet (Adults with ID) 
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
I am asking if you would like to help in a special project.  Before you decide if you would like to 
help, you might like to know what the project is about and what you will be asked to do. Please 
read this information carefully. If you do not understand anything you can contact me or if it is 
easier you can speak to the person in charge of your group or club who can contact me. 
 
       Some information about the project 
  I am interested in finding out how good people are at remembering things. I    
  also want to find out how good people are at remembering other people’s    
   faces. 
 
 Why you are being asked to help 
 You are being asked if you would like to help because you are aged between    
  18 and 60 years. 
 
  What you will be asked to do 
  For the project I will need to meet with you 2 or 3 times. I will speak to you     
  about the best days and times to come and visit you at your club or group.  In    
  our first meeting I will show you 2 films on my computer.  They are short films    
  and they will not have anything upsetting in them.   You will also be asked to  
  play some picture and word games and I will ask questions about remembering  
  things. 
 
We will also need to meet again after one week. You will be asked to play some more picture 
and word games. I will also ask you some questions to see how good you are at remembering 
faces. 
 
I might ask you to meet me again to ask you some more questions about remembering things.  
Not everybody will have to do this.  
 
Deciding if you would like to help 
You can choose if you would like to help with the project. If you do not want to help you do not 
have to. If you would like to help you will be given this information sheet to keep. I will ask you 
some easy questions to make sure you understand what the project is about and what I will be 
asking you to do. I will ask you to sign a form to say that you are happy to help me and that you 
understand everything I have told you about the project. 
 
        I would like to record our meetings on my voice and video recorder to make    
        sure that I do not forget what you have told me. I would also like to use these  
      recordings to show some other people in another project.  These people will  
      not be able to tell who you are because I will not use your full name. Showing   
      these other people the recordings of what you tell me is an important part of  
        my project. If you do not want me to show these recordings to other people      
        please tell me. 
 
     At the start of each meeting I will check with you to make sure you are still  
    happy to help me.  If you decide you do not want to help me any more please  
    tell me. This is not a problem and I will not ask you to explain why. 
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The good thing about taking part 
If you decide you would like to help by taking part in the project the good thing is that you might 
find it interesting because you will be able to find out how good you are at remembering lots of 
things including other peoples’ faces. I will not ask you to do anything that you cannot do or do 
not want to do.  
 
 Information you give me 
 All the information you give me will be kept safe.  The papers I write on during  
 our meetings will not have your name on them. People will not be able to tell  
 who you are.  
 
The papers will be kept in a safe place and it will be locked so no-one else will be 
able to see them.  I will only keep the papers for 10 years. After this they will be 
shredded and thrown away in a special bin. 
 
 
Who I am 
My name is Debra Collins and I am a student at the University of Winchester. My teacher, Rachel 
Wilcock is also helping me with the project. 
 
What I will do with the information you give me 
The information you give me will be used in a type of schoolwork. It will be marked by my 
teachers. I might also tell other people about my project.  None of these people will know that 
you have helped me because your name will not be used. 
 
This project has been checked by my teacher. She has made sure that all the things I ask people 
to do in the project are OK for the people doing them. 
 
Questions? 
If you have any questions about the project you can ask me when we meet or you 
can ask the leader of your group or club to speak to me.  You can also ask to speak 
to my teacher, Rachel Wilcock.  All of our email addresses and telephone numbers 
can be found at the end of this sheet. 
 
Address and telephone numbers 







   07773 168262 
 




  rachel.wilcock@winchester.ac.uk 
 
    




Parent/Guardian Information Sheet 
 
Study title - Eyewitness skills of children and adults 
Your son/daughter is being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide whether 
to give consent for your son/daughter to participate, it is important for you to understand why 
the research is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information 
carefully and feel free to contact me if anything is unclear.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
When people witness a crime it is likely that they will be required to give an account of the 
witnessed event and they may even be asked to identify a perpetrator from a line-up. The aim 
of this study is to examine how much adults and children can remember about a witnessed event 
and how accurate they are at identifying a perpetrator from a video identification line-up. 
 
Does my son/daughter have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not your son/daughter takes part.  If you do decide that your 
son/daughter can participate you will be given this information sheet to keep and asked to sign 
a consent form.  
 
It is important to note that the interviewing sessions will be audio and video recorded.  This 
allows for the transcribing and coding of information however, I am also asking for permission 
to allow the videos of your son/daughter to be used in a separate ‘mock juror’ study, which 
involves showing adults of jury eligible age a random sample of the video-taped evidence from 
participants to gauge their opinions of its’ accuracy and reliability.  The mock juror study is an 
essential part of the research however, if you would prefer for your son/daughter’s video not to 
be used for this purpose please indicate this on the Consent Form. The mock jurors will not be 
able to identify your son/daughter from the video as their full name will not be disclosed and 
any identifying logos (e.g. school/club badges on uniforms) will be distorted. 
 
What does the study involve? 
The study will consist of up to 3 sessions split over a period of 3 weeks. The researcher will 
arrange to visit your son/daughter at their school/club/centre.  In the first session your 
son/daughter will be asked to confirm they are happy to participate by signing a simply worded 
consent form.  They will be shown 2 short films, containing no violent or aggressive material, 
followed by two tests (one provides a measure of memory and the other an estimate of their 
verbal/non-verbal cognitive abilities). They will then be asked some questions about the films 
(please can I ask that you do not tell your son/daughter that they will be questioned about the 
films as this would not happen in a real-life investigation).  In the second session, a week later, 
your son/daughter will undertake a test of verbal ability, followed by an interview about their 
memory.  Your son/daughter may be selected to undertake a third session (involving a repeat 
interview), which will take place two weeks after viewing the films.   
 
 
What are the possible benefits and disadvantages of taking part? 
By taking part in this study your son/daughter will be making an invaluable contribution to a 
piece of psychological research.  The study’s results could help inform professionals within the 
Criminal Justice System about eyewitness memory in adults and children, as well as aid the 
development of effective strategies to improve the witness skills of these groups. Taking part in 





Will my son/daughter’s taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about your son/daughter during the research will be kept 
strictly confidential.  Your son/daughter will be assigned a number and therefore will not be 
identifiable from their data.  All information matching their number to their identity will be 
stored in a separate, password-secured file which can only be accessed by myself and my 
Director of Studies, Dr Rachel Wilcock.  Electronic data files and paperwork will be stored (in a 
locked file) for a minimum of 10 years after the study has been completed, before being 
destroyed.   
 
Who is organising the research and what happens to the results? 
The research is being organised by Debra Collins (who is DBS checked), a PhD Student at The 
University of Winchester. It is being supervised by Dr Rachel Wilcock (Director of Studies), Dr 
Wendy Kneller and Dr Genevieve Waterhouse, also of The University of Winchester. The results 
will be used in an assessed PhD.  They may also be submitted for publication in an academic 
journal and may be presented at conferences.  No individual data will be presented or reported.   
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Winchester Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Contacts for further information 
If you would like further information about this study, you can either contact me (Debra Collins), 


























Adult Consent Form 
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
Please draw a circle around yes or no 
 
Are you happy to take part in the project?   Yes  No  
 
Do you understand what you are being asked to do?  Yes  No 
 
Do you understand that it is OK to stop at any time?  Yes  No 
 
Are you happy to have the meetings recorded on a  
voice recorder?       Yes  No 
 
Are you happy to have the meetings recorded on a  
video recorder?       Yes  No 
 
Are you happy for the recordings to be used in  
another project?      Yes  No 
 
Do you understand that all of the information you give me  
will be kept safe and that other people will not be able to  
tell who you are?      Yes  No 
 
To show that you are happy to take part in the project please write your name on the line below: 
 
 Your name: ______________________________________ 
 
 Date of Birth: _____ / _____ / _____ 
 
 Researcher’s name: ______________________________________ 
 
 Researcher’s signature: ___________________________________ 
 













Parent/Guardian Consent Form  
 
Study title: Eyewitness skills of children and adults 
 
By signing below, I agree that: 
 
• I have read the attached information sheet and retained a copy for my records. 
 
• I understand the nature and purpose of the research that my son/daughter will be 
required to undertake. 
 
• I am aware that my son/daughter has the right to withdraw from the research at 
any time, without giving a reason for withdrawing. 
 
• I understand that the data my son/daughter provides will be treated confidentially 
and, if presented (e.g. in a journal paper or at an academic conference), personal 
details which would allow my son/daughter to be identified will be removed. 
 
• I have been given contact details for the researcher, their Supervisor and the Chair 
of the University’s Ethics Research Committee so that I can discuss the research in 
further detail if required. 
 
• I give consent for my son/daughter to participate in the research. 
 
• I give consent for the sessions to be audio recorded. 
 
• I give consent for the sessions to be video recorded* 
 
• I give consent for the video recordings to be used in a later mock juror study* 
 
* If you would prefer for your son/daughter’s sessions not to be video recorded or used in a later 
mock juror study, please indicate by deleting the relevant statements. 
 
 
 Parent/Guardian’s name (Please print): _______________________ 
 
 Parent/Guardian’s signature: _______________________________ 
 
 Son/daughter’s name: ____________________________________ 
  
 Son/daughter’s date of birth: _______________________________ 
 
 Researcher’s name: ______________________________________ 
 
 Researcher’s signature: ______________________________ 
  









Adult Debriefing Sheet 
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
Thank you for helping me with my project. You did really well and were a very big help. 
 
What the project was about 
I wanted to find out how much you could remember about the two films I showed you because 
I am interested in finding out how much information people can remember about something 
they have seen.   
 
When I have finished my project I hope to be able to help people remember more. 
 
Questions 
Are there any questions you would like to ask me about the project?  If you cannot think of any 
questions now but then you think of some when you go away, you can always ask the person in 






















Witness Interview Protocols 
 
Brief Statement Taking Interview 
 
“Tell me what you remember about the films you just saw?” 
 
A number of follow up questions to be asked depending upon what was said in response to the 
above question. Possible follow up questions are: 
    
















Where did it happen? 
 
 





Detailed Witness Interview  
 
Greet (Phase 1)  
Greet participant and thank him/her for coming. 
Ask participant if they are happy to go ahead with the research and to give their consent for 
the interview to be recorded 
 
Rapport (Phase 2) 
Ask interviewee some questions about themselves and offer information about myself …when 
it is clear that they are fairly relaxed move to phase 3 
 
Truth or lie exercise (Phase 3) 
“I'm going to tell you something now - can you listen very carefully and tell me whether 
what I say is true or a lie?” 
 
One of the following examples is then used:  
“That is a television (when it is a computer)”. 
 
Explain the purpose of the interview (Phase 4) 
“What I would like to do now is to ask you about the FIRST/SECOND FILM you saw a few 
days ago, the one that was INSIDE/OUTSIDE. I want you to listen carefully and tell me the 
truth. Are you happy to do that?” 
“Remember that I have not seen the film so I do not know what happened” 
 
Free recall (Phase 5 – Recall attempt 1) 
“Tell me in as much detail as you can, everything you remember about the first/second film, 
the one that was inside/outside. Remember, that it is important that you never guess or 
make anything up. If you can’t remember or don’t know please just say so.” 
When participant has finished pause for 10 seconds before commencing the questioning 
phase. 
 
Questioning (Phase 6 – Recall attempt 2) 
“Based on the things you have just told me I would like to ask you some questions” 
 
Closure (Phase 7) 
“OK, is there anything else you wish to add or change” 
 
 “Now what I would like to do now is to ask you about the FIRST/SECOND FILM you saw a 
few days ago, the one that was INSIDE/OUTSIDE. I want you to listen carefully and tell me 
the truth. Are you happy to do that?” 
“Remember that I have not seen the film so I do not know what happened” 
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Free recall (Phase 5 – Recall attempt 1) 
“Tell me in as much detail as you can, everything you remember about the first/second film, 
the one that was inside/outside. Remember, that it is important that you never guess or 
make anything up. If you can’t remember or don’t know please just say so.” 
When participant has finished pause for 10 seconds before commencing the questioning 
phase. 
 
Questioning (Phase 6 – Recall attempt 2) 
“Based on the things you have just told me I would like to ask you some questions” 
 
Closure (Phase 7) 
“Just before we finish is there anything else you wish to add or change” 
“Do you have any questions?” 







































Child Information Sheet  
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
Why you are being asked to help? 
I am asking if you would like to help with a special project. I am interested in 
finding out how good people are at remembering things as well as how good 
they are at remembering other people’s faces. You are being asked if you 
would like to help because you are aged between 6 and 12 years. These are 
the ages of the children I need for my project. 
 
Do you have to help? 
You can choose if you would like to help with the project.  If you would like to help you will be 
given this information sheet to keep. You will be asked to sign a form to make sure you 
understand what you are being asked to do.  
 
I would like to record our meetings on my voice and video recorder to make 
sure that I do not forget what you have told me. I would also like to use 
these recordings to show to some other people for another project I am 
doing. At the start of each meeting I will check with you to make sure you 
are still happy to help me.  If you decide you do not want to help me 
anymore that is not a problem and I will not ask you to tell me why. 
  
What will you be asked to do? 
I will need to meet with you 3 or 4 times. In the first meeting I will show you 2 films on my 
computer.  They are not very long films and they will not have anything upsetting or horrible in 
them.   You will also be asked to play some picture and word games and I will ask questions 
about remembering things. 
 
We will then need to meet again after one week. You will be asked to play some more picture 
and word games. I will also ask you some questions to see how good you are at remembering 
faces. I might ask you to meet me again to ask you some more questions about remembering 
things.  Not everybody will have to do this.  
 
After some time I will ask to meet with you one more time. In this meeting we will talk to another 
person using my computer. Again, they will ask you questions about remembering things. 
 
What happens to the information you give me? 
All the information you give me will be kept safe.  The papers I write on 
during our meetings will not have your name on them. People will not be 
able to tell who you are. The papers will be kept in a safe place and it will 
be locked so no-one else will be able to see them.  
 
The project has been checked by my teacher and a special group of people 
to make sure that everyone who helps me will be able to do everything I am asking them to do. 
 
What if you have further questions? 
If you have any questions about the project you can ask me when we meet or you can ask your 
parents/guardian to contact me.  You can also speak to my teacher, Rachel Wilcock. 
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Telephone: 07773 168262 
 















































Child Consent Form  
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
 
Please draw a circle around yes or no 
 
Are you happy to take part in the project?    Yes  No  
 
 
Do you understand what you are being asked to do?   Yes  No 
 
 
Do you understand that it is OK to stop at any time?   Yes  No 
 
 
Are you happy to have the meetings recorded on a voice recorder? Yes  No 
 
 
Are you happy to have the meetings recorded on a video recorder? Yes  No 
 
 
Are you happy for the recordings to be used in another project?  Yes  No 
 
 
Do you understand that all of the information you give me will be  
kept safe and that other people will not be able to tell who you are? Yes  No 
 
 
To show that you are happy to take part in the project please write your name on the line below: 
 
  
Your name: ___________________________________________ 
  
Researcher’s name: ______________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s signature: ___________________________________ 
  
















Child Debriefing Sheet 
 
Project title: How good people are at remembering things 
 
 
Thank you for helping me with my project. You did really well and were a very big help. 
 
What the project was about 
I wanted to find out how much you could remember about the two films I showed you because 
I am interested in finding out how much information people can remember about something 
they have seen.   
 
When I have finished my project I hope to be able to help people remember more. 
 
Questions  
Are there any questions you would like to ask me about the project?  If you cannot think of any 
questions now but then you think of some when you go away, you can always ask your 































Film A - Identification Line-up Matrix 
 
                
      Film A – Perpetrator 
 
             
        
 
             
 
 
Film A - Innocent suspect for  
perpetrator absent line-up 
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Film B Identification Line-up Matrix 
 
                           
      Film B – Perpetrator 
 
            
                                               




Film A - Innocent suspect for  





Bivariate correlations between the cognitive measures for the adults with ID and TD children 
 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 






 Adults with ID (N = 40)  TD Children (N = 40) 
 















































Note: There were two versions of the mock juror credibility questionnaire: one in which no 
information about the witness was provided and another (as per the questionnaire below) in 






Participant No (UPI): ________________ 




Study Title: Mock Juror Perceptions of Adult Eyewitnesses 
 
To take part in this research study, you must be eligible for jury service in the UK. To be eligible 
for jury service, you must meet the criteria listed in the box below. 
  
Eligibility for jury service: 
You could be selected to serve on a jury in the UK if you: 
• Are aged between 18 and 75 years old; 
• Are registered on your local government’s electoral register; 
• Have lived in the UK, the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man for the last five years since 
you were 13 years old. 
 
You are disqualified from jury service if:  
• You lack the mental capacity to do so. Mental capacity is the ability to make a decision 
for yourself. People who cannot do this are said to ‘lack capacity’ under the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. This must be due to an impairment of or disturbance in the 
functioning of the mind or brain which may be due to illness, injury, learning disability, 
or mental health problems.  
• To have capacity a person must be able to:  
o Understand the information that is relevant to the decision they want to 
make.  
o Retain the information long enough to be able to make the decision.  
o Weigh up the information available to make the decision.  
o Communicate the decision by any means.  
You are disqualified from jury service if you are currently on bail in criminal proceedings. You 
are also disqualified if: 
• you have ever been sentenced to imprisonment for five years or more 
• If you have been imprisoned at all in the last 10 years  
 
Do you meet the criteria for serving on a jury (please circle)? 
 
Yes    *No 
 
*If you have answered ‘No’ to the above question, please advise the researcher as you will 
be unable to participate in the study 
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Some questions about yourself … 
How old are you? (please specify in the space provided) 
_____ years old 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male   
 Female 
 Prefer not to say 
 Other (please specify):  __________________________ 
 
What is your ethnicity? (please tick the relevant box) 
 White British 
 White Irish 
 Any other White background 
 
 Asian or Asian British 
 Asian Indian 
 Asian Pakistani 
 Asian Bangladeshi 
 Any other Asian background 
 
 
 Black or Black British 
 Black Carribean 
 Black African 
 Any other Black background 
 
 
 Mixed White and Black Carribean 
 Mixed White and Black African 
 Mixed White and Asian 
 Any other Mixed background 
 
 Chinese  





Have you ever served on a real jury? (please circle) 
 
Yes    No 
 
 












PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CAREFULLY 
 
You will now be shown a video of an adult witness being interviewed about a ‘mock’ hate crime 
they have seen (the witness has actually seen and been interviewed about two separate ‘mock’ 
hate crime events, but you will only be shown one interview about one of the events). 
 
As part of the interviewing process, a truth and lies exercise was undertaken and it was 
ascertained that the witness demonstrated a clear appreciation of the distinction between these 
two terms.   
 
The adult witness you are about to see in the video may have a learning disability. 
 
Definition of ‘learning disability’: 
A learning disability is a reduced intellectual ability and difficulty with everyday activities, which 
affects someone for their whole life. 
 
People with a learning disability are likely to take longer to learn. They may also need support to 

































After watching the video please answer the following questions  
regarding the witness: 
 
1) Please circle the number that you feel best represents your perception of how 
accurate the witness’s account was 
Not at all 
accurate 
     Extremely 
accurate 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how convincing the witness was 
in their account 
Not at all 
convincing 
     Extremely 
convincing 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how confident the witness 
appeared in what they said in their account  
Not at all 
confident 
     Extremely 
confident 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how competent the witness 
appeared in their account 
Not at all 
competent 
     Extremely 
competent 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
5) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how honest the witness 
appeared  
Not at all 
honest 
     Extremely 
honest 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
6) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how believable the witness 
appeared 
Not at all 
believable 
     Extremely 
believable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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7) Please circle the number that you feel best represents how complete the witness’s 
account appeared 
Not at all 
complete 
     Very 
complete 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
8) Please circle the number that you feel best represents the witness’s overall level of 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 




to testify  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
10)   Please circle the number that you feel best represents how good this individual  
  was as a witness OVERALL  
Not at all 
credible 
     Extremely 
credible 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
11)   Based on the video-taped evidence from this witness, do you think they have a 
  learning disability (please circle)? 
 
   Yes      No 
12)   Please circle the number that you feel best represents how much knowledge and    








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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OPTIONAL: If you wish, please let the researcher know how you think the witness’s credibility 

















































Study title: Mock Juror’s Perceptions of Adult Eyewitnesses 
 
 
By signing below, I agree that: 
 
 
• I have read the attached Information Sheet and retained a copy for my records 
 
• I understand the nature and purpose of the research that I am required to undertake 
 
• I am aware that my participation is voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw 
from the research (within two weeks of participating– see the Information Sheet for 
further details) 
 
• I understand that the data I provide will be treated confidentially and, if presented 
(e.g. in a journal paper, at an academic conference or during teaching), no individual 
data will be reported 
 
• I have been given contact details for the researcher, their Director of Studies 
(Supervisor) and the Chair of the University’s Ethics Research Committee so that I 
can discuss the research in further detail if required. 
 
 
To be completed by the Participant 
 
Participant’s name (Please print): ___________________________ 
 
Participant’s signature: ___________________________________ 
  
Participant’s date of birth: _____ / _____ / _____ 
 
*Participant’s Unique Personal Identifier (see below):  ______________________ 
 
(*The Unique Personal Identifier should be created by using the first letter of your mother's first 
name, the third letter of your surname, the month of your birth (in numbers) and your house 
number – if you do not have a house number use ‘00’) 
 
To be completed by the Researcher 
 
Researcher’s name: ______________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s signature: ___________________________________ 
 














Study title - Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of Adult Eyewitnesses 
 
Thank you for taking part in the study.  
 
Aim of the study 
The main aim of the study is to find out more about how mock jurors perceive eyewitness 
evidence from adult eyewitnesses with learning disabilities. Of particular interest is the 
perceived credibility and accuracy of eyewitness evidence from this group. Conducting this 
research will not only help to increase our understanding of jurors’ perceptions of this group as 




Are there any questions you would like to ask me about the study?  If you cannot think of any 
questions now but think of some at a later date, please feel free to contact me. 
 
 
 
